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Abstract
This dissertation examines the characteristics and performance of non-traditional investment
motives, with a secondary focus on small-employment subsidiaries. It also investigates how
firms re-evaluate and change their organizational control after an industry-wide consumer
confidence crisis.
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) examines the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according
to different investment purposes, with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment
motives. The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include the size of an affiliate, the
ownership mode, expatriate control, and performance. It finds that FDI with a support
function differs substantially from a typical manufacturing facility. Meanwhile, there is a
huge difference among sub-categories of major investment motives.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. The
main theoretical/conceptual lenses are the liability of smallness and orchestration theory.
Using a large sample of Japanese FDI, we found that small subsidiaries have a higher exit
rate than large ones. Further, this relationship is moderated by four factors: (1) serving as a
center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capital-intensive industry;
and (4) being located in a developed country.
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide consumer confidence
crisis. This study draws on the theoretical lens of transaction cost economics (TCE) and
institutional theory. This study finds that Japanese MNEs in the crisis sector undertook more
entries, especially in the service segment. MNEs also undertook fewer exits in the crisis
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Due to demand uncertainty induced by the
crisis, MNEs lowered their ownership level to reduce their exposure to risk in the crisis
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Moreover, majority owners were more
likely to increase organizational control, compared with minority owners. Majority owners
were also more likely to exit, compared with WOS or minority owners.
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On the whole, this dissertation challenges our existing view of a “typical” subsidiary in a
“typical” investment setting. It also reemphasizes the centrality of investment motives to firm
internationalization research and recommends a routine inclusion of investment motives in
IB research.

Keywords
Investment motives, size, mode, organization control, expatriate control, performance,
survival, liability of smallness, orchestration theory, TCE, environmental uncertainty,
demand uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty, legitimacy, reputation.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This dissertation examines the characteristics and performance of non-traditional investment
motives, with a secondary focus on small-employment subsidiaries. It also investigates how
firms re-evaluate and change their organizational control after an industry-wide consumer
confidence crisis.
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) examines the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according
to different investment purposes, with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment
motives. The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include the size of an affiliate, the
ownership mode, expatriate control, and performance. It finds that FDI with a support
function differs substantially from a typical manufacturing facility. Meanwhile, there is a
huge difference among sub-categories of major investment motives.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. The
main theoretical/conceptual lenses are the liability of smallness and orchestration theory.
Using a large sample of Japanese FDI, we found that small subsidiaries have a higher exit
rate than large ones. Further, this relationship is moderated by four factors: (1) serving as a
center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capital-intensive industry;
and (4) being located in a developed country.
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide consumer confidence
crisis. This study draws on the theoretical lens of transaction cost economics (TCE) and
institutional theory. This study finds that Japanese MNEs in the crisis sector undertook more
entries, especially in the service segment. MNEs also undertook fewer exits in the crisis
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Due to demand uncertainty induced by the
crisis, MNEs lowered their ownership level to reduce their exposure to risk in the crisis
sector, especially in the manufacturing segment. Moreover, majority owners were more
likely to increase organizational control, compared with minority owners. Majority owners
were also more likely to exit, compared with WOS or minority owners.
On the whole, this dissertation challenges our existing view of a “typical” subsidiary in a
“typical” investment setting. It also reemphasizes the centrality of investment motives to firm
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internationalization research and recommends a routine inclusion of investment motives in
IB research.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have different investment motives for their foreign
direct investment (FDI) (Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). For example, one
MNE may invest in Africa to access minerals and natural resources, while another MNE
may invest in the United States to gain access to the local market, e.g., Toyota’s
manufacturing investments in six U.S. states. After an MNE has gained some experience
in FDI, it may opt to reconfigure its existing subsidiaries. This might occur by shifting
manufacturing subsidiaries to developing countries while opening new R&D centers in
developed countries. Recently, MNEs from emerging markets (EMNEs) have acquired
technologically advanced firms for the purpose of strategic asset seeking, i.e., to augment
their long-term competitive advantage (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng,
2007; Luo & Tung, 2018; Meyer, 2015; Narula, 2012). The abovementioned firms are
typically engaged in FDI for the purposes of resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency
seeking, or strategic asset seeking, which are the four major investment motives in
Dunning’s original typology.
Hennart and Slangen (2015: 117) urged scholars “to start paying more attention to actual
choices that were theoretically suboptimal, that is, choices deviating from a model’s
theoretical prediction… especially their evolution over time vis-à-vis theoretically
optimal choices.” This dissertation is a direct response to this call, as it examines the
characteristics and performance of non-traditional investment motives and smallemployment subsidiaries. It also examines how firms changed their organizational
arrangement after an industry-wide consumer confidence crisis.
This dissertation systematically examines the role of investment motives in firm
internationalization. The first two essays investigate the characteristics and performance
of FDI according to different investment purposes, with particular attention given to nontraditional investment motives such as management-supportive investment (i.e.,
controlling business in the area), trade-supportive investment (i.e., information gathering
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and royalty collection), and finance-supportive investment (i.e., financing and currency
hedging). The Toyo Keizai dataset (TK dataset), which covers Japanese overseas
investment from 1991 to 2017, is used for our empirical analysis. In total, subsidiaries
with the abovementioned non-traditional investment motives represent about 15% of all
subsidiaries. In the TK dataset, 61,695 subsidiary-year observations (8,642 subsidiaries)
belong to the category of non-traditional motives and these subsidiary-year observations
report an average annual revenue of US$50 million. Collectively, these represent
approximately US$3 trillion of investment.
Following the theme of non-traditional FDI, the third essay investigates MNEs’ responses
to an industry-wide crisis setting. The crisis management literature on FDI has focused on
the determinants of survival or exit and has largely neglected those MNEs that continue
to operate during a crisis. For exceptions, see Chung & Beamish, 2005; Chung, Lee,
Beamish, Southam, & Nam, 2013; Zhou, Park, & Zhou, 2014. This study addresses the
gap by theoretically drawing on transaction cost economics (TCE) and institutional
theory (i.e., legitimacy and reputation) to systematically investigate the repertoire of
strategies that MNEs can deploy during a crisis. It shows that there are even investment
opportunities for MNEs to explore during an industry wide consumer confidence crisis,
which constitutes the non-traditional element in this study.
This chapter proceeds by introducing the motivation of the dissertation, providing an
overview of three integrated essays, and suggesting intended contributions to the FDI
literature.

1.1 Motivation for Essays 1 and 2 of the Dissertation
Most previous studies on investment motives have covered the four major motivations,
i.e., market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking
(Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, subsidiaries are heterogeneous
due to their differences in investment motives (Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, & Smeets,
2010). Because of the different strategic roles undertaken by subsidiaries, they have
corresponding structural forms that affect their level of autonomy and performance
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(Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995). As MNEs orchestrate the global process of value
creation and capture, they tend to adopt a “portfolio of entry modalities” (Pitelis & Teece,
2018: 535). In fact, due to structural, financial, and legal reasons, there are many types of
subsidiaries that differ from the image of a typical subsidiary as a standalone
manufacturing facility. For example, there are sometimes very large subsidiaries in terms
of sales, but with few or no employees. Hence, there are sound theoretical and empirical
reasons to investigate those subsidiaries established for non-traditional investment
motives.
Indeed, other investment motives do exist in Dunning’s (1993) original typology, such as
in the case of escape, passive, and support investments. The latter include managementsupportive investments, trade-supportive investments, and finance-supportive
investments (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2012). Non-traditional motives have been
traditionally regarded as secondary and have received much less attention from scholars
in their studies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015). Nonetheless, a few non-traditional
investment motives have received at least some scrutiny. For example, there have been
studies about (i) regional management centers (e.g., Ambos, Schlegelmilch, Ambos, &
Brenner 2009; Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; Lasserre, 1996; Schotter,
Stallkamp, & Pinkham, 2017; Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016) and (ii) escape investment
(e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Barnard & Luiz, 2018; Boisot & Meyer,
2008; Fathallah, Branzei, & Schaan, 2018; Kobrak, Oesterle, & Röber, 2018; Li, Xia,
Shapiro, & Lin, 2018; Shi, Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017; Weng & Peng, 2018; Witt & Lewin,
2007). The main theoretical lens for studying escape investment is institutional arbitrage,
i.e., to escape weak institutions in the home country for a better institutional environment
in the host country (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Witt &
Lewin, 2007). Escape investment is not examined in this thesis. The main theoretical lens
for regional management centers is the integration–responsiveness framework (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1989; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016). Partial overlap
exists between regional management centers and subsidiaries with managementsupportive functions, which are examined in this thesis.
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The focus of this thesis is on support investments, including management-supportive
investments, trade-supportive investments, and finance-supportive investments.
Subsidiaries established for these purposes are not self-contained profit centers. They
incur costs, but the benefits accrue to the MNE as a whole (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).
For example, management-supportive investments include those regional and branch
offices that act as intermediaries between head offices and foreign subsidiaries.
Subsidiaries with trade-supportive functions usually facilitate the import and export of
goods and services. They also provide marketing and public-relations services for their
parent companies, such as information gathering and royalty collection, which is the first
step in setting up a market- or resource-seeking affiliate.
Finance-supportive investments provide financing and currency-hedging services to the
MNE. Special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) are one type of financing investment. They are
“essentially robot firms that have no employees, make no substantive economic
decisions, have no physical location, cannot go bankrupt” (Gorton & Souleles, 2007:
550). SPVs are set up for the purpose of accessing low-cost financing, avoiding tax, and
taking debt off the balance sheet for the parent firm (PwC, 2011). They are passive in
business decision making and have no employees. Yet these SPVs serve important
functions in the MNE global network. However, investment with finance-supportive
functions has been routinely excluded from FDI studies (e.g., Blevins, Moschieri,
Pinkham, & Ragozzino, 2016; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008).
Why has it been so difficult to empirically investigate non-traditional investment
motivations? There are two primary reasons. The first is that many existing studies on
investment motives have used aggregate-level data, e.g., at the country level (Brouthers,
Gao, & McNicol, 2008) or industry level (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005), as a proxy for the
four major investment motives. For example, Brouthers et al. (2008) used country-level
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data. Market-seeking
FDI was calculated using the average multilateral FDI flows in the industries of
wholesaling, retailing, transportation, storage, communications, real estate, and financial
services, while FDI in the industries of textiles, machinery and equipment manufacturing,
and clothing was treated as labor-seeking FDI. Nachum and Zaheer (2005) used industry-
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level data under the assumption that the industry averages equate to a “representative”
firm in the industry. In their study, local market-seeking efforts were measured using the
cost of sales of affiliates as a share of total costs. However, it is difficult to find proxies
for non-traditional motivations using aggregate-level data. The second reason it has been
so difficult to empirically investigate non-traditional investment motivations is that for
datasets like the TK dataset where detailed information on subsidiary motives is
available, researchers have realized that small subsidiaries with fewer than 20 employees
are qualitatively different from typical manufacturing facilities (Beamish & Inkpen,
1998). As a result, subsidiaries with fewer than 20 employees have routinely been
excluded from analysis.

1.1.1

Motivation for Studying Small-Employment Subsidiaries

Because none of the 160+ publications from Ivey faculty and Ph.D. candidates and
graduates based on the TK dataset1 have focused on small-employment subsidiaries, we
conducted a preliminary analysis of Japanese FDI with small-scale employment. An
empirical analysis of the TK dataset (1991–2017 version) shows that there were 557,179
subsidiary-year observations (56,193 subsidiaries), among which 406,282 observations
(44,220 subsidiaries) reported information on the number of employees. Among them,
150,823 subsidiary-year observations (37% of all subsidiary-year observations, involving
24,466 subsidiaries) had fewer than 20 employees and 22,261 subsidiary-year
observations (5.5% of all subsidiary-year observations, involving 5,790 subsidiaries) had
zero employees. For example, (1) Toshiba Capital Asia was one such Japanese affiliate
with 19 employees, yet it reported revenue of a whopping US$71.4 billion in 2013. It was
a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) of its Japanese parent firm, Toshiba, and its main
business was loans and credit cards. (2) Kumagai Australia Finance Ltd was another
Japanese affiliate that was 100% owned by the Japanese parent firm. It also operated in
the loan/credit card sector, had three employees, and reported revenue of US$15 billion

1 P. W. Beamish, “Japanese Foreign Direct Investment Article Abstracts,” Ivey, 2019, accessed June 17,

2019, https://www.ivey.uwo.ca/internationalbusiness/research/ivey-international-research-bythemegeography/japanese-foreign-direct-investment-article-abstracts.
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in 1992. (3) Visualant was a U.S. high-tech company that sold proprietary technology
solutions for identification, authentication, and diagnosis. The company, whose Japanese
parent owned 10.5%, had 10 employees and reported revenue of US$9.1 billion in 2015.
(4) KG International Petroleum was a wholesale company with eight employees and it
generated US$7.8 billion in 1998. (5) Marubeni Motor Service was another Japanese
affiliate that operated in the loan/credit card sector. It had four employees and reported
revenue of US$6.9 billion in 1999. In sum, these five affiliates had a total of 44
employees, yet reported revenue of US$110.2 billion.
There were also affiliates that reported zero employees. Here, a similar pattern existed.
(1) Valepar S.A. was a Japanese affiliate with a turnover of US$48.3 billion in 2013 and
its main business was financial services for mining. Japan’s Mitsui owned 18.2% of the
shares. (2) Toyota Motor North America, an investment/management company, reported
revenue of US$27.5 billion in 1998. It was an affiliate with no employees, and was a
100% owned subsidiary of Toyota. (3) Dia Chemical Taiwan was a 100% owned
Japanese subsidiary in the chemical wholesale industry and reported revenue of US$23
billion in 2010. (4) Itochu Petroleum (a WOS) reported revenue of US$15.2 billion in
2009, and was another Japanese affiliate in the wholesale trade sector. (5) Mitsui Oil
Hong Kong was a 100% owned Japanese affiliate in the oil wholesale industry, and
reported revenue of US$11.6 billion in 2012. In sum, all these affiliates reported zero
employees, but were able to generate billions of dollars in revenue. Such unusual yet
financially significant practices among MNE subsidiaries warrant further study.

1.2 Motivation for Essay 3 of the Dissertation
Essay 3 is motivated by empirical observations of an industry-wide consumer confidence
crisis in the Chinese food industry in 2008. The melamine-contaminated baby formula
scandal in 2008 was the major event that made Chinese consumers think twice before
purchasing domestically produced food products. Besides melamine-contaminated milk
products, there were also media reports about banned cooking oil (Wu & Chen, 2013)
and pork contaminated with chemicals. In a survey conducted by the Chinese government
in 2012, 41% of respondents reported that food safety was a “serious problem.” Food
safety concerns, along with inequality and corruption, represented three top governance
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concerns of the Chinese population (Yasuda, 2015). The baby formula crisis offers a
natural experimental setting to study crisis responses by MNEs.
Meanwhile, there is a research gap in the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer,
Short, & Coombs, 2016) as it relates to international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo,
2010; Zhao, Park, & Zhou, 2014). When facing potential risks or economic crises, MNEs
adopt a “fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and FDI has
focused on the “flight” scenario and has investigated the determinants of survival (e.g.,
Chung & Beamish, 2015; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013, 2017). There are only a few
exceptions that examine how MNEs “fight” or adjust their operations to survive the crisis
(e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 2013; Naidoo, 2010; Zhao, Park, & Zhou,
2014). This study addresses this research gap by investigating the repertoire of strategies
that MNEs can deploy in a crisis.
In addition, previous crisis management research in international business has mostly
focused on regional or country-level crises (e.g. Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, &
Beamish, 2013, 2017) or MNE-firm-level crises (e.g. Zhao, Park, & Zhou, 2014). This
study adds to the literature by focusing on an industry-level crisis.

1.3 Dissertation Overview
Essays 1 and 2 of this dissertation systematically examine the role of investment motives
on firm internationalization. They do so via two integrated essays, with a focus on nontraditional investment motives and small-employment subsidiaries. Following the theme
of non-traditional FDI, Essay 3 examines MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide crisis.
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) emphasizes the centrality of investment motives in international
business (IB) studies by proposing a theoretical framework for the antecedents and
consequences of investment motives (see Figure A). It integrates a) the theoretical
argument that an MNE’s ownership advantages (O-advantages) interact with the location
advantages (L-advantages) of host and home countries to jointly determine the type of
investment motive(s) of an affiliate (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012;
Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011) and b) a theoretical framework of the effects of
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investment motives on subsidiary-level characteristics and performance (Benito, 2015).
To achieve that goal, four hypotheses were developed. Unlike the existing literature on
the OLI paradigm which uses the umbrella term of country specific advantages (CSAs),
we differentiate between host country specific advantages (host CSAs) and home country
specific advantages (home CSAs).
Figure A: Theoretical framework for understanding investment motives

Note: The primary source of the left circle is Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula (2015); Narula (2012); and Meyer et al. (2011); the primary
source of the right circle is Benito (2015).

The data analysis looks at the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according
to different investment purposes (Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017;
Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 2004), with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment
motives. Although there exist different classification typologies of investment purposes
(e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Behrman, 1972; Hollander, 1970; Hymer,
1976; Kacker, 1985; Porter, 1986; Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), as a
baseline, we adopt the typology proposed by Dunning (1993). In addition to the four
main investment motives (Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), this essay pays
special attention to two other categories of investment purposes: support investments and
passive investments. Essay 1 addresses two research questions: (1) What are the
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determinants of investment motives? (2) How do subsidiaries with different investment
purposes differ in their characteristics and performance?
The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include subsidiary-level characteristics such
as the size of the affiliate (measured by the number of local employees), the ownership
mode (wholly owned subsidiary, majority-owned subsidiary, equally owned subsidiary,
and minority-owned subsidiary), expatriate control (expatriate number, expatriate
percentage), and performance (measured by both revenue and subjective evaluation).
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. It
addresses two research questions: (1) What is the main relationship between subsidiary
size and survival? (2) How is the main effect moderated by the special roles of smallemployment subsidiaries? Examples of such roles include those serving as centers of
importance and vertical investment.
The main theoretical lens is the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986) and
orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). The main statistical model is the Cox
proportional hazards model. Using a sample of Japanese overseas FDI, we found that
smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit rate than larger ones. Further, we also found that
the liability of smallness is conditional upon the following four factors: (1) serving as a
center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capital-intensive
industry; and (4) being located in a developed country.
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines MNEs’ responses to the food safety crisis in China in
2008. It addresses the following four research questions: (1) Does the crisis trigger more
foreign entries in the crisis sector? (2) Does the crisis trigger fewer foreign exits in the
crisis sector? (3) What is the impact of demand uncertainty on MNEs’ subsidiary control
in the crisis sector? (4) What is the effect of MNEs’ equity position (i.e., WOS, majority
equity, minority equity) on subsidiary control in the crisis sector? The main theoretical
lens is TCE (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982) and institutional theory
(i.e., legitimacy and reputation) (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Rao, 1994).
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Using a large sample of Japanese MNEs in China with 79,528 subsidiary-year
observations, our results show that the crisis triggered more foreign entries in the crisis
sector, especially in the service segment. Meanwhile, the crisis also triggered fewer
foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing segment. With regard to existing
operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce their exposure to risk.
Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS, majority, and minority) were
under varying levels of partner opportunism and reputational risk. As a result, majority
owners were more likely to increase their ownership level to ensure quality control than
minority owners. Majority owners were also more likely to disassociate from the
reputational risk through divestment, compared with WOS and minority owners.

1.4 Contributions
This dissertation hopes to make various contributions to the literature by reemphasizing
the centrality of investment motives to IB research and focusing on non-traditional FDI,
including non-traditional investment motives, small-employment subsidiaries, and
industry-level crises. Taken together, this dissertation challenges our existing view of a
“typical” subsidiary in a “typical” FDI setting.
Essay 1 reemphasizes the centrality of investment purposes to research on firm
internationalization (Benito, 2015; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). It is the first empirical
attempt to systematically test Dunning’s (1993) typology on investment motives, using
the largest sample ever employed to date. Dunning’s original typology offered definitions
and examples for each type of investment motive. This study suggests that Dunning’s
typology does have predictive power for key characteristics (such as size, ownership
control, and expatriate control) and performance outcomes. It extends Dunning’s
typology by offering theoretical explanations to account for differences among FDI with
divergent investment purposes. It also makes an empirical contribution by including all
categories specified in Dunning’s (1993) typology, whereas most previous empirical
studies examined only one or two investment purposes per study, sometimes in a
piecemeal fashion.
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Second, this study provides a nuanced picture of FDI in functions such as “financing and
hedging,” “information gathering and royalty revenue,” and “building new business,”
which have been neglected in most empirical analyses of investment motives (CuervoCazurra & Narula, 2015). These investment motives are not only important in a strategic
sense, but also in investment dollars. FDI with these motives is substantially different
from other types of FDI and collectively exemplifies the central theme of this
dissertation—that there is huge heterogeneity (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2008) among
subsidiaries. Hence, there is a need to disaggregate data and treat investments with
different investment motives separately. We also argue that where data is available,
investment motives should be routinely included in an IB analysis looking at foreign
investment.
Third, our results show that there is a huge difference among subcategories of major
investment motives. For example, under the big umbrella of “market-seeking” FDI, there
are four subcategories—that is, “local market access,” “tax breaks for investment,”
“alliances with customers in Japan,” and “building new business.” The latter three
subcategories are substantially different from the first subcategory in all four of the
characteristics and performance measures tested in the present research. This suggests
that future IB studies should consider investment motives at the subcategory level.
Essay 2 makes at least two contributions to the literature. First, we quantify the liability
of smallness by exploring the survival likelihood of small-employment subsidiaries.
Second, we identify four contingency factors that enhance the survival chances of smallemployment subsidiaries. These are the special roles of i) centers of importance, (ii)
vertical investment, (iii) being in a human-capital-intensive industry, and (iv) being
located in a developed country.
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it contributes
to TCE and extends the theoretical argument about external uncertainty, especially
demand uncertainty. Consistent with prior research on entry-mode choice (i.e., IJVs or
WOSs) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish, 2014) and post-entry-mode
conversion (i.e., conversion from IJVs to WOSs) (e.g., Puck et al., 2009), it suggests that
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MNEs reduced their equity control to cope with environmental uncertainty. It goes
beyond prior research by extending the argument about external uncertainty and
organizational control in a post-entry crisis empirical setting.
In addition, we examined the relationship between behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner
opportunism) and organizational control by introducing the concepts of reputational risk
and MNEs’ equity position. The results show that compared with WOS and minority
owners, majority owners are at high levels of both operational and reputational risk. As a
result, majority owners will either choose to a) increase their ownership level to exert
more organizational control in order to ensure product quality or b) disassociate
themselves from the IJV through divestment in order to avoid reputational damage to
their global brand and operation. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates
the strategic options of MNEs of different equity positions in coping with partner
opportunism.
Second, our study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in entry and exit
decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth,
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are
more likely to enter and less likely to exit a market in an industry where local producers
are facing a crisis.
Third, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, &
Coombs, 2016) as it relates to international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010;
Zhao et al., 2014). When facing a political or economic crisis, many MNEs assume a
“fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and FDI has focused on
the “flight” scenario and has explored the determinants of survival (e.g., Chung &
Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013, 2017). There have been
few examples of how MNEs “fight” or adapt their operations to survive a crisis (e.g.,
Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 2010; Naidoo, 2010; Zhao et al., 2014). Our
research adds to the second line of literature by showing that MNEs have a repertoire of

13

strategies of entering, exiting, lowering or increasing their ownership level, or simply
remaining unchanged, which depends on their equity position and industry segment.
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Chapter 2

2

The Characteristics and Performance of Foreign Direct
Investment According to Investment Motives

This chapter describes the characteristics and performance of FDI according to
investment motives. Such a focus was driven by both theoretical and empirical reasons.
At the theoretical level, investment motives are key to the understanding of MNE activity
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Mesquita, 2016; Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). Dunning and
Lundan (2008) argued that “any theory of the MNE critically depends on the presumed
motivation and intention of the enterprise involved” (p. 81). Investment motives are
systematically associated with the central aspects of internationalization, because they
help to identify location choices and evaluate performance outcomes (Benito, 2015).
When an MNE with adequate capital in hand is contemplating internationalization, it may
have multiple location choices in mind. If its investment motive is to seek raw material
resources, it may choose resource-rich locations such as Africa. If the same company
intends to seek market access, it may choose locations with high population density and
potential for market growth.
Moreover, the evaluation of performance outcome is contingent upon investment motives
(Benito, 2015; Meyer, 2015; Verbeke & Brugman, 2009; Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009;
Verbeke & Forootan, 2012). For example, a natural-resource-seeking subsidiary may be a
cost center, which makes it irrelevant to judge its performance on profitability. In
strategic-asset-seeking FDI, the improved capability of the parent firm, such as R&D
output, is a better performance evaluation criterion than the short-term profitability of the
focal subsidiary.
However, the investment motives behind the internationalization of the firm have been
largely assumed or taken for granted in IB literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un,
2015). Most theories assume a market-seeking motive for firm internationalization
(Benito, 2015). Take the incremental internationalization process model, or “the Uppsala
school” (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), as an example. The implicit assumption is that firms
seek market access in the host country. Yet the sequential entry model is more applicable
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to market-seeking behavior, but less applicable to strategic-asset-seeking FDI (Benito,
2015; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Thus, internationalization theories may be incomplete
unless they take into consideration all major types of investment motives.
At the empirical level, most research on firm internationalization has extensively studied
the “who” (firm-specific advantages, or FSAs), “where” (location), “how”
(internalization; sequential entry; incremental commitment; diversification), and “so
what” (performance) parts of firm internationalization. However, little attention has been
paid to the “why” or motivations behind a firm’s strategic decision to internationalize
(Benito, 2015; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Although the centrality of investment motives
in firm internationalization makes it relevant to study their direct or moderating effect
(Benito, 2015), the role and nature of investment motives have only been “sporadically
considered” in empirical research (Beamish & Lutpon, 2016).
This chapter attempts to fill this research gap by systematically examining affiliate-level
characteristics and performance according to investment motives. It uses the Kaigai
Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Japanese Overseas Investment) dataset (Toyo Keizai, 2017) for
subsidiary-level information. The TK dataset has 557,179 subsidiary-year observations
(56,193 subsidiaries) and 194,171 observations reported with up to eight investment
purposes.
We intend to make three contributions. First, there are investment motivations that have
received little or no attention in the vast majority of empirical IB studies, such as
“financing and currency hedging” (J), “information gathering and royalty revenue” (K),
and “building new business” (M). These investment motives are important not only in a
strategic sense, but also in terms of investment dollars. For example, investments in
“financing and currency hedging” (J) reported an annual revenue2 of US$62 million per
subsidiary and collective annual revenue of US$126 billion. Second, investments with the
purpose of “local market access” (F) accounted for about half of all investment (48.32%).

2 Unless otherwise specified, revenue refers to average annual revenue.
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Under the general large category of “market access,” there are other subcategories as
well, such as “tax breaks for investment” (C), “alliances with Japanese customers” (I),
and “building new business” (M). These subcategories have different characteristics
compared with the subcategory of “local market access.” For example, those with the
investment purpose of “local market access” reported average annual revenue of US$59
million, but the average annual revenue recorded by other subcategories was much lower:
US$28 million for “tax breaks for investment,” US$26 million for “alliances with
customers in Japan,” and US$10 million for “building new business.” Third, investments
of various investment purposes have very different characteristics, as will be explained
below. Some particular types of investment such as “financing and currency hedging”
and “information collection and royalty revenue” represent particular types of
investments that are different from a standard subsidiary. Hence, it is misleading and
inappropriate to aggregate data from all various investment purposes, as occurs in most
IB research. Thus, we suggest that scholars should disaggregate analyses according to
investment purposes and conduct more fine-grained analysis.
This chapter starts with a review of the literature on the characteristics and performance
of FDI according to investment motives. Then a theoretical framework for the
antecedents and consequences of investment motives is proposed, which integrates two
existing theoretical paradigms in the literature. In total, four hypotheses are developed.
Of these, so far, Hypotheses 3 and 4 have been tested and are discussed in this essay. This
is followed by discussion of the data source and preliminary data analysis, then
presentation of results and discussion.

2.1 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature on the conceptual typology and empirical measurement
of investment motives, and the effect of investment motives on subsidiary characteristics
and performance. This literature review limited the scope of research to leading
international business, management, and strategy journals. We identified eight core IB
journals: Global Strategy Journal (GSJ), International Business Review (IBR),
International Journal of Management Reviews (IJMR), Journal of International Business
Studies (JIBS), Journal of International Management (JIM), Journal of World Business
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(JWB), Multinational Business Review (MBR), and Management International Review
(MIR) (Kim & Aguilera, 2016). We also searched 15 leading management/strategy
journals: Academy of Management Annals (AMA), Academy of Management Journal
(AMJ), Academy of Management Perspectives (AMP), Academy of Management Review
(AMR), Asia Pacific Journal of Management (APJM), British Journal of Management
(BJM), European Journal of Management (EJM), Harvard Business Review (HBV),
Journal of Management (JOM), Journal of Management Studies (JMS), Long Range
Planning (LRP), Management and Organization Review (MOR), Organization Studies
(OS), Organization Science (OS), and Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) (Kim &
Aguilera, 2016). The time window of the analysis was the 30 years from January 1988 to
January 2018.
The following keywords were used to search for relevant articles published in the
abovementioned journals: (1) “investment motive(s)”; (2) “investment purpose(s)”; (3)
“investment motivation(s)”; (4) “seeking” AND “foreign investment”; (5) “seeker” AND
“foreign investment”; (6) “types of FDI(s)”; and (7) “kinds of FDI(s).”
After all the relevant articles had been identified, these articles were categorized
according to the following three topics: (1) the theoretical development of the typology of
investment motives of FDI; (2) the empirical measurement of the theoretical construct of
investment motives; and (3) the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according
to investment motives.

2.1.1

Theoretical Construct of Investment Motives

This section traces the historical development of the concept of “investment motive,” its
main typologies, the multiplicity of investment motives, and how investment motives
change over time.

2.1.1.1

Main Typology of Investment Motives

MNEs internationalize for various reasons and scholars have proposed different
classifications of motives (see Table 1). Building on the efforts of early work on
investment motives, Dunning (1993) offered the most comprehensive typology on
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investment motives. It considers four major investment motives (i.e., resource seeking,
market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking) and three minor ones
(i.e., support investment, escape investment, and passive investment). Later scholars
added different dimensions to the typology, such as industry competitive pressure
(Nachum & Zaheer, 2005), the host- and home-country conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra,
Narula, & Un, 2015), the geopolitical influence of the home country (Moghaddam et al.,
2014), and instant reaction to opportunities (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018). A suggested
direction for future research is to add a time dimension to the typology, i.e., to
differentiate investments for current revenue generation and cost cutting and those
intended for future revenue generation (such as building new business and strategic asset
seeking).
Table 1: Main typologies of investment motives
Dunning
(1993)
Market seeking

Nachum &
Zaheer (2005)
Market seeking;
export seeking

Resource
seeking

Efficiency
seeking

Efficiency
seeking

Strategic asset
seeking
Support
investment
Escape
investment
Passive
investment

Knowledge
seeking

Luo & Tung
(2007, 2018)

Cuervo-Cazurra
et al. (2015)
Sell more

Asset seeking

Buy better

Buy better and sell
more

Asset seeking

Upgrade

Moghaddam et
al. (2014)
End customer
market seeking
Natural resource
seeking;
efficiency
seeking
Global value
chain
consolidation
seeking
Knowledge
seeking

Buy better and sell
more
Escape
Buy better and sell
more
Competitive
strategic
motivation

Opportunity
seeking

Geopolitical
influence
seeking

Hollander (1970) argued that the main driver for internationalization is for the pursuit of
sales and he classified investment motives into commercial, non-commercial, and
inadvertent. Hymer (1976) took a holistic approach to the value chain and proposed that
MNEs internationalize for the purpose of either vertical integration or horizontal
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expansion. Porter (1986) built on the idea of the value chain and classified FDI into two
categories: upstream (raw materials) and downstream (distribution). In addition to the
focus on the value chain, Kacker (1985) introduced the concept of external market forces
and identified the pull factor of the host market (market growth) and the push factor of
the home market (market saturation) for MNE internationalization. Dunning (1993)
proposed the best-known classification of investment motives, which covers both the
internal drive of the MNE (e.g., competence exploiting and competence augmentation)
and the external factors of the host and home markets.
Building on Behrman’s (1972) early taxonomy on motives behind FDI, Dunning (1993)
proposed four main types of investment motives. (1) Natural resource seekers are
interested in gaining access to physical resources and cheap labor. (2) Market seekers are
motivated to protect their existing markets or explore new markets, especially when the
host government imposes tariffs on imported products, e.g., a market seeker relocates its
domestic production facility to a foreign location. Market seekers are also motivated to
adapt their products to local needs, to have a tradeoff between transportation and
production costs, and to follow the strategic moves of their customers and competitors in
a foreign location. (3) Efficiency seekers appear at a later stage of firm
internationalization when the MNE reconfigures its existing affiliate network to gain
economies of scale and scope, and hence efficiency. Although the first three types of FDI
are interested in exploiting an MNE’s existing competitive advantage, (4) the fourth type
aims at exploring or augmenting an MNE’s firm-specific advantages by gaining access to
technology, brands, a distribution network, managerial capability, and so on (Dunning,
1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008).
In addition to the four main types of investment motives, Dunning (1993) also identified
another three types of secondary investment motives: (1) escape investments, (2) support
investments, and (3) passive investments. Escape investments are triggered by “restrictive
legislation or macro-organizational policies by home governments” (Dunning & Lundan,
2008: 74). For example, some U.S. MNEs in the biotechnology industry relocate their
stem cell research to Europe, as it is not allowed in the United States. In empirical
analysis, the push factors for outward FDI also include the high cost of conducting
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domestic business compared to cross-national business (Boisot & Meyer, 2008).
Meanwhile, institutional rigidity and inflexibilities are positively associated with outward
FDI (OFDI) in developed countries (Witt & Lewin, 2007). Support investment covers
trade-supportive investment (e.g., sales offices), finance- supportive investment (e.g.,
financial and hedging affiliates), and management-supportive investment (e.g., regional
headquarters) (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015).
Passive investment refers to those investments where the parent firm has “faith in the
existing organisation and management of the company and is undertaken to earn profits
or to gain capital appreciation” without “injecting new resources, management skills and
institutional forms into the company” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 75). Most studies treat
equity ownership level between 10% and 25% as portfolio investment (Dunning &
Lundan, 2008). According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1999),
20% was most commonly used as the cut-off. Here, the parent firm would not be deemed
able to exert “significant influence” over its international joint venture (IJV) subsidiary if
the equity level was below 20%. Based in part on this approach, Dhanaraj and Beamish
(2004) rejected the common practice in IB research of treating equity investment between
5% and 95% as IJVs. They investigated the relationship between foreign equity
ownership level and subsidiary mortality and found that investments with less than 20%
equity ownership had very high mortality rates and those with more than 80% equity
ownership had a mortality rate similar to that of a wholly owned subsidiary. Their study
provided empirical support for FASB’s standard of using 20% as the cut-off point.
Dunning’s typology has been critiqued on the grounds that it fails to consider external
factors (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015) or differentiate
between MNEs from developed countries and emerging markets (Moghaddam, Sethi,
Weber, & Wu, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008; Ramamuti,
2012). Recent developments on the typology of investment motives retained Dunning’s
original emphasis on MNEs’ internal drive to expand, while adding external factors such
as competitive pressure in the industry (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005) and host- and homecountry effects (Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015). Nachum and Zaheer (2005)
classified investment motives into six categories, including market seeking, resource
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seeking, export export seeking,3, efficiency seeking, knowledge seeking, and competitive
strategic motivation. The first five categories can be found in Dunning’s (1993) original
typology, while the last one constitutes an MNE’s oligopolistic reaction to industry
competitors. Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, and Un (2015) combined Dunning’s (1993)
concept of firm competence exploitation and augmentation with behavioral searches
(Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947) for better host-country conditions and avoidance of
poor home-country conditions. They divided investment motives into four categories: (1)
sell more; (2) buy better; (3) upgrade; and (4) escape. “Sell more” refers to MNEs
exploiting existing firm capabilities and better host-country conditions, which is similar
to market seeking in Dunning’s (1993) typology. “Buy better” refers to an MNE’s access
to better inputs for production, which exploits existing firm capabilities and resources
while escaping poor home-country conditions. It is similar to natural resource seeking in
Dunning’s (1993) typology. “Upgrade” refers to augmentation of a firm’s capabilities
that can be accessed in host countries, which is similar to strategic asset seeking in
Dunning’s (1993) typology. “Escape” refers to the exploration of better conditions in the
host country, while avoiding the constraints imposed by the home country, which is
similar to “escape investment” in Dunning’s (1993) typology. Although efficiencyseeking, trade-supportive, finance-supportive, and passive investments are qualitatively
different, they are all included under the category of “buy better” and “sell more” in
Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, and Un’s (2015) typology.
Moreover, efforts have been made to include the additional investment motives of
EMNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007; Moghaddam, Sethi, Weber, & Wu, 2014). Luo and Tung
(2007) collapsed the investment motives of EMNEs into two categories: (1) asset seeking
and (2) opportunity seeking. Asset seeking covers resource seeking and strategic asset
seeking. Opportunity seeking includes market seeking and focal EMNEs’ timely reaction
to trade and investment polices by host and home countries. The latter form of investment

3 “Export seeking” is defined as “locating production overseas in order to serve third country market and

lower production and transportation cost” (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005: 750). It is one subtype of market
seeking in Dunning’s typology.
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motive is not path-dependent, or evolutionary (Luo & Tung, 2007), which is different
from MNEs from developed countries. Moghaddam, Sethi, Weber, and Wu (2014)
modified Dunning’s original typology of investment motives and proposed a new
typology from the theoretical lens of the value chain: (1) end-customer market seeking;
(2) natural resource seeking; (3) knowledge seeking; (4) efficiency seeking; (5) global
value chain consolidation seeking; and (6) geopolitical influence seeking. A closer
examination shows that end-customer-market seeking is similar to market seeking in
Dunning’s typology. Natural resource seeking and efficiency seeking (low-cost labor
seeking) are similar to resource seeking. Knowledge seeking is similar to strategic asset
seeking. Global value chain consolidation seeking is similar to efficiency seeking. The
only newly proposed type is geopolitical influence seeking, which explains FDI behavior
of an MNE from an emerging economy following the home government’s political
agenda. For example, SOEs from emerging economies may have both political and social
motivations, in addition to profit maximization, when they seek outward FDI (CuervoCazzura, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014).

2.1.1.2

Multiplicity of Investment Motives

MNEs have mixed or multiple motives in their FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015;
Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Getachew & Beamish, 2017). For example, an EMNE may
invest in an advanced economy due to both market-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking
motives (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012).
Drawing on Birkinshaw and Hood’s (1998) study on subsidiary heterogeneity and the
possibility that a subsidiary has diverse investment purposes, Getachew and Beamish
(2017) extended the concept of diversification from the MNE corporate level (i.e.,
product diversification) to the subsidiary level (i.e., investment purpose diversity), which
is conducive to the learning and adaptation of a subsidiary in an adverse institutional
environment. Investment purpose diversity also helps a subsidiary to reallocate resources
and maintain flexibility, and hence survival.
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2.1.1.3

Evolving Investment Motives

In addition to multiplicity, investment motives also evolve or change over time.
Secondary motives may gain prominence over time (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015).
Qian and Delios (2008) empirically tested the idea of the changing motivation for FDI of
Japanese banks that followed their clients in international expansion. They argued that as
firms gained more experience in the host country, their propensity for following their
clients would decrease as these firms accumulated more host-country experience. The
rationale was that firms were likely to gain local market experience and change their
motive from following their clients to local market seeking. However, the empirical
results did not support their argument. They found that, as firms accumulate more
experience in their host society, they are more likely to follow their clients in the host
country to set up branch offices or subsidiaries. A three-way interaction was not included
in the paper to test the hypothesis of changing motivations.

2.1.2

Empirical Measurement of Investment Motives

Previous research on investment purposes has used aggregate data to measure investment
purposes, at the country level (Brouthers et al., 2008), industry level (Nachum & Zaheer,
2005), and, on a few occasions, at the firm level or subsidiary level (Chakravarty, Hsieh,
Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Makino, Beamish, & Zhao,
2004).
Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol (2008) used country-level data in the Foreign Direct
Investment Database collected by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development in their analysis. FDI motives were measured by industries. For example,
industries such as wholesaling, retailing, transportation, storage, communications, real
estate, and financial services were grouped under market-seeking FDI. Nachum and
Zaheer (2005) used industry-level FDI data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis to measure investment motivations. For example, market seeking was
operationalized by “the cost of sales of affiliates as a share of total costs” and resource
seeking was measured by “local purchases by affiliates as a share of total costs.” When
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aggregate data is used, it violates the assumption of “multidimensionality and
heterogeneity of MNE activity” (Doz & Prahalad, 1991).
Makino, Lau, and Yeh (2002), using survey data collected from MNEs in Taiwan, made
the first effort to measure investment purposes at the subsidiary level. Drawing on
Dunning (1993), they divided investment motives into three categories, i.e., market
seeking, resource (labor) seeking, and strategic asset seeking. Respondents were asked to
identify reasons for their FDI. Dummy variables were created for each motive (“1” when
a respondent indicated the motive and “0” otherwise). Another study that measured
investment motives at the subsidiary level was conducted by Makino, Chan, Isobe, and
Beamish (2007). They used the Trend Survey of Overseas Business Activities by the
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is an annual survey conducted
on Japanese foreign affiliates across the world. The original dataset listed seven
investment objectives for a subsidiary, including “the procurement of raw and natural
resources, access to low-cost inputs, following customers, market expansion, the transfer
of dividends and earned loyalty, hedging against exchange rate risk, and research and
development” (p. 1121). These seven objectives were classified into four categories in the
final analysis: resource/labor seeking, market seeking, capital seeking, and strategic asset
seeking.
Although information on investment motives has been included in subsequent surveys,4
the most comprehensive listings of subsidiary-level investment purposes are those studies
using the TK dataset (Chakravarty et al., 2017; Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Makino et
al., 2004), which classified investment motives into 16 categories, specifically (1) access
to natural resources, (2) access to a labor force, (3) invitation from the local government,
(4) establishment of a production network, (5) establishment of a distribution network,
(6) access to a local market, (7) import to a third-country, (8) import back to Japan, (9)
follow the customers/the affiliated company; (10) hedging against exchange rate risks,

4 Section 2.1.3 covers previous research on investment motives, where survey data on investment motives

have been collected.
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(11) information collection, (12) product development and planning, (13) entry into new
business, (14) regional HQ, (15) measures again trade frictions, and (16) others. Makino
et al. (2004) used the original coding in the dataset in their analysis of investment
purposes and location choices, while Chakravarty et al. (2017) followed Dunning’s
(1993) classification of investment motives and divided investment purposes into five
categories based on the original coding, including market seeking, resource seeking,
efficiency seeking, strategic asset seeking, and capital seeking. Getachew and Beamish
(2017) went a step further to generate a new variable for investment purpose diversity.

2.1.3

Previous Research on Investment Motives

Subsidiaries (or FDI projects) are heterogeneous due to their differences in investment
motives (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). A key theme of this dissertation is that they have
different characteristics (such as mode choice, expatriation policy, location choice, etc.)
and performance (such as financial and non-financial performance, termination, etc.).
They have access to different resources and are under varying levels of pressure both
within their MNE network and in their interaction with host countries.
With different investment motives, subsidiaries differ in their entry-mode choices (Cui &
Jiang, 2009; Pan, 2017; Yu, Lee, & Han, 2015), staffing and expatriate policy (Paik &
Ando, 2011), location choice (Galan, Gonzalez-Benito, & Zuniga-Vincente, 2007;
Goerzen, Asmussen, & Nielsen, 2013; Lei & Chen, 2011; Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002;
Makino et al., 2004), performance (Hansen & Gwozdz, 2015; Luo & Bu, 2017; Yang,
Yang, & Doyle, 2013), and termination (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Makino et al.,
2007). This section covers the following five topics: (1) entry-mode choice; (2) staffing
and expatriate policy; (3) location choice; (4) performance; and (5) termination. While all
these topics have been previously covered in the literature, special attention is paid to
how they differ according to investment motives.

2.1.3.1

Entry-Mode Choices

The literature on investment motives and entry-mode choices has covered market-seeking
behavior (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997; Gil, Nakos, Brouthers, & Brouthers, 2006; Yu et al.,
2015), resource-seeking behavior (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015), following-the-client
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behavior (Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Gil et al., 2006), and strategic-asset-seeking behavior
(Cui & Jiang, 2009). Moreover, the institutional environment of host countries has been
used as a moderator in some analyses (Yu et al., 2016; Pan, 2017). In our review, entrymode choice is limited to the decision of establishing a WOS or an IJV.
First, the relationship between the investment motive of market seeking and entry-mode
choice is not conclusive in the existing literature. One school of thought draws from the
transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007) and argues
that MNEs try to protect their own firm-specific assets or advantages such as proprietary
technology and brands. Thus, they would prefer WOSs over IJVs due to concerns of
possible opportunistic behavior by JV partners, especially leakage of know-how
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Another school argues that MNEs would prefer IJVs over
WOSs in order to have access to a local partner’s complementary assets (Beamish &
Banks, 1987) or to provide an incentive to a local partner through shared ownership (Yu
et al., 2015).
Empirical results have found evidence for all three options, i.e., preference for WOSs,
preference or IJVs, or no preference. Drawing from the survey results of 108 informants
from Fortune 500 firms, Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) found that market-seeking intention
had no effect on the choice between a WOS or an IJV. One critique of this research is
that the location of their FDI was not disclosed in the study. Gil et al. (2006) found that
MNEs prefer to establish a WOS affiliate when pursuing a market-seeking strategy in
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries when there are few local partners in their
industry. However, in a recent study by Yu et al. (2015), it was found that market-seeking
MNEs prefer to establish an IJV in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and
Malaysia because MNEs rely on local partners to establish local distribution channels.
The effect was even stronger in host societies with better market governance or more
favorable institutional environments as measured by political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, the control of corruption, etc. One
possible explanation is that MNEs are less worried about the local partner’s opportunistic
behavior in a favorable host institutional environment and are willing to provide more of
an incentive to a local partner to exert efforts in seeking customers.
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Second, MNEs engaged in resource-seeking FDI are likely to adopt an IJV as an entry
mode over a WOS (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015). Although resource-seeking FDI is
usually vertically integrated, MNEs engaged in resource-seeking FDI export their output
to other affiliates within their MNE network, which requires more coordination among
different affiliates and tighter control of the focal subsidiary (Kim & Hwang, 1992).
Following this logic, a WOS would be preferred over an IJV in resource-seeking FDI.
However, empirical research results show the opposite, in the context of both CEE
countries and Southeast Asian countries (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015). Because these
host countries have less developed market governance structures, MNEs prefer to use an
IJV in order to provide incentives to local partners to navigate the local business
environment and find the right suppliers and resources (Yu et al., 2015). Moreover, under
more favorable host-country institutional environments, MNEs’ preference for an IJV
over a WOS is weakened because the relative importance of local partners is diminished
and there is less need to provide an incentive to local partners.
In addition to resource-seeking FDI, following the client is another category that has been
studied. Many service firms have expanded internationally to provide service to their
existing customers, which is qualitatively different from manufacturing FDI seeking local
market access (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). From a survey of 175 U.S. service firms
undertaking international expansion, Erramilli and Rao (1990) found that subsidiaries
with the investment purpose of following the client preferred to have a higher ownership
level in their affiliates compared with market-seeking subsidiaries, because local
knowledge was not highly valued in following-the-client FDI.
Finally, as EMNEs are engaged in FDI for the purpose of strategic asset seeking, they
usually prefer a WOS over an IJV (Cui & Jiang, 2009) because strategic assets such as
technology, brands, and distribution channels cannot be fully accessed through an IJV
(Rui & Yip, 2008). From a survey of 138 Chinese firms, Cui and Jiang (2009) found that
firms with a strategic-asset-seeking motivation were 2.66 times more likely to use a WOS
as the entry mode compared with firms that were not strategic asset seeking.
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In sum, most existing research on the relationship between investment motives and entrymode choice (including ownership level) covers market-seeking, resource-seeking,
following-the-client, and strategic-asset-seeking FDI. Little is known about the mode of
choice for FDI with such investment motives as efficiency seeking and those with
support functions.

2.1.3.2

Staffing and Expatriate Policy

Expatriates have two primary functions: control and knowledge management (Delios &
Bjorkman, 2000). In addition, expatriates also fulfill the role of being an ambassador, i.e.,
managing multiple stakeholders at home and in host societies (Peng & Meyer, 2016).
First, when there is a strong need for the MNE headquarters to control its subsidiaries,
MNEs will send expats to the affiliate to align the operations. Meanwhile, if there is a
greater risk involved in the operations of subsidiaries, MNEs will send more expats as
well. For example, when there is a greater institutional distance between the host and
home countries, the need for control is stronger in an unfamiliar environment. As a result,
more expats will be sent to subsidiaries (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007). Second, expats
also fulfill the role of knowledge transfer, i.e., they transfer knowledge and practices
from the MNE headquarters to the affiliate. For example, in the service industry, when
close contact with end customers and high levels of professional skills are needed, expats
are preferred over local staff (Bouquet, Hebert, & Delios, 2004). When an MNE is
engaged in strategic-asset-seeking or knowledge-seeking FDI, expatriates are sent to
subsidiaries for reverse knowledge transfer (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000). Third, in
addition to the roles played by expats, the availability of experienced expats and
remuneration policies for expats also have an impact on expat policy (Widmier,
Brouthers, & Beamish, 2008). For example, MNEs with more global FDI experience are
staffed with more experienced expats and are more likely to send expats abroad than less
experienced MNEs. However, as an MNE gains more host-country experience, its need
for expats diminishes, as local managers make good business sense and the increased
input from local managers improves profitability (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998).
With regard to the relationship between investment purpose and expat policy, only one
study (Paik & Ando, 2011) has been identified that investigated this relationship. They
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analyzed a cross-sectional TK dataset in 2008 to investigate the relationship between
investment motives and the use of expats as measured by the ratio of expats to local
employees. The investment motives were classified into two categories: (1) global
integration and (2) local market seeking. If affiliates are self-contained profit centers,
their objectives might differ from those of MNEs (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). It was
hypothesized that affiliates with a global integration mandate would be more likely to use
expats because expats were sent to strictly follow the orders of the headquarters so as to
align the interests of the headquarters and the affiliates. Nonetheless, it was affiliates with
a global integration motive that had a lower proportion of expats. One possible
explanation is that these were mature MNEs with a lot of international experience and
they had trained local managers who were as good as expats in interest alignment. The
proportion of expats in foreign affiliates was even lower when the parent MNEs
accumulated more international experience. The rationale was that as MNEs had more
experience in international operations, they would have more experience in international
coordination and rely less on expats to carry out global integration.
However, in local-market-seeking affiliates, MNEs tend to staff less with expats, as local
managers have more knowledge of the local market and have better access to local
resources compared with expats. That line of logic gained empirical support by Paik and
Ando. As an MNE accumulates more experience in the host country, it will be even less
likely to send expats to the affiliates as they gain more confidence in monitoring the
behavior of local managers, and in handling the internal and external uncertainty in the
local environment.
Paik and Ando (2011) contribute to our understanding of the impact of investment
purposes on expatriate staffing policies. Nonetheless, their research has several
limitations. First, it collapsed investment purposes into two categories: global integration
and local market seeking. In fact, there are other motives for affiliates. Second, only
cross-sectional data in 2008 was used in their analysis, which helps to explain their
contradictory finding versus the original hypothesis. A larger dataset with a longer
timeframe might be able to alleviate this problem.
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2.1.3.3

Location Choice

Location is a key decision for an MNE to make when contemplating international
expansion. There is a huge literature on location choice in international business (e.g.,
Beugelsdijk & Mudambi, 2013; Dunning, 1998). This section is limited to the literature
and empirical studies that directly link investment motives and location choice. The
investment motives of an MNE have a direct impact on its location choice. Most existing
literature linking investment motives and location choice has treated location choice as a
dichotomous variable, e.g., developed countries versus less developed countries (Makino
et al., 2002; Makino et al., 2004), European Union versus Latin America (Galan et al.,
2007), developed regions versus less developed regions, e.g., China versus Vietnam, and
East China versus South China (Lei & Chen, 2011). The main theoretical lens is asset
exploitation and asset seeking. Asset-exploitating FDI is defined as “the transfer of a
firm’s proprietary assets across borders,” while asset-seeking FDI is defined as “a means
to acquire strategic assets (i.e., technology, marketing and management expertise)
available in a host country” (Makino et al., 2002: 404).
In empirical research, strategic-asset-seeking FDI is classified as asset seeking, while
market-seeking FDI is classified as asset exploitation. First, as strategic assets are more
likely to be located in developed countries or regions, asset-seeking FDI is more likely to
be located in developed countries than in less developed countries. Empirical results
show consistent support (Lei & Chen, 2011; Makino et al., 2002; Makino et al., 2004;
Galan et al., 2007). Second, resource-seeking FDI is mainly interested in acquiring
resources such as labor and natural resources in a host country at a lower real cost than
the cost in the home country (Dunning, 1993). As it is easier to obtain low-cost resources
in less developed countries than in developed countries, it was hypothesized that
resource-seeking FDI is more likely to be found in less developed countries than in
developed countries (e.g., Makino et al., 2002; Makino et al., 2004; Galan et al., 2007).
However, empirical analysis showed conflicting results. The hypothesis was supported in
the context of Taiwanese and Japanese MNEs’ overseas investment (e.g., Makino et al.,
2002; Makino et al., 2004), but was negatively related to Spanish MNEs’ investment in
Latin America versus the European Union (Galan et al., 2007). One possible explanation
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is that Latin American countries had poor transportation infrastructure despite richness in
natural resources. As a result, Spanish MNEs had to incur a high cost for transportation
and logistics expenses, which offset the cost savings in natural resources. Another
commonly used asset-exploitation motive is market seeking. It was argued that developed
countries have a higher market potential than less developed countries. As a result,
market-seeking FDI is more likely to be located in developed countries than less
developed countries (Makino et al., 2002). This line of reasoning has had mixed
empirical results. Makino et al. (2004) found that market-seeking motivation was the
highest ranked motivation in both developed (66.8%) and less developed countries
(62.6%). One possible explanation for the popularity of market-seeking FDI in both
developed and less developed countries is that MNEs can use a differentiation strategy in
developed countries and use a cost-reduction strategy in less developed ones (Makino et
al., 2002). Nonetheless, Galan et al. (2007) found that market seeking was irrelevant in
Spanish MNEs’ choice of the European Union over Latin America.
Another location decision is global cities versus non-global cities (Goerzen, Asmussen, &
Nielsen, 2013). Global cities are characterized by “a high degree of interconnectedness to
local and global markets; a cosmopolitan environment; and high levels of advanced
producer services” (Goerzen et al., 2013: 430). An MNE’s decision to locate a subsidiary
in a global city versus a non-global city has been analyzed through the theoretical lens of
“competence-exploiting” versus “competence-creating” (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005,
2011). “Competence-exploiting” units are “demand driven with a focus on market
servicing,” while “competence-creating” units are “supply driven with a focus on
enhancing production and research and development competencies” (Goerzen et al.,
2013: 433). According to this definition, market-seeking FDI is classified as competenceexploiting, while strategic asset seeking, resource seeking, and efficiency seeking are
classified as competence-creating. It was hypothesized that market-seeking FDI is more
likely to be located in global cities because there is a liability-of-foreignness-reducing
effect of global cities due to their cosmopolitan culture. Meanwhile, MNEs are more
likely to locate production and R&D facilities in non-global cities than global cities due
to the cost of place and concern over technology spillover to competitors. Using a cross-
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sectional TK dataset in 2001, this hypothesis received empirical support (Goerzen et al.,
2013).
Moreover, investment motives have been used as moderators in at least two locationchoice studies (e.g., Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2018; Schotter & Beamish, 2013). Jiang
et al. (2018) found that horizontal investment motives (such as market-seeking FDI) have
a negative moderating effect on repeated entry in a host country due to internal
competition and a possible cannibalization effect, while vertical investment motives
(such as resource-seeking FDI) have a positive moderating effect because these
subsidiaries provide complementary assets to each other. Schotter and Beamish (2013)
analyzed how a manager’s personal perception of a country, i.e., the hassle factor, leads
to location shunning in an MNE’s decision making. They found that the hassle factor
negatively moderates the relationship between a country’s FDI potential and an MNE’s
FDI intensity. However, the moderated relationship is weaker if the investment motive is
natural resource seeking, as natural resources are location-immobile.

2.1.3.4

Performance

Performance is a multidimensional measure that covers both subjective and objective
measures including accounting data, financial market reaction, reputation or perception of
growth, sales, profitability, survival, etc. (Richard et al., 2009). The performance
outcome for FDI is contingent upon its investment motivations (Benito, 2015; Verbeke &
Brugman, 2009; Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009; Verbeke & Forootan, 2012). Parent
MNEs will assign different roles to affiliates, and resource transfer between the parent
firm and affiliates will vary due to differences in investment motives, which is critical for
subsidiary performance (Verbeke et al., 2009). Meanwhile, different types of FDI have
corresponding performance objectives and time horizons to realize those objectives. For
example, value-chain cost saving will be the main objective for vertical FDI, while
revenue generation will be the main concern for horizontal FDI (Verbeke et al., 2009). In
strategic-asset-seeking FDI, parent firms have a long horizon to achieve the goal of
realizing their objective, which is not instantly achievable (Yang, Yang, & Doyle, 2013).
As a result, it is insufficient to measure performance without taking into consideration the
investment motives. However, most empirical research studies on performance have not
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included investment motives in their analyses, with a few exceptions (e.g., Hansen &
Gwozdz, 2015; Luo & Bu, 2017; Yang et al., 2013).
In empirical research, both parent MNE firm performance and subsidiary performance
have been measured. MNE performance has been subjectively assessed by such measures
as international marketing performance according to a 7-point Likert scale (Luo & Bu,
2017). It has also been objectively measured by stock market reaction to parent firms
engaged in FDI, such as cumulative abnormal returns (Yang et al., 2013). With regard to
subsidiary performance, multiple measures have been used, including financial (internal
rate of return, or IRR), operational (premature stop of operations, or PSO), and
organizational (manager’s subjective assessment of subsidiary performance, or MP)
measures (Hansen & Gwozdz, 2015). The use of multiple measures of subsidiary
performance will overcome the pitfall of using sales and profit as an indicator of
performance because, in non-market-seeking FDI, subsidiaries might have the mandate of
being a low-cost production base, which helps the parent MNE to integrate its global
value chain and achieve transfer pricing and profitability (Luo, 2003).
With regard to the main effect of investment motives on subsidiary performance
outcome, efficiency-seeking FDI has a better survival outcome compared to FDI with
other motivations including local market seeking and resource (labor) seeking (Hansen &
Gwozdz, 2015). It has been argued that an efficiency-seeking subsidiary is a key part of
the value chain and that the parent MNE is more likely to provide additional resources to
prevent it from exiting in times of crisis compared with subsidiaries founded on the basis
of other investment motives. However, there is no difference among subsidiaries with
different investment motives when a financial measure (IRR) or managerial assessment
of subsidiary performance is used. Nonetheless, only four types of subsidiaries are
included in the analysis: local market seeking, efficiency seeking, resource seeking, and
other (Hansen & Gwozdz, 2015).
Moreover, strategic-asset-seeking FDI has been tested as a moderator of the relationship
between foreign investment and performance outcome for parent MNEs. When a
subjective MNE performance measure is used, strategic asset seeking has a positive
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moderating effect on the relationship between foreign investment and MNE performance
outcome because strategic-asset-seeking FDI is intended to improve the resource
portfolio, which will help the parent MNE’s performance in the long run (Luo & Bu,
2017). Using surveys of Chinese executives of MNEs engaged in FDI between 2009 and
2012, Luo and Bu (2017) found that a strategic-asset-seeking motivation enhanced the
positive impact of foreign investment on international customer breadth for the parent
MNE. Nonetheless, when short-term stock-market reaction was used as a measure of
MNE performance, strategic-asset-seeking motivation negatively moderated the
relationship between foreign investment projects and MNE performance. Using a sample
of 121 FDI projects initiated by 102 Chinese listed companies between 2001 and 2009,
Yang et al. (2013) found that strategic-asset FDI project announcements produced lower
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for Chinese listed companies than traditional FDI
projects. It has been argued that most Chinese MNEs engaged in strategic-asset-seeking
FDI have a low absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) or recombination
capability (Rugman, 2010) to combine acquired strategic assets (such as technology,
brand, and reputation) with existing firm resources to create value for the parent MNE in
the short run. This helps explain the short-term negative stock-market reaction to
strategic-asset-seeking FDI.

2.1.3.5

Termination

In terms of the relationship between initial investment motives and the termination of
affiliates, Makino et al. (2007) investigated the impact of initial investment motives on
intended terminations and unintended terminations. Here, termination is defined as
complete termination, i.e., the affiliate is closed, not a mode change or product strategy
change. Investment purposes are classified in four categories: resource/labor seeking,
market seeking, capital seeking, and strategic asset seeking. It was found that there was a
much higher termination rate (close to 30%) for affiliates with the purpose of strategic
asset seeking compared to affiliates in any of the other three categories (around 7%) in
IJVs. It was argued that once an MNE acquired such strategic assets as proprietary
technology and management know-how, the affiliates were likely to be terminated
because local partners could not provide more value or resources to the MNE. However,
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in the case of resource/labor/market/capital-seeking IJVs, resources, labor, or capital
provided by local partners were continuously valued. As a result, MNEs did not terminate
those IJVs. Survey results of Japanese overseas affiliates between 1996 and 2001
provided empirical support. Mode choice, i.e., IJV versus WOS, moderated the
relationship between initial investment motives and intended termination. For strategicasset-seeking investments, the termination rate of WOSs (3.2%) during the study period
was much lower than that of IJVs (28.6%), because once an MNE has finished acquiring
strategic assets, it will exit the IJV, as it will not be able to provide further value or
resources to the MNE.
Getachew and Beamish (2017) paid special attention to the host-country context and
investigated how the relationship between host-country institutional environment and
subsidiary exit is moderated by investment motives. Slangen and Beugelsdijk (2010)
argued that horizontal FDI, such as market-seeking FDI, operates more independently
from its parent and sister affiliates and is more embedded in the host environment.
Vertical FDI is more tightly integrated with the global MNE network and has less
autonomy than horizontal FDI. Following this line of logic, Getachew and Beamish
(2017) operationalized horizontal FDI as market-seeking FDI. Using a matched sample of
FDI in African and OECD countries, they found no relationship between market-seeking
orientation and exit. FDI in Africa, a region characterized by high institutional voids and
institutional instability, had a higher subsidiary exit rate that FDI in OECD countries. The
relationship between entry to Africa and exit was weakened by market-seeking
orientation, because horizontal FDI is more embedded in the host environment and
operates rather independently. As a result, the parent firm had a higher tolerance for
horizontal FDI to stay in host countries with institutional voids and instability compared
with vertical FDI. Moreover, investment purpose diversity also weakened the relationship
between entry to Africa and subsidiary exit, because affiliates with diverse investment
purposes could explore and learn more about the local environment with more flexibility
in a host environment with institutional voids, thus mitigating the hazards of doing
business in adverse host societies. However, investment purpose diversity did not have a
direct impact on subsidiary exit.
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In sum, two types of categorization exist in the previous literature regarding investment
purpose and exit, i.e., asset exploitation versus asset augmentation (Makino et al., 2007)
and horizontal versus vertical FDI (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Slangen & Beugelsdijk,
2010). The relationship between investment purpose and exit is not conclusive.

2.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this chapter (see Figure A) is rooted in the OLI paradigm
(Dunning, 1988; Dunning 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), where the interaction of an
MNE’s ownership advantages (O-advantages) with the location advantages (Ladvantages) of host and home countries jointly determines the investment motive(s) of an
affiliate (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012; Meyer et al., 2011). Unlike the
existing literature on the OLI paradigm which uses the umbrella term of country specific
advantages (CSAs), we differentiate between host country specific advantages (host
CSAs) and home country specific advantages (home CSAs). Once an MNE decides on
the strategic investment motives for an affiliate, the central aspects of its
internationalization such as mode choice (WOS versus IJV), expatriate deployment, and
size are differentiated in a systematic manner (Benito, 2015). Meanwhile, internalization
theory (e.g., Caves, 1971; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982) has
been used to explain the mode choice between WOS and IJV. The particular market
failures identified in our analysis are asset specificity and information asymmetry.
Moreover, the theory of investment development path (Narula & Dunning, 2000) has
been applied to discuss host-country conditions. Four hypotheses have been developed to
further explain this model.

2.2.1

Ownership Advantages and Investment Motives

Ownership advantages (O-advantages) are transferrable firm-specific assets that are
capable of generating economic rent and creating a competitive advantage for the focal
MNE in foreign direct investments (Narula, 2010). There are two types of O-advantages:
asset-type (Oi) and transaction-type (Ot) (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Asset-type
ownership advantages include management know-how, proprietary knowledge, the
knowledge to manage multi-location businesses, etc. Transaction-type ownership
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advantages derive from the ability of the firm to organize efficient internal hierarchies
and utilize external markets. Examples include operational manuals and codes of
conduct.
When MNEs are engaged in FDI, the availability of investment motives is bounded or
constrained by their existing ownership advantages or firm-specific advantages.5 An
MNE’s proprietary knowledge, marketing capabilities, capital, and years of international
experience will be used to illustrate this point.
First, if an MNE possesses superior proprietary technology and marketing capabilities, it
has the options of market-seeking and natural-resource-seeking FDI, among others. Due
to the transferability of proprietary knowledge and marketing capabilities, an MNE can
position itself either as a differentiator or a cost-leader in the host market and can derive
superior economic rent from those capabilities. In the case of natural resource seeking,
especially in the oil and mining industries, an MNE’s possession of extractive technology
is necessary for it to be involved in natural-resource-seeking FDI.
Second, an MNE that possesses substantial capital may be engaged in natural-resourceseeking, market-seeking, or strategic-asset-seeking FDI. It may go to a low-labor-cost
country to set up factories to lower its production costs, while at the same time seeking
access to local markets. It may also enter an extractive business where a huge investment
is required upfront. In terms of strategic-asset-seeking FDI, MNEs from emerging
economies that are technological laggards, and yet possess significant capital, are likely
to conduct FDI to acquire strategic assets such as management know-how, proprietary
technology, and distribution networks (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018).
Third, an MNE’s FDI experience may also affect its motives. An MNE with limited
experience in FDI is more likely to have supportive investment motives, such as
information collection, at the early stage of internationalization, which will help it to
further develop its footprint in the host country. As an MNE accumulates more

5 In this chapter, ownership advantages and firm-specific advantages are used interchangeably.
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experience in FDI, it may have multiple production locations, R&D centers, or
distribution centers. To achieve economies of scale and scope, it may seek efficiencyseeking FDI by rationalizing its production and distribution network. It may also
establish subsidiaries for such support functions as regional management centers to
achieve a better result in global integration and local responsiveness (Chakravarty et al.,
2017; Schotter, 2017). Hence, we provide the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between an MNE’s ownership advantages
and the investment motives of its overseas affiliates.

2.2.2

Location Advantages and Investment Motives

In this section, we distinguish between two types of location-specific advantages, i.e.,
host-country-specific advantages and home-country-specific (dis)advantages. Hostcountry advantages have a direct impact on the investment motives of MNEs. Homecountry advantages have a mediating effect on investment motives through ownership
advantages. Meanwhile, home-country advantages also have a direct effect on investment
motives while interacting with host-country advantages to influence investment motives.

2.2.2.1

Host-Country-Specific Advantages and Investment Motives

Due to the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) for MNEs conducting business abroad,
foreign locations must be able to offer advantages and attract MNEs to do business
(Buckley & Hashai, 2004; Dunning, 1998). There are four types of locational advantages:
markets, natural resources, agglomeration, and institutions (Dunning, 1993; Dunning &
Lundan, 2008; Narula & Santangelo, 2012; Peng & Meyer, 2016). Market advantages
refer to the population density and purchasing power of the local population. Natural
resource advantages refer to the natural endowment in a location, including natural
resources, low-cost labor, human capital, and infrastructure. Agglomeration advantages
refer to the clusters of related businesses or the collocation of businesses (Narula &
Santangelo, 2012) with the advantage of knowledge spillover, a skilled labor force within
the region, and a pool of specialized buyers and suppliers (Kalnins & Chung, 2004;
Nachum, 2000). Institutions advantages refer to the institutional environment, such as
culture, norms, legal and financial infrastructure, regulations and policy, and so on
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(Narula & Santangelo, 2012). Locational advantages are in principle public goods, but
this is not always the case. For example, while universities and research facilities are
publicly available, certain locational advantages are internalized as firm-specific assets
and are not publicly available. That is why local embeddedness matters to foreign
investors who wish to have full access to the resource advantages of a particular location
(Meyer et al., 2011).
In the process of internationalization, an MNE attempts to utilize its ownership
advantages in conjunction with location-specific assets (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula,
2015). The possible options for investment motives are contingent upon the availability
of certain types of locational advantages that MNEs have in mind during the
internationalization process. Meanwhile, the investment development path theory predicts
that the developmental stage of a host country also attracts specific types of investment
(Narula & Dunning, 2000). For example, for countries at an early stage of development,
inward FDI outnumbers outward FDI and they mainly attract natural-resource-seeking
and market-seeking FDI. When host countries are at a higher level of development,
outward FDI exceeds inward FDI and they mainly attract strategic-asset-seeking FDI and,
to a lesser extent, market-seeking or resource-seeking FDI. As countries can progress
from one stage to another, it is difficult to put them into a specific category and predict
their inward FDI. As a result, the following discussion will focus on the specific
locational advantages of host countries and their predictive power for specific
investments.
First, for market-seeking investments, population size and the purchasing power of a
location are the main factors for consideration (Benito, 2015). Due to the costs and risks
involved in FDI, proximity also matters, especially for firms at an early stage of
internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The tax incentives of the local
government also provide incentives for market-seeking FDI.
Second, natural-resource-seeking FDI is constrained by the location of available
resources. For example, if an MNE is interested in oil exploration, there are only a
limited amount of oil fields in the world to choose from. Meanwhile, due to the cost of
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transporting resources, local transportation infrastructure is also a factor for consideration
(Galan et al., 2007). If the motive is to access local labor, then the cost of local labor and
the amount of cheap labor available are the main factors for consideration.
Third, with regard to efficiency-seeking FDI, the cost of labor matters for those MNEs
that seek to rationalize their production network. Because long distances will lead to
higher transportation costs and management costs, proximity among affiliates is also a
factor for consideration for efficiency-seeking FDI (Benito, 2015).
Fourth, for strategic-asset-seeking FDI, as developed countries are more likely to have
such strategic assets as proprietary knowledge, global distribution networks, and
management know-how, an MNE is more likely to choose developed countries over
developing countries (Makino et al., 2004). Within developed countries, industrial
clusters are likely to be chosen over non-clustered areas due to consideration over
knowledge spillover and connections with suppliers and distributors (Narula &
Santangelo, 2012. Hence, we present the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: There is a relationship between an MNE’s host-country location
advantages and the investment motives of its overseas affiliates.

2.2.2.2

Home-Country Advantages, and Ownership Advantages

The home-country location advantage (L) determines the initial ownership advantage of
domestic firms (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018; Hobdari et al., 2017; Narula, 2012). To be
specific, the L advantage determines the amount and type of initial O advantage or
resource munificence of domestic firms. For illustration purposes, there are three types of
countries: low-income developing countries (LDCs), emerging economies, and advanced,
developed countries. LDCs are characterized by institutional voids and poor legal and
market infrastructure, and firms from these countries are endowed with little initial O
advantages to be able to engage in any significant economic activity, including firm
internationalization. Due to limited inward FDI and little linkage with the global
economy, there is little chance for these firms to augment their O advantages by learning
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from MNEs from other countries. As a result, there are few firms with O advantages
except in the extractive industry.
Second, for those firms from emerging economies, the initial O advantage is still a
function of the L assets. However, due to its connection with the global economy and
being part of the global value chain—plus the collocation advantage (Narula &
Santangelo, 2012) resulting from the substantial inward FDI in those countries—these
firms are able to augment their O advantages through knowledge transfer from MNEs
from advanced economies. As a result, the O advantage of domestic firms from emerging
economies goes beyond the L advantage of the home countries by having more breadth.
However, these firms lack resources in term of technology, finances, and human capital
(Awate et al., 2012). Compared with developed-country MNEs, they are technology
laggards, face financial constraints, and lack highly qualified management personal in
firm internationalization. Nonetheless, due to their capability to deal with imperfect
institutions at home, they might be able to develop capabilities that will help them to
operate in other emerging economies through institutional learning (Cuervo-Cazurra et
al., 2018).
Third, for firms from advanced economies, they are endowed with better institutional and
market infrastructure. Most of them are knowledge-intensive firms and deeply embedded
within the global value chain. These firms have better organizational skills to achieve
knowledge transfer. In other words, there are more L advantages for domestic firms to
internalize in advanced economies and they have better organizational skills to internalize
those L advantages.
In summary, the more advanced the home country is, the more the L advantage for an
MNE to internalize as an O advantage (Narula, 2012). Hence, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: The more advanced the home country, the greater the initial O
advantage possessed by an MNE from that country.
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2.2.2.3

Impact of Home-Country (Dis)advantages on Investment
Motives

Most literature on the impact of home-country (dis)advantages on firm
internationalization treats it as a push factor for outward FDI. First, if the population size
is small in the home country, then there is a limited domestic market, which may act as a
push factor for firms to internationalize. MNEs from Scandinavian countries fall into this
category. Second, when the home country is going through rapid industrialization, it may
need resources for industrial input. For example, investments of MNEs from China and
India in Africa may seek resources to satisfy the needs of domestic industrial
development. Third, when there is a competitive domestic market with both domestic and
foreign players, MNEs may seek strategic-asset-seeking investment abroad to augment
their capabilities (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018).
Fourth, the vast majority of literature on home-country conditions and investment
motives focuses on escape investment (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015; Barnard & Luiz,
2018; Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Fathallah et al., 2018; Kobrak et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2017;
Witt & Lewin, 2007). MNEs may conduct escape investment to “avoid the poor
conditions of the home country” (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015: 32), that is, problematic
conditions that would add costs to firm operations. For example, because the cost of
doing business domestically exceeded the cost of doing business internationally and there
was better protection of intellectual property rights in Western countries than in domestic
markets, Chinese firms chose OFDI to escape “weak institutions” in their home country
(Boisot & Meyer, 2008). When different dimensions of institutions are not progressing at
the same time, internal frictions and conflicts arise. This results in institutional fragility,
which also acts as a push factor for OFDI (Shi et al., 2017).
In developed countries, it is not “weak institutions” per se, but the “ossification of
institutions,” such as taxes and high social contribution, which may act as a push factor
for MNEs to invest abroad (Witt & Lewin, 2007). In their study, Witt and Lewin (2007)
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found a positive association between Societal Coordination Index (SCI)6 score and
outward FDI. Nonetheless, a later study (Kobrak et al., 2018) showed that SCI score was
not only positively related to outward FDI, but also positively related to inward FDI. This
means that a stable and elaborated institutional environment not only promotes outward
investment, but also attracts inward investment. High labor costs in the home country
have been found to have a similar effect on OFDI in the IT industry (Weng & Peng,
2018). Moreover, there is a time dimension to escape FDI. For example, Barnard and
Luiz (2018) argued that there was a cumulative process of institutional misalignment and
contestation in South Africa’s OFDI that spanned from 1956 to 2012. Escape FDI could
also occur in less than a decade in hyper-turbulent home contexts such as Lebanon, where
wars forced domestic firms to invest abroad (Fathallah et al., 2018). Hence, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2c: There is a relationship between home-country (dis)advantages
and the investment motives of MNEs.

2.2.2.4

Joint Impact of Home- and Host-Country (Dis)advantages
on Investment Motives

The literature on the joint effects of home and host countries on firm internationalization
mainly draws from the theoretical lens of “institutional arbitrage” (Mingo, Junkunc, &
Morales, 2018). Early literature on home–host country differences focused on
institutional differences between the home and host countries, such as the cultural
distance between host and home countries (Kogut & Singh, 1988), the difference between
the regulatory institutions between home and host countries (Henisz & Delios, 2000), and
so on. It has been argued that the larger the distance, the more difficult it is for MNEs to
operate and to transfer knowledge and skills from the home to host countries (Kostova,
1999). Thus, the larger the institutional distance between the host and home countries, the
less likely that an MNE will invest in the host country and the more difficult it will be for
an MNE if it chooses to operate in that host country.

6 The SCI score measures the importance of coordination in an economy.
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Nonetheless, recent studies found that the relationship between institutional distance
between home and host countries and the likelihood of firm internationalization can also
be curvilinear. Using private equity (PE) investments in Latin America between 1996 and
2011, Mingo et al. (2018) found that a strong institutional environment in the host
country attracted PE projects from PE firms of home countries with both strong and weak
institutions. Meanwhile, weak institutional environments in the host countries deterred
PE projects from PE firms from both strong and weak institutional environments.
Moreover, different actors from the same home country may react differently to the same
institutional distance between home and host countries. For example, Chinese SOEs face
greater legitimacy challenges investing abroad than private Chinese MNEs do (Li et al.,
2018). As a result, SOEs are less likely to conduct OFDI compared with private firms.
We propose that home- and host-country (dis)advantages have a joint impact on
investment motives. When a firm contemplates what type of FDI to engage in, it
simultaneously considers home- and host-country (dis)advantages. For example, CuervoCazurra, Narula, and Un (2015) argued that MNEs simultaneously seek favorable hostcountry conditions and avoid poor home-country conditions in firm internalization. By
collapsing investment motives into four categories—“sell more” (i.e., market seeking),
“buy better” (i.e., natural resource seeking), “upgrade” (i.e., strategic asset seeking), and
“escape” (i.e., escape investment)—they argued that firms would be motivated to “sell
more” and “upgrade” to obtain better host-country conditions. It was also argued that
MNEs would be motivated to “buy better” and “escape” to avoid poor home-country
conditions. Moreover, firms could also be motivated to simultaneously “buy better” and
“sell more” (such as efficiency seeking). Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2d: There is a relationship between the institutional arbitrage of host
versus home countries and the investment motives of MNEs.

2.2.3

Investment Motives and Mode Choices

The choice of operation mode is a central aspect of firm internationalization. It refers to
organizational arrangements such as exporting, licensing, WOSs, and IJVs. The
operational mode may also change over time (Benito, Peterson, & Welch, 2009). The
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major relevant theoretical framework is internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976),
where the major market failures identified are asset specificity and information content.
In this section, only the choice between WOSs and IJVs is discussed, which is viewed in
a spectrum between hierarchy and market (Buckley & Casson, 1996), i.e., WOSs are
closer to hierarchy and IJVs are closer to market.
First, for market-seeking FDI, a key driver of its overseas expansion is proprietary
technology and resources such as brands and trademarks. The main market failure in this
case is information content or information asymmetry. In the case of proprietary
technology, due to the difficulty associated with evaluating technology without
adequately understanding it, an MNE will be more likely to choose in-house operations
over other modes of operation such as licensing. Empirical evidence shows that R&D
expenditure that generates proprietary technology is positively associated with both
licensing practices and direct investment, but the effect is stronger for direct investments
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Once an MNE decides to choose in-house operations, it
has the choice between WOSs and IJVs. Due to concerns over unwanted dissemination
(Benito et al., 2009) and leakage of know-how to JV partners, it is likely that it will
choose WOSs over IJVs. Empirical evidence shows that higher R&D expenditure is
positively associated with WOSs rather than IJVs (Stopford & Wells, 1972).
Meanwhile, brands and trademarks represent revenue-generating assets in which an MNE
has incurred a major investment. Due to the reputational nature of brands and trademarks,
a widely publicized scandal by an outside partner may seriously harm the reputation of a
well-established brand overnight. As a result, an MNE with brands and trademarks will
prefer in-house operations over licensing in overseas expansion. When an MNE chooses
in-house operations and has a choice between a WOS and an IJV, the opportunistic
behavior of an IJV partner that might tarnish its brand image is a major concern for the
MNE (Benito, 2015). As a result, a WOS would be the preferred choice over an IJV.
Thus, we propose a positive association between market-seeking FDI and a preference
for WOSs over IJVs.
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Second, in the case of resource-seeking FDI, we differentiate between natural-resourceseeking and labor-seeking FDI. In natural-resource-seeking FDI, the main market failure
is asset specificity for the focal MNE, which entails two major risks: hold-up risk and
under-investment of transaction partners (Benito, 2015). For an MNE operating in
extractive industries, its heavy investment upfront for specialized machinery and
infrastructure will subject it to hold-up risks from contracting partners. As a result, it is
likely to internalize the transaction. However, in reality, national governments often
control local extractive resources and local partners are often chosen to deal with
different stakeholders including governments, employees, and local residents (Gil et al.,
2006; Yu et al., 2015). In places with institutional voids and instability, there is an even
stronger need to find a local partner (Yu et al., 2015). Here, MNEs will prefer to
internalize the transaction if it is involved in natural-resource-seeking behavior, so WOSs
will be the preferred operation mode. However, in locations characterized by high
institutional voids and instability, an IJV will be preferred over a WOS.
With regard to labor-seeking FDI, due to the abundance of cheap labor worldwide and
the low switching costs from one labor supplier to another, there is less risk of market
failure from hold-up behavior by the business partner. As a result, an MNE will prefer to
have an open transaction with market partners and have multiple suppliers at the same
time. Further, there is less necessity to internalize the operation, which explains the
prevalence of global sourcing (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). When an MNE chooses to
establish a subsidiary in a host country, due to consideration of tariffs and local content
requirements, an IJV will be chosen over a WOS, as an IJV partner can offer
complementary resources (Beamish & Banks, 1987) and requires less resource
commitment from the focal MNE.
Third, in terms of efficiency-seeking FDI, an MNE may be engaged in rationalizing its
production network or distribution network. The major market failure is asset specificity.
In the case of production networks, there are considerable transaction-specific assets
involved in rationalizing production networks, such as logistics and IT infrastructure, and
there is a strong need for vertical integration. Here, an MNE will prefer to internalize the
transaction with a business partner. If an MNE chooses to establish a subsidiary, WOSs
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will be chosen over IJVs. In the case of distribution networks, in addition to the need for
vertical integration, there is also a potential risk of free-riding from business partners
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). As a result, an MNE will prefer to internalize the
transaction and a WOS will be preferred over an IJV when a subsidiary is established.
Fourth, in strategic-asset-seeking FDI, an MNE is interested in gaining full access and
control of such assets as proprietary technology, management know-how, and distribution
networks (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018). The major market failure is information content
mentioned above. Due to the strong need for control, it will opt for internalization, i.e.,
buy a target company instead of undertaking a market transaction. When an MNE
acquires a firm for strategic-asset-seeking purposes, it is likely to choose WOSs over
IJVs so that it can have full access and control over strategic assets.
Fifth, we consider support functions such as trade support (sales offices), financial
support (financing and currency hedging), and management support (regional
management centers). These functions are vital to the operations of the MNE and the
major market failure involved is information content such as business secrets. To avoid
the risk of opportunistic behavior by business partners and the unwanted dissemination of
business secrets, an MNE will prefer to internalize the transaction instead of contracting a
business partner. After a subsidiary is established, a high-control mode such as a WOS
will likely be preferred over an IJV, due to the need to completely control the subsidiary.
Hence, we provide the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a:
Market-seeking FDIs will prefer WOSs over IJVs;
Resource-seeking FDIs will prefer IJVs over WOSs;
Efficiency-seeking FDIs will prefer WOSs over IJVs;
Strategic-asset-seeking FDIs will prefer WOSs over IJVs;
FDIs with support investment purposes will prefer WOSs over IJVs.
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2.2.4

Investment Motives and Expatriate Deployment

Expatriates play multiple roles in a subsidiary, i.e., as a strategist, monitor, ambassador,
daily manager, and trainer (Peng & Meyer, 2016). The ambassador role is for stakeholder
management purposes. The roles of strategist, monitor, and daily manager are for control
purposes and the alignment of the goal of the MNE headquarters and the subsidiary. The
role of trainer is for knowledge transfer (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000).
Drawing from the framework of vertical versus horizontal FDI (Slangen & Beugelsdijk,
2010), we first categorize investment motives into two categories. Market-seeking
investments are horizontal FDI, while resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, strategicasset-seeking investments and support functions are vertical FDI. Because there is a
stronger need for the alignment of interests between the MNE and subsidiaries for
vertical FDI than for horizontal FDI (Paik & Ando, 2011) and local managers have better
knowledge about the host country than expatriate managers, we propose that there is a
higher expatriate deployment in vertical FDI than in horizontal FDI. Hence, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: Subsidiaries with horizontal investment motives have a lower
expatriate ratio than those with vertical investment motives.

2.2.5

Investment Motives and Subsidiary Size

Existing major theories in management make an implicit assumption that firm size will
grow. The resource-based view (Penrose, 1995) has argued that the firm will grow until
management capabilities put a limit on the growth potential of the firm. Meanwhile,
according to TCE (Coarse, 1937), when the cost of internal coordination is greater than
the cost of market transactions, the firm will stop growing. There is a limited number of
studies in IB on subsidiary size, including those focused on firm size and control
(Johnston & Menguc, 2007; Peng & Beamish, 2014) and firm size and divestment
(Duhaime & Baird, 1987).
We draw upon contingency theory (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), especially the
relationship between strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962), to establish the linkage
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between investment motives and subsidiary size. As per contingency theory, the structure
of an organization is contingent upon its external and internal needs. Chandler’s (1962)
classic study of diversification strategy and divisionalization structure showed that
changes in strategy required corresponding adjustments in organizational structure.
Subsequent research confirmed his idea that structure followed strategy. For example,
Rumelt (1974) showed that the match between strategy and structure has a significant
impact on performance. Miller (1986, 1996) added that, given the organizational structure
and business environment, there are limited strategies available to an organization. In
international business, Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) argued that the fit between the
strategy and structure of a subsidiary influences its performance.
Investment motives can also be classified into major investment motives, i.e., resource
seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking, and those in
support functions, such as sales support, management support, financial support, etc. Due
to the differences in strategic goals, we argue that those with a support function will have
a smaller subsidiary size than those with a major function. For example, a sales office can
be staffed with a handful of employees yet be fully operational, given the nature of the
business. A regional management office is usually smaller compared with an averagesized subsidiary, as it only performs one function—to implement tight control between
the subsidiary and headquarters. However, the size of the subsidiary will be much larger
if the main purpose is to access local cheap labor, to have access to local markets, or to
have a team for research and development. Hence, we present the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3c: The size of subsidiaries with support investment motives will be
smaller than that of subsidiaries with the major investment motives.

2.2.6

Investment Motives and Performance

As discussed earlier, organization performance is a multi-dimensional measure (Richard,
et al., 2009). Different measures have been suggested for different types of investment
(Benito, 2015). For example, in market-seeking FDI, relevant measures include sales
growth and market share. For efficiency-seeking FDI, appropriate measures include profit
margins. For natural-resource-seeking FDI, measures include input costs and the stability
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of suppliers. For strategic-asset-seeking FDI, new patents for the MNE could be an
appropriate measure. We limit our discussion to subsidiary-level performance, as
measured by profitability and sales growth.
We draw upon the framework of vertical versus horizontal FDI (Slangen & Beugelsdijk,
2010) to establish a linkage between investment motives and subsidiary-level
performance. First, in terms of the sales growth of a subsidiary, market-seeking FDI (i.e.,
horizontal FDI) is more likely to outperform other types of investments (vertical FDI
including natural-resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic-asset-seeking FDI),
as the main objective of market-seeking FDI is revenue growth, while other investments
are interested in lowering the cost for the MNE as a whole.
Second, in terms of the profitability of the subsidiary, it is contingent upon the timeframe
used for gauging the performance (Verbeke et al., 2009). For natural-resource-seeking
FDI, especially in extractive investments, there is a huge investment upfront and it takes a
longer time to break even compared with a typical subsidiary such as a manufacturing
facility. If the investment is for the purpose of accessing low-cost labor, then it is likely to
be profitable due to its nature as a low-cost production base. For market-seeking FDI,
investment with the purpose of building new business is likely to underperform versus
other investments as far as profitability is concerned because of the risks involved. For
efficiency-seeking FDI, investment is likely to be profitable due to economies of scale
and scope. For strategic-asset-seeking FDI, especially that invested in R&D development,
due to the risks involved in new R&D development, it is also unrealistic to expect quick
profitability. Hence, we present the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: FDIs with horizontal investment motives will perform better than
those with vertical investment motives.

2.3 Data and Sample Selection
2.3.1

Data Source

The Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Japanese Overseas Investment) dataset (Toyo
Keizai, 2017) was used for subsidiary-level information. It was matched with Nikkei
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NEEDS data for MNE parent-level information. This matched dataset was selected for
three reasons. First, the TK dataset is the most comprehensive data source on Japanese
foreign investment (Sachwald, 1995). Primary data were collected from the managers of
overseas affiliates through the Japanese parent firms. Information from other sources
such as press releases, annual reports, and telephone interviews was also included
(Makino et al., 2004). Second, it is a longitudinal dataset spanning 27 years from 1991 to
2017, which allows for panel data analysis. Third, it has detailed information on the
investment purposes of the parent firms of the subsidiaries, which is generally not
available from sources where country (Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008) or industry
(Nachum & Zaheer, 2005) aggregate-level data is used.

2.3.2

Sample Selection and the Decision Rules

The 16 categories of investment purposes from the Toyo Keizai dataset (TK dataset)
were condensed into six types of investment motives defined by Dunning (1993), and
Dunning and Lundan (2008): (1) natural resource seeking; (2) market seeking; (3)
efficiency seeking; (4) strategic asset seeking; (5) support investment; and (6) passive
investment (see Table 2). The logic behind these allocations is as follows.
First, natural resource seekers are defined as those “seeking physical resources of one
kind or another” and those “seeking plentiful suppliers of cheap and well-motivated
unskilled or semi-skilled labor” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 68). As a result, those in
Categories A (natural resources, materials) and B (labor intensity) were put into the first
type of investment motive: natural resource seeking.
Second, market seekers are defined as those “that invest in a particular country or region
to supply goods or services to markets in these or adjacent countries” (Dunning &
Lundan, 2008: 69). They are treated as “self-contained production units” (Dunning &
Lundan, 2008: 71). Examples here include those that follow their customers, adopt their
products to local needs, or are attracted by tax breaks from host countries. Following the
definition and examples, those in Categories C (tax breaks for investment), F (local
market access), I (alliances with customers in Japan), and M (building new business)
were put into the second type of investment motive: market seeking.
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Table 2: Classifications of investment purposes
Investment motive
1. Natural resource
seeking7

Definition offered by Dunning (1993)
1. Physical resources, such as minerals,
agricultural products
2. Cheap and motivated unskilled or
semi-skilled labor

TK Categories
A = natural resources,
materials
B = labor intensity

2. Market seeking

Definition: invest in a particular
country or region to supply goods or
services to markets in these or adjacent
countries
1. Follow customers
2. Localization needs
3. Import substituting
4. Response to competitors’ moves
5. Local government policy
1. To rationalize the structure of
established resource-based or marketseeking investments
2. Benefits include economies of scale,
scope, and risk diversification

C = tax breaks for
investment
F = local market access
I = alliances with
customers in Japan
M = building new
business

3. Efficiency seeking

4. Strategic asset
seeking
5. Escape investment
6. Trade-supportive
investment
7. Financesupportive
investment
8. Managementsupportive
investment

To sustain or advance their global
competitiveness

9. Passive investment

1. Portfolio institutional investment
2. Real-estate investment

D = building an
international network of
production
E = building an
international network of
distribution
L = research &
development

J = financing, currency
hedging
K = information
gathering, royalty
revenue
N = control business of
the area

7 Although Dunning (1993) also proposed a third type of resource seeking, which is to “acquire

technological capability, management or marketing expertise and organizational skills” (p. 57), it is not
included in our table due to the overlap between this type of investment and strategic asset seeking
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015).
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Third, efficiency seeking is defined as “rationalizing the structure of established resourcebased or market-seeking investment in such a way that the investing company can gain
from the common governance of geographically dispersed activities. Such benefits are
essentially those of the economies of scale and scope and of risk diversification”
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 72). Following this definition, investment motives in
Categories D (building an international network of production) and E (building an
international network of distribution) were classified as efficiency seekers.
Fourth, strategic asset seekers are less interested in exploiting existing firm advantages,
and more interested in augmenting their “global portfolio of physical assets and human
competence” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 73). Investments in Category L (research and
development) were classified as strategic asset seeking.
Fifth, support investment is defined as investments taken “to support the activities of the
rest of the enterprise of which they are part” and they are “rarely self-contained profit
centers” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 74). They include trading companies, financial
support companies, and regional or branch offices. Regional offices sometimes provide
“financial and marketing information for the parent company” (Dunning & Lundan,
2008: 75). Following the definition and examples given, Categories J (financing,
currency hedging), K (information gathering, royalty revenue), and N (control businesses
of the area) were classified as support investments.
Sixth, passive investment refers to portfolio investment. The present study follows the
logic of Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) and used equity ownership level less than 20% as
the cut-off point for passive investment, i.e., the first Japanese parent firm’s equity level
is greater than 0% and less than 20%.
Seventh, in Dunning’s (1993) typology, there is another type of investment, “escape
investment,” which is defined as “to escape restrictive legislation or macro-organizational
policies by home governments” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 74). Examples include
“round-tripping” investment between China and Hong Kong, which is used to exploit the
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preferential treatment given to foreign investment (including investment from Hong
Kong) by the Chinese government. The essence of this type of investment is that
investors have to leave the home country for a better outcome. The closet category in the
TK dataset is Category O (trade conflict), where producers have to relocate their
investment to a third country to avoid steep tariffs imposed on their goods due to trade
conflicts between home and host countries. However, due to its small proportion in the
TK dataset (Table 3)—2,887 subsidiary-year observations (1.49%), which only amount
to around 300 subsidiaries (assuming about 10 years of data per subsidiary)—Category O
was excluded from our analysis.
Also excluded from the analysis were Category G (exports to other countries), Category
H (exports to Japan), and Category P (other purposes) due to difficulty in allocating them
in a single discrete category. For example, Category G (exports to other countries) can be
put into both natural resource seeking (Chakravarty et al., 2017) and market seeking
(Getachew & Beamish, 2017). A Japanese parent can invest in a low-labor-cost country
in order to save on costs while seeking market access in a third country. All excluded
observations together represent 48,674 subsidiary-year observations (8.74% of the entire
sample). Also, due to the fact that multiple investment purposes can be recorded for one
subsidiary and that those in Categories G, H, P, and O are likely to be recorded as the
second or third purposes for a particular subsidiary-year, it is very likely that they have
been included in other categories in our analysis.8.
Before conducting the analysis of the characteristics and performance of affiliates of six
types of investment purposes, a preliminary analysis was made on the distribution of the
six types of investment motives (Table 3). In the 1991–2017 version of the TK dataset,
there are 557,179 subsidiary-year observations: 8,318 Japanese MNEs investing in
56,193 subsidiaries in 164 countries. For each of the 557,179 subsidiary-year

8 For example, Category G was recorded as the first investment purpose for only 697 subsidiary-year

observations; however, 18,129 subsidiary-year observations reported G as one of the investment purposes
in the TK dataset. This means that Category G could have been recorded as the second, third, or even
fourth investment purpose. A similar pattern can be found for Categories H (774 versus 17,539), O (278
versus 2,887), and P (5,568 versus 10,119).
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observations, a Japanese parent firm can choose multiple answers from the list of
investment purposes for one subsidiary (Chakravarty et al., 2017). Meanwhile, if a
subsidiary has multiple Japanese parent firms, duplicate answers are counted once. 9 For
example, if two Japanese parents choose “market access” as the investment purpose,
market access is recorded once. There is no rank order among the 16 investment
purposes. In the TK dataset, 194,171 subsidiary-year observations (34.8% of the whole
dataset) recorded at least one investment purpose and they recorded an average 10 of two
investment purposes. In sum, (1) natural resource seekers represent 45,834 subsidiaryyear observations (23.60%11); (2) market seekers represent 161,844 subsidiary-year
observations (83.35%); (3) efficiency seekers represent 94,180 subsidiary-year
observations (48.50%); (4) strategic asset seekers represent 14,244 subsidiary-year
observations (7.34%); (5) support investment represents 61,695 subsidiary-year
observations (31.77%); and (6) passive investment represents 17,528 subsidiary-year
observations (9.03%).

9 Toyo Keizai, Overseas Japanese Companies Data Technical Summary, March 2012.
10 The maximum number of investment purposes was eight, which was recorded for a Thailand subsidiary.

They cover labor intensity (B), tax breaks for investment (C), building an international production network
(D), local market access (F), exports to other countries (G), exports to Japan (H), alliances with customers
(I), and building new business (M).
11 These percentages are for those investments that reported up to eight investment purposes. As one

subsidiary can have more than one investment purpose, the sum of all percentages will be greater than one.
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Table 3: Converting investment purposes in TK dataset into six investment motives
defined by Dunning & Lundan (2008)
No.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Investment
motive

Natural
resource
seekers

Market
seekers

Efficiency
seekers

Strategic
asset seekers

Support
investment

Passive
investment

Other

Categories in the TK
dataset
A = natural resources,
materials
B = labor intensity
subtotal
C = tax breaks for
investment
F = local market
access
I = alliance with
customers in Japan
M = building new
business
subtotal
D = building
international
production network
E = building
international
distribution network
subtotal
L = research and
development
subtotal
J = financing, currency
hedging
K = information
gathering, royalty
collection
N = control business
of the area
subtotal
Equity share of first
Japanese parent firm
<20%
subtotal
G = exports to other
countries

Observations
(1 investment purpose)
Subsidiaryyear
(%)
observations

Observations (up to 8
investment purposes)
Subsidiaryyear
(%)
observations

2,365

3.37

11,372

5.86

1,654
4,019

2.36
5.73

34,462
45,834

17.75
23.60

1,127

1.61

12,796

6.59

33,885

48.32

129,233

66.56

1,320

1.88

11,104

5.72

713

1.02

8,711

4.49

37,045

52.82

161,844

83.35

10,524

15.01

58,868

30.32

4,052

5.78

35,312

18.19

14,576

20.78

94,180

48.50

1,516

2.16

14,244

7.34

1,516

2.16

14,244

7.34

2,027

2.89

6,671

3.44

2,569

3.66

47,517

24.47

1,773

2.53

7,507

3.87

6,369

9.08

61,695

31.77

3,046

4.34

17,528

9.03

3,046

4.34

17,528

9.03

275

0.39

18,129

9.34

H = exports to Japan

509

0.73

17,539

9.03

O = trade conflict

253

0.36

2,887

1.49

P = other purposes

5,568

7.94

10,119

5.21

subtotal

6,605

9.42

48,674

25.07

total

70,130

194,171
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2.3.3

Main Statistical Tools

In the exploratory analysis, frequency distributions have been run for the general
distribution of investment purposes and regression tests (OLS linear regression and
binary logstic regression) have been run to test the relationship between investment
purposes and subsidiary-level characteristics and performance.

2.4 Preliminary Analysis Results
The frequency distribution of the number of investment purposes is shown in Table 4.
Among those that reported investment purposes, 70,130 subsidiary-year observations
reported one investment purpose (36.12%), 57,330 reported two investment purposes
(29.53%), and 37,098 reported three investment purposes (19.11%).
Table 4: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations by number of
investment purposes
Number of
investment
purposes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

2.4.1
2.4.1.1

Frequency Percentage Cumulative
(%)
percentage
(%)
70,130
57,330
37,098
17,953
11,410
226
23
1
194,171

36.12
29.53
19.11
9.25
5.88
0.12
0.01
0
100

36.12
65.64
84.75
93.99
99.87
99.99
100
100

Descriptive Data on Investment Purposes
Frequency Distributions

Of the 70,130 subsidiary-year observations that reported one investment purpose (Table
5), the top category is F (local market access, 48.32%), followed by D (building an
international production network, 15.01%).
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Table 5: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose
No.

Investment purpose

Frequency

(%)

1

F = local market access
D = building an international production
network
P = other purposes
E = building an international distribution
network
K = information gathering and royalty
revenue
A = natural resources and materials
J = financing and currency hedging
N = control business of the area
B = labor intensity
L = research and development
I = alliances with customers in Japan
C = tax breaks for investment
M = building new business
H = exports to Japan
G = exports to other countries
O = trade conflict
Total

33,885

48.32

10,524
5,568

15.01
7.94

4,052

5.78

2,569
2,365
2,027
1,773
1,654
1,516
1,320
1,127
713
509
275
253
70,130

3.66
3.37
2.89
2.53
2.36
2.16
1.88
1.61
1.02
0.73
0.39
0.36
100

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Among those 57,330 subsidiary-year observations that reported two investment purposes,
nine combinations have over 1,000 subsidiary-year observations (Table 6). A closer
examination shows that eight out of nine categories have F (local market access) as one
element. The top category is FK (local market access; information gathering, royalty
revenue), with 12,839 subsidiary-year observations, followed by FD (local market access;
building international production network), with 9,432 subsidiary-year observations, and
FE (local market access; building international distribution network), with 6,439
subsidiary-year observations.
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Table 6: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations with two
investment purposes (top nine categories)
No. Items
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Frequency

FK = “local market access” and “information gathering and
royalty revenue”
DF = “building an international production network” and “local
market access”
EF = “building an international distribution network” and “local
market access”
BF = “labor intensity” and “local market access”
BD = “labor intensity” and “building an international production
network”
CF = “tax breaks for investment” and “local market access”
FG = “local market access” and “exports to other countries”
FI = “local market access” and “alliances with customers in
Japan”
FP = “local market access” and “other purposes”

12,839
9,432
6,439
3,315
2,192
1,705
1,466
1,267
1,043

A similar pattern can be found for those 37,098 subsidiary-year observations that
reported three12 investment purposes (Table 7). Nine combinations have over 1,000
subsidiary-year observations. Eight out of nine categories have F (local market access) as
an element. The top category is FKE (local market access; information gathering, royalty
revenue; building an international distribution network), with 3,735 subsidiary-year
observations, followed by FDB (local market access; building international production
network; labor intensity), with 3,087 subsidiary-year observations, and FED (local
market access; building international distribution network; building international
production network), with 2,127 subsidiary-year observations.

2.4.1.2

Annual Growth Patterns

This section provides an analysis on the annual growth pattern of investments of different
purposes for two types of data: (1) subsidiary-year observations that reported only one

12 We have also run the frequency distributions of those that reported four or five investment purposes.

There are 16 * 15 * 14 * 13 = 43,680 possible combinations of four investment purposes and 16 * 15 * 14 *
13 * 12 = 524,160 possible combinations of five investment purposes. Most of these combinations have
zero observations and the top category has no more than 100 subsidiary-year observations. A detailed
report is available upon request.

66

investment purpose (i.e., 70,130 subsidiary-year observations); (2) subsidiary-year
observations that reported up to eight investment purposes (i.e., 194,171 subsidiary-year
observations). For example, one observation could have reported an investment purpose
of A (natural resources, materials) but it could also have reported other investment
purposes such as B (labor intensity) or C (tax breaks for investment).
Table 7: Frequency distribution of subsidiary-year observations with three
investment purposes (top nine categories)
No. Items
1
EFK = “building an international distribution network,” “local
market access,” and “information gathering and royalty
revenue”
2
BDF = “labor intensity,” “building an international production
network,” and “local market access”
3
DEF = “building an international production network,”
“building an international distribution network,” and “local
market access”
4
DFG = “building an international production network,” “local
market access,” and “exports to other countries”
5
BCF = “labor intensity,” “tax breaks for investment,” and “local
market access”
6
DFK = “building an international production network,” “local
market access,” and “information gathering and royalty
revenue”
7
BFK = “labor intensity,” “local market access,” and
“information gathering and royalty revenue”
8
BDH = “labor intensity,” “building an international production
network,” and “exports to Japan”
9
FKL = “local market access,” “information gathering and
royalty revenue,” and “research and development”

Frequency
3,735

3,087
2,127

1,322
1,200
1,093

1,056
1,048
1,048

First, for those observations that reported only one investment purpose (70,130
subsidiary-year observations), the annual growth pattern is shown in Figures 1a to 16a. A
closer examination shows that three investment purposes show an upward trend between
1991 and 2017: building an international production network (Figure 4a), building an
international distribution network (Figure 5a), and controlling the business of the area
(Figure 14a). Another three investment purposes show a clear downward trend: local
market access (Figure 6a), information gathering and royalty collection (Figure 11a), and
trade conflicts (Figure 15a). There is no clear pattern for other investment purposes.
Meanwhile, subgroups within a category show different growth patterns. For example,
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within the big category of market access, “alliances with customers in Japan” shows a
general upward trend, while “local market access” shows a downward trend, and the
trend for other subcategories is less clear.

68

Figure 1a & 1b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “natural resources and materials” over all subsidiary-year observations
with one investment purpose in each year

Figure 2a & 2b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “labor intensity” over all subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose in each year
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Figure 3a & 3b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “tax breaks for investment” over all subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose in each year

Figure 4a & 4b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “building an international production network” over all subsidiary-year
observations with one investment purpose in each year
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Figure 5a & 5b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “building an international distribution network” over all subsidiary-year
observations with one investment purpose in each year

Figure 6a & 6b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “local market access” over all subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose in each year
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Figure 7a & 7b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “exports to other countries” over all subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose in each year

Figure 8a & 8b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “exports to Japan” over all subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose in each year
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Figure 9a & 9b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “alliances with customers in Japan” over all subsidiary-year observations
with one investment purpose in each year

Figure 10a & 10b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “financing and currency hedging” over all subsidiary-year observations
with one investment purpose in each year
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Figure 11a & 11b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “information gathering and royalty revenue” over all subsidiary-year
observations with one investment purpose in each year

Figure 12a & 12b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “research and development” over all subsidiary-year observations with
one investment purpose in each year
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Figure 13a & 13b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “building new business” over all subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose in each year

Figure 14a & 14b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “control business of the area” over all subsidiary-year observations with
one investment purpose in each year
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Figure 15a & 15b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “trade conflict” over all subsidiary-year observations with one investment
purpose in each year

Figure 16a & 16b: Percentage of subsidiary-year observations with investment
purpose: “other purposes” over all subsidiary-year observations with one
investment purpose in each year
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Second, when those observations that reported up to eight investment purposes are
examined (Figures 1b to 16b), the general pattern is similar to those with only one
investment purpose, but the percentages are higher in all categories because one
subsidiary-year observation can be counted in different categories.

2.4.2

Characteristics and Performance

Next, a comparison is presented of the characteristics and performance among investment
according to the different types of investment purposes.

2.4.2.1

Descriptive Statistics

Table 8: Descriptive statistics for selected variables at affiliate level 13
Variable

Revenue
(‘000 USD)
Number of
employees
Revenue per
employee
(‘000 USD)
Number of
expats
Ratio of
expats to total
employees
First Japanese
parent’s
ownership
level (%)
Subjective
performance
(3 = gain, 2 =
breakeven, 1
= loss)

Subsidiaryyear
observations

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max

38,218

63,466

7,695

811,127

0

106,000,000

62,643

187

30

881

0

79,003

34,667

1,460

189.14

19,199

0

1,507,406

59,459

3

2

6

0

33814

53,831

0.10

0.04

0.14

0.00

1.00

70,078

69.76

90

35.14

0.00

100.00

26,572

2.42

3

0.77

1.00

3.00

13 Because all the variables have highly skewed distributions, the median is also included for descriptive

purposes.
14 The subsidiary is Canon USA. It had 4,980 local employees in 1991, with 338 expats.
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Descriptive statistics were calculated for affiliate-level characteristics (revenue,
employee, revenue per employee, number of expats, ratio of expats to local employees,
the first Japanese parent’s ownership level) and performance, which is measured by a
subjective evaluation of subsidiary profitability by the MNE headquarters. Performance
has three categories: gain, breakeven, and loss.
The descriptive statistics for a few selected variables of interest at the affiliate level are
shown in Table 8, which covers revenue, number of employees, revenue per employee,
number of expatriates, ratio of expatriates to local employees, the first Japanese parent’s
ownership level, and a subjective measure of performance (i.e., 3 = gain, 2 = breakeven,
1 = loss). It shows that the median revenue is US$7.69 million and the median number of
local employees is 30. The median revenue per employee is US$189,000. The average
number of expatriates is three and the ratio of expatriates to local employees is 0.14. The
average ownership level of the first Japanese parent is 70%. In terms of performance,
most affiliate managers rate their performance as half-way between gain and breakeven.
These variables show different levels of missing values, with the ownership level having
the least missing data and the subjective performance having the most missing data.

2.4.2.2

Differences in Characteristics and Performance

Table 9 indicates that affiliates with various investment purposes differ significantly
across the five dimensions of revenue, number of employees, revenue per employee,
number of expats, and ratio of expats to local employees. First, the highest three
categories in terms of revenue are O (trade conflict, US$345.7 million), G (exports to
other countries, US$162.2 million), and A (natural resources and materials, US$132.8
million), and the lowest three categories are M (building new business, US$10.1 million),
H (exports to Japan, US$14.8 million), and B (labor intensity, US$18.3 million). One
possible explanation for the above result is that exports to other countries are used for
market seeking (or revenue-generating purposes), while affiliates engaged in natural
resources and materials are usually mining companies, which can generate a huge amount
of revenue. Those with the lowest revenue may be part of the vertical value chain of the
parent MNEs, such as “exports to Japan” and “labor intensity,” where transfer pricing is

78

Table 9: Affiliate-level characteristics
No.

1

Investment
motive

Natural resource
seekers

Category in
TK dataset

A = natural
resources,
materials

3

4

5

Market seekers

Efficiency
seekers

Strategic asset
seekers

Support
investment

6

7

8

Other

Revenue
per
employee
(‘000 USD)

No. of
expats

Expats
Ratio

Coefficient of
OLS
regression15

182

2,525

2.88

0.13

0.03***

18,381

281

145

3.20

0.04

–0.07***

28,293

281

415

2.70

0.07

–0.03***

59,190

151

1,335

3.18

0.09

–0.01***

I = alliances
with customers
in Japan

26,230

151

625

2.85

0.10

–0.002

M = building
new business

10,150

242

610

1.66

0.12

0.02**

D = building an
international
production
network

77,385

408

308

4.06

0.03

–0.08***

E = building an
international
distribution
network

69,121

76

2,072

2.21

0.11

0.01***

22,874

81

2,165

2.38

0.15

0.05***

62,146

15

10,663

1.12

0.31

0.21***

64,225

107

746

2.66

0.21

0.11***

90,996

84

14,419

3.06

0.28

0.18***

174,339

477

559

1.33

0.03

162,221

84

5,689

3.56

0.20

0.09***

L = research
and
development
J = financing,
currency
hedging
K = information
gathering,
royalty
collection
N = control
business of the
area

Passive
investment

No. of
employees

132,810

B = labor
intensity
C = tax breaks
for investment
F = local
market access
2

Revenue
(‘000 USD)

Equity share of
the first
Japanese parent
firm < 20%
G = exports to
other countries
H = exports to
Japan
O = trade
conflict
P = other
purposes

14,853

168

1,593

1.67

0.07

–0.04***

345,761

686

326

11.71

0.09

–0.02

54,818

172

1,348

3.07

0.18

0.05***

Sample average

63,634

187

1,460

3.00

0.10

15 Results are based on the bivariate OLS regression of the ratio of expats to total employees on investment

purposes, sample size = 53,832.
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quite likely. As there is a risk associated with building new business (Category M), the
lowest revenue is found in that category.
Second, regarding the number of employees, the highest three categories are O (trade
conflict, 686), D (building an international production network, 408), and B (labor
intensity, 281). The lowest three categories are J (financing, currency hedging, 15), E
(building an international distribution network, 76), and L (research and development,
81). N (control business of the area, 84) and G (exports to other countries, 84) are also at
the low end in terms of the number of employees. Apparently, those with production
functions have a higher number of employees, while those in finance, sales, R&D, and
regional management centers have fewer staff.
Third, in terms of revenue per employee, the top three categories are N (control business
of the area), J (financing, currency hedging), and G (exports to other countries), which
benefit from their small employee sizes. Meanwhile, those with more employees have the
lowest rates of revenue per employee, such as O (trade conflict), D (building an
international production network), and B (labor intensity).
Fourth, expatriate staffing is measured by the number of expats and its ratio to total
employees (Peng & Beamish, 2014). The top three categories for the number of expats
are O (trade conflict, 12), D (building an international production network, 4), and G
(exports to other countries, 3.5). The lowest three categories for the number of expats are
J (financing and currency hedging, 1.12), M (building new business, 1.66), and H
(exports to Japan, 1.67). When the expats to total employee ratio is considered, the top
three categories are J (financing and currency hedging, 0.31), N (control business of the
area, 0.28), and K (information gathering, royalty revenue, 0.21). The lowest three
categories are D (building an international production network, 0.03), B (labor intensity,
0.04), and H (exports to Japan, 0.07).
Table 10 shows the ownership modes by affiliates of different investment purposes. The
general pattern is that WOS has the highest percentage, followed by minority, majority,
and then even equity share. In terms of the percentage of WOS among various
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investments, the top three categories are N (control business of the area, 92.6%), J
(financing and currency hedging, 87.2%), and G (exports to other countries, 77.5%),
while the lowest three categories are H (exports to Japan, 41.3%), A (natural resources
and materials, 42.8%), and C (tax breaks for investment, 48.3%). Here, vertical and
horizonal investment cannot explain the result, because categories N, H, and A are all
vertical investments, but they have strikingly different WOS percentages.
The result in Table 11 shows the subjective performance evaluation by affiliate
managers. Among those that have reported gains, the top three categories are B (labor
intensity, 64%), J (financing and currency hedging, 63.2%), and F (local market access,
62.6%), while the lowest three categories are M (building new business, 35.4%), H
(exports to Japan, 40.4%), and N (control business of the area, 35.4%). Although both B
(labor intensity) and H (exports to Japan) are vertical investments, they have very
different levels of “gain” outcome—64% versus 40%. Meanwhile, those categories with
greater risks involved in the business such as M (building new business) and N (control
business of the area) have a lower percentage of “gain.”
In sum, the data show quite a nuanced picture of investment according to different
purposes. Neither the horizontal versus vertical investment framework (Slangen &
Beugelsdijk, 2010) nor the main investment categories proposed by Dunning (1993) can
explain them all. Thus, further extension is warranted.
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Table 10: Ownership modes (%)
No.

1

2

3

4

5

Investment
motive
Natural
resource
seekers

Market
seekers

Efficiency
seekers

Strategic
asset seekers

Support
investment

Category in TK
dataset
A = natural
resources,
materials
B = labor intensity
C = tax breaks for
investment
F = local market
access

7

other

Majority

Even

Minority

Coefficient
for logistic
regression16

42.8

16.1

6.5

34.6

−0.80***

52.1

15.1

7.6

25.2

−0.40***

48.3

11.9

6.1

33.7

−0.56***

62.7

12.3

5.1

19.9

0.07***

I = alliances with
customers in Japan

50.3

16.6

4.8

28.4

−0.48***

M = building new
business

57.8

9.5

3.7

29

−0.16***

D = building an
international
production network

51.3

20

6.6

22

−0.51***

65.1

12.9

4.3

17.7

0.14***

71.9

12.5

5

10.6

0.46***

87.2

4.7

2.3

5.8

1.46***

71.7

8.5

5.8

14

0.45***

92.6

1.9

2

3.5

2.07***

77.5

7.2

4.4

10.8

0.75***

41.3

23.7

2.8

32.3

−0.84***

58.3

22.4

6.6

12.7

−0.14

P = other purposes

65.2

8.4

6.1

20.3

0.15***

Sample average

61.9

12.9

5.3

19.9

E = building an
international
distribution
network
L = research and
development
J = financing,
currency hedging
K = information
gathering, royalty
collection
N = control
business of the area

6

WOS

G = exports to
other countries
H = exports to
Japan
O = trade conflict

16 The co-efficients are drawn from the results of bivariate logistic regression of ownership modes (1 =

WOS and 0= otherwise) on investment purposes (sample: those reported only one investment purpose; size:
61,613 subsidiary-year observations).
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Table 11: Affiliate-level performance (%)
No.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Investment
motive

Category in TK dataset

Natural
resource
seekers

A = natural resources,
materials

61.0

20.4

18.6

0.08

B = labor intensity

64.0

24.3

11.7

0.21*

C = tax breaks for
investment

54.0

31.5

14.5

−0.22*

F = local market access

62.6

21.1

16.3

0.28***

I = alliance with customers
in Japan

57.1

18.3

24.6

−0.09

M = building new business

35.4

27.0

37.6

−0.99***

D = building an
international production
network

61.2

19.6

19.2

0.09*

E = building an
international distribution
network

61.3

24.6

14.1

0.09

43.7

25.2

31.2

−0.64***

63.1

25.3

11.6

0.17*

K = information gathering,
royalty collection

49.3

33.9

16.8

−0.42***

N = control business of the
area

40.9

34.0

25.2

−0.76***

67.0

17.8

15.2

45.1

44.3

10.6

−0.57**

H = exports to Japan

40.4

43.6

16.0

−0.77***

O = trade conflict

55.3

14.6

30.1

-0.16

P = other purposes

51.9

28.4

19.6

-0.32***

Sample average

59.2

23.2

17.6

Market
seekers

Efficiency
seekers

Strategic
asset seekers

Support
investment

Passive
investment

Other

8

L = research and
development
J = financing, currency
hedging

Equity share of the first
Japanese parent firm
< 20%
G = exports to other
countries

Gain

Breakeven

Loss

Coefficients17 of
logistic
regression (gain
= 1; breakeven
or loss = 0)

17 The result is based upon bivariate logistic regression of performance on investment purposes; sample

size = 26,572.
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2.5 Preliminary Discussion
This chapter reintroduced the centrality of investment purposes to IB research (Dunning
& Lundan, 2008) and proposed a theoretical framework with antecedents and
consequences for different investment motives. It integrates theoretical arguments on the
joint efforts of ownership advantages and home- and host-country location advantages on
investment motives (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012; Meyer et al., 2011)
and the systematic differences in affiliate-level characteristics (such as size, mode choice,
and expatriate deployment) and performance associated with each type of investment
motive (Benito, 2015). We tested our hypotheses using the TK dataset. The preliminary
results largely supported Hypotheses 3 and 4. The details are as follows.

2.5.1

Size

The size of the affiliates is measured by the number of local employees. The sample
average is 187, while those in manufacturing functions such as those with the purposes of
“labor intensity” (281), “tax breaks for investment” (281), and “building an international
production network” (408) consistently have a higher-than-average number of
employees. Meanwhile, those with a finance (“financing and currency hedging”: 15),
sales (“building an international distribution network”: 76), and regional management
(“control business of the area”: 84) function have a consistently lower-than-average
subsidiary size. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that those in support
functions have a smaller size compared with those with major functions.
These results provide additional support to Beamish and Inkpen’s (1998) decision to
exclude subsidiaries with fewer than 20 employees from analysis due to concerns over
non-viable subsidiary organizations that were just agencies or sales offices with a few
employees. Those subsidiaries with financing and hedging functions are also small, with
an average of 15 employees.

2.5.2

Mode Choice

We hypothesized in Hypothesis 3a that those subsidiaries with market-seeking, naturalresource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, strategic-seeking, and support functions are likely
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to choose WOSs over IJVs, while those subsidiaries with labor-seeking purposes are
likely to choose IJVs over WOSs. The results generally support our hypothesis.
The main theory linking investment purposes and mode choices is internalization, where
the major market failures are asset specificity and information content. MNEs may prefer
WOSs over IJVs due to concerns over information content, i.e., protection of their
proprietary knowledge and know-how. Another perspective on asset specificity and
vertical integration also argues for a preference of WOSs over IJVs because coordination
among affiliates and tighter control is needed if a subsidiary is part of the vertical value
chain (Kim & Hwang, 1992). However, an IJV will be the preferential ownership mode if
local partners are able to provide complementary assets (Beamish & Banks, 1987) and
ownership is used as an incentive to local partners (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015).
Our data show that those in the resource-seeking categories (A, “natural resources and
materials,” and B, “labor intensity”) preferred IJVs over WOSs, which is consistent with
the literature (Gil et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2015) in that local partners provided
complementary assets to focal MNEs (Beamish & Banks, 1987), although they were part
of the vertical value chain of the MNE network. However, other subsidiaries that were
also part of the vertical value chain showed a different preference in terms of ownership
modes. For example, those subsidiaries in the support functions such as “financing and
currency hedging” (J), “information gathering and royalty collection” (K), and “control
business of the area” (N) all showed a preference for WOSs over IJVs. One possible
explanation is that these functions are vital to the operations of the focal MNE, and local
partners can offer few complementary assets.
As no previous research investigated the relationship between efficiency seeking and
mode choice, the present study addressed this gap by showing that those subsidiaries
established with the purpose of building an international production network showed a
preference for IJVs over WOSs, while those with the purpose of building an international
distribution network showed a preference for WOSs over IJVs. Although both of these
two investments are aimed at improving the efficiency of the MNE network and both are
part of the vertical value chain of the MNE, those in the downstream sector, such as sales,
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are far more valued than those in the upstream (production) sector. Consistent with prior
research (Cui & Jiang, 2009), those in the category of “research and development” (I)
showed a preference for WOSs over IJVs because strategic assets such as brands,
distribution channels, and technology cannot be fully accessed via an IJV (Rui & Yip,
2008).
Among market seekers, those with the purpose of “local market access” showed a
preference for WOSs over IJVs due to concerns with protecting their proprietary
knowledge and know-how (Brothers & Hennart, 2007; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986).
However, other subgroups in the market-seeking category preferred IJVs over WOSs. For
example, those with the purpose of “alliancess with customers in Japan” (I) preferred
IJVs over WOSs, which is different from the mode choice of U.S. service MNEs
expanding abroad by following their clients (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). Erramilli and Rao
(1990) suggested that local knowledge was not highly valued in the service industry
when MNEs followed their clients in international expansion. In our sample, those in the
service industry only accounted for 25% of those following the clients. Local knowledge
and complementary assets offered by local partners are indeed valued by MNEs even
when they follow their clients abroad when they operate in industries other than the
service industry.
With regard to the other two categories of market seekers, both “tax breaks for
investment” (C) and “building new business” (M) showed a preference for IJVs over
WOSs. For those in the category of “tax breaks for investment,” they invested in the host
country due to favorable investment policies offered by the host government. In many
cases, governments required investors to establish IJVs in hopes of a positive technology
spillover from the focal MNE. Meanwhile, in the case of “building new business” (M) in
a non-home-country context, an IJV is also preferred over a WOS. One possible
explanation is that there is considerable risk involved in building up a new business in a
non-home-country context, and a local partner can share risks and uncertainty associated
with a new business.
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In sum, TCE arguments still hold in cases when technology, brand, sales, and distribution
channels are at stake. Here, WOSs are still preferred over IJVs. However, in cases where
local partners can offer supplementary assets and the affiliates are involved in resourceand labor-seeking FDI, IJVs are preferred over WOSs. The findings are consistent with
the arguments of the smile of value creation (Mudambi, 2007) and smile-dynamic
analysis (Mudambi, 2008), where advanced economies are in control of the two ends of
the smile, i.e., R&D, marketing, distribution, and specialized services, while emerging
economies are mainly stuck in the manufacturing sector. Our findings show that MNEs
operating at the two ends of the smile curve, i.e., R&D, marketing, and distribution, are
more likely to prefer WOSs over IJVs, while those in the middle of the curve, i.e.,
manufacturing, are more likely to choose IJVs over WOSs.

2.5.3

Expatriate Control

With regard to expatriate control, we hypothesized in Hypothesis 3b that there is a
positive association with vertical FDI and expatriate deployment. This received empirical
support. As noted in the literature, expatriates play two primary roles in a subsidiary, i.e.,
control and knowledge management (Delios & Bjiorkman, 2000). Our results are
consistent with the literature in that when there is a stronger need for control and
coordination, either due to concerns over vertical integration (as in the categories of
“natural resources and materials” and “building an international distribution network”) or
due to risks involved (as in the category “building new business”), the expat ratio is
higher. Meanwhile, those subsidiaries in support functions also showed a greater desire
for control (i.e., financing and currency hedging, information gathering and royalty
collection, control business of the area). When there is a need for knowledge transfer, the
expat ratio is higher than average, i.e., as in the category of research and development.
Moreover, for investments with the purpose of exploiting cheap local labor (i.e., labor
intensity and building an international production network), the expat ratio is much lower
compared with the group average, although they are also part of the vertical supply chain.
In other words, the coordination and control needs among subsidiaries established for
vertical integration purposes are different due to the divergent functions they play.
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Meanwhile, there is a different need for expats among market seekers. For example,
“local market access” has a negative impact on the expat ratio, which is consistent with
the literature in that local managers have better knowledge about the local market and it
makes good business sense to hire locals instead of sending expats (Beamish & Inkpen,
1998). However, those in the category of “tax breaks for investment” had a lower-thanaverage expat ratio. One possible explanation is that these are manufacturing subsidiaries.
For those that follow their customers in international expansion, this has no effect on the
expat ratio, which means that they have an average expat ratio. This suggests that those
who venture abroad by following their clients have an average need for control and
coordination.

2.5.4

Performance

We hypothesized in Hypothesis 4 that the profitability of the subsidiary is contingent
upon the timeframe used to evaluate performance and that those investments with the
motive of strategic asset seeking are likely to underperform compared with other types of
investments due to the longer time horizon innate in this type of FDI project. This
hypothesis received empirical support.
Our results are consistent with Verbeke et al.’s (2009) argument that FDI with different
investment purposes is likely to have different performance objectives and different time
horizons to achieve those objectives. FDI established for vertical integration purposes
such as natural resource seeking (i.e., labor intensity) or efficiency seeking (building an
international production network) had a positive effect on the performance evaluation of
gain. FDI established for strategic-asset-seeking purposes had a negative effect on
performance evaluation. In contrast, FDI in the category of market seeking has a mixed
picture. For example, that in the category of “local market access” had a positive effect
on performance evaluation, while that in the categories of “tax breaks for investment”
and “building new business” had a negative effect. One possible explanation of the
negative effect of “building new business” on performance outcome is the risks involved
in building new business.
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Meanwhile, FDI in the support function had a mixed effect on the performance outcome.
FDI in the category of “financing and hedging” had a positive effect, while FDI in
regional management functions such as “information gathering” and “control business of
area” had a negative effect on performance.

2.6 Limitations and Directions for Future Studies
This chapter has limitations. First, it only covered four characteristics and performance
measures for each type of investment motive. Future studies can further explore how
affiliates differ by other characteristics and performance outcomes such as industry,
location, and exit rate, etc. Meanwhile, this chapter only examined the direct relationship
between investment purposes and performance outcomes. Future studies can examine
whether investment purposes moderate the existing relationships in IB studies and what
types of relationships are likely to be moderated by investment purposes. For example,
Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) found that there is a downward curve relationship between
ownership level and subsidiary exit rate. It would be interesting to see whether and how
this curve differs by each investment purpose.
Second, this analysis is based on FDI that originated in Japan. Future studies can test
Dunning’s typology on FDI from other developed countries and emerging economies.
Third, future studies can further explore the theme of heterogeneity among subsidiaries
by examining other special categories such as small-employment subsidiaries, i.e., those
with fewer than 20 employees. Some of these small-employment subsidiaries have
billions of dollars in revenue, which makes it worthwhile to examine how they generate
such a large amount of revenue and how they are managed by the headquarters. This
question will be considered in Chapter 3.

2.7 Preliminary Conclusion
The present study is the first empirical attempt to systematically test Dunning’s (1993)
typology on investment motives, using the largest sample ever employed to date.
Dunning’s original typology offered definitions and examples for each type of investment
motive. This study suggests that Dunning’s typology does have predictive power for key
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characteristics (such as size, ownership control, and expatriate control) and performance
outcomes. It extends Dunning’s typology by offering theoretical explanations to account
for the differences among FDI with divergent investment purposes. It also makes an
empirical contribution in that it includes all categories specified in Dunning’s (1993)
typology, whereas most previous empirical studies examined only one or two investment
purposes in a single study, sometimes in a piecemeal fashion.
Second, this study provides a nuanced picture of FDI in functions such as “financing and
hedging,” “information gathering and royalty revenue,” and “building new business,”
which have been neglected in most empirical analyses of investment motives (CuervoCazurra & Narula, 2015). These investment motives are not only important in a strategic
sense, but also in investment dollars. FDI with these motives is substantially different
from other types of FDI and collectively exemplifies the central theme of this
dissertation—that there is huge heterogeneity (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2008) among
subsidiaries. Hence, there is a need to disaggregate data and treat investments with
different investment motives separately. We also argue that where data is available,
investment motives should be routinely included in an IB analysis looking at foreign
investment.
Third, our results also show that there is a huge difference among subcategories of major
investment motives. For example, under the big umbrella of “market-seeking” FDI, there
are four subcategories such as “local market access,” “tax breaks for investment,”
“alliances with customers in Japan,” and “building new business.” The latter three
subcategories are substantially different from the first subcategory in all the four
characteristics and performance measures tested in the present research. This suggests
that future IB studies should consider investment motives at the subcategory level.
In summary, Dunning’s (1993) typology on investment motives does have predictive
power. Due to significant heterogeneity among subsidiaries, special attention should be
given to FDI in special categories such as “financing and currency hedging,”
“information gathering and royalty collection,” and “building new business” and
subcategories of major investment motivations.
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Chapter 3

3

Subsidiary Size and Survival

This chapter addresses the following two research questions: (1) What is the main
relationship between subsidiary size and survival? (2) How is this main effect moderated
by the special roles of small-employment subsidiaries? Examples of such roles include
serving as centers of importance and serving as a means of vertical investment.
The main theoretical/conceptual lenses used in this chapter are the liability of smallness
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986) and orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). It has been
argued that there is a high mortality rate for small organizations because they do not have
access to resources, especially financial resources. Meanwhile, orchestration theory
argues that “MNE operations are not a set of isolated, separable elements. Instead, each
MNE is an integrated entity” (Pitelis & Teece, 2018: 532).Thus, subsidiaries are not all
equally important within the MNE network. Extending this logic, we found that
subsidiaries that have been assigned special roles (such as being centers of importance)
within the MNE network have different survival prospects compared with standard
subsidiaries.
In our analysis, we examined how a subsidiary’s size influences its exit rate and how this
relationship is moderated by small-employment subsidiaries with access to resources.
The main statistical tool used in this chapter is a Cox proportional hazards model for
survival analysis.
We make at least two contributions to the literature. First, we quantify the liability of
smallness by showing the survival likelihood of small-employment subsidiaries. Second,
we identify four contingency factors that enhance the survival chances of smallemployment subsidiaries. These are the special roles of i) centers of importance, (ii)
vertical investment, (iii) being in a human capital-intensive industry, and (iv) being
located in a developed country.
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3.1 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature on the concepts of the liability of newness
(Stinchcombe, 1965) and the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), followed by
the literature on the advantages of larger firms (Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015) and
the “small is beautiful” concept (Schumacher, 1974). Afterwards, the relationship
between subsidiary size and survival is examined.

3.1.1

Liability of Newness and Liability of Smallness

The seminal work of Stinchcombe (1965) on the “liability of newness” identified a few
key internal and external obstacles for new organizations. Internal constraints include the
creation of new roles and structures, which might result in temporary inefficiencies. New
organizations also face issues in attracting qualified employees. External barriers include
competitive pressure from established organizations, which makes entry into a new
market or domain prohibitive. The liability of newness might also intersect with the
liability of smallness, as new organizations are usually small (Aldrich & Auster, 1986;
Bruderl & Schussler, 1990). In addition to co-existing with the liability of newness, the
liability of smallness adds additional explanatory power for the high mortality rate of new
organizations (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983).
Moreover, not all new organizations are born small. Aldrich and Auster (1986) formally
formulated the construct of the “liability of smallness.” They argued that smaller
organizations face difficulties in raising financial capital, satisfying government tax
regulations, competing with larger organizations for qualified employees, and so on. This
chapter focuses on the liability of smallness.
Early studies on the liability of smallness focused on the disadvantages of smaller firms,
such as the high mortality rate of smaller firms (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Freeman, Carroll,
& Hannan, 1983), and the advantages of larger firms, including delivering high-quality
goods in a reliable manner (Hanan & Freeman, 1977), accessing financial capital
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986), gaining external legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1991), and
achieving economies of scale (Jovanovic, 1982) and market power (Bain, 1956).
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3.1.2

Advantages of Larger Firms

Recent empirical research on firm size has further identified four areas of advantage for
larger firms: (1) resources, (2) economies of scale and scope, (3) legitimacy, and (4)
market power (Josefy et al., 2015).

3.1.2.1

Resources

Size is closely associated with a firm’s acquired and retained resources. Larger firms
enjoy an advantage over smaller ones in terms of absolute resource advantage, slack
resources, and valuable capabilities (Josefy et al., 2015).
First, larger firms have an absolute resource advantage over smaller ones, including
access to information (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998) and other resources essential to the
survival of the organization. As a result, they are more self-reliant and less dependent on
external sources, such as director interlocks or alliance partners (Lavie, 2006), for
resources. For example, larger firms have better access to information than smaller ones
because they have more employees to collect environmental information and have more
resources to gather information through other means such as hiring consultants and
attending conferences (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).
Second, there are benefits associated with slack resources, which facilitate larger firms to
survive in changing and turbulent environments by initiating strategic change, such as
through new product introduction or innovation (Bourgeois, 1981). Due to the
availability of slack resources, there is less risk associated with experimenting with new
products and new markets, which reduces the failure rate (Hannan & Freeman, 1989).
Meanwhile, larger firms are more likely to engage in geographic diversification and enter
new markets (Fuentelsaz, Gomez, & Polo, 2002). In addition to product and market
diversification, slack resources also provide an advantage for larger firms in innovation
because they can recoup R&D expenditures faster due to the greater volume of product
sales (Cohen & Klepper, 1996).
Third, in addition to innovation, larger firms are endowed with a number of other
valuable capabilities, such as political lobbying and the ability to manage a network of
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relationships (Josefy et al., 2015). In investigating the network evolution and quality of
knowledge accessed by firms of different sizes in the biotechnology industry, Demirkan,
Deeds, and Demirkan (2012) found that larger firms are better at growing their network
size due to existing policies and structures of collaborative networks. Meanwhile, larger
firms have a greater incentive to engage in political lobbying activities for beneficial
public policies for their industry, sometimes even for their own firm (Schuler, 1996;
Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). Larger firms benefit disproportionally from the
preferential public policies in their industry, although smaller firms can free-ride on the
same polices.

3.1.2.2

Economies of Scale and Scope

Larger firms benefit from economies of scale in production and achieve greater efficiency
because their unit cost is lower due to the large volume, which constitutes a major
competitive advantage for large firms in a single business (Barney, 2002). Dobrev and
Carroll (2003) proposed a mechanism for a firm to translate a large production volume
into cost efficiencies and suggested that a firm should have the following abilities: “(1) to
purchase and make use of specialized manufacturing equipment; (2) to derive savings
from operational expansions and quicker pay-back on investments in production facilities
and capacity expansion; (3) to promote in-depth employee specialization based on an
intricate division of labor; (4) to extract rents from experiential learning and the benefits
of high frequency with which the same tasks are carried out; and (5) to reduce per unit
overhead costs” (p. 542). Investigating the mortality rates of large organizations in the
automobile industry in four major countries, Dobrev and Carroll (2003) found that the
largest organizations had lower rates of mortality.
In addition to economies of scale, large organizations also benefit from economies of
scope through related diversification and exploiting the synergy between their “strategic
assets” (Josefy et al., 2015; Markides & Williamson, 1994). Through related
diversification, a firm can expand and create new strategic assets more rapidly and at a
lower cost than rivals who are not diversified across related businesses, which also
constitutes a competitive advantage of large organizations (Markides & Williamson,
1994).
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3.1.2.3

Legitimacy and Status

Having a large size may assist the focal organization in establishing legitimacy among
external stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, the result may be confounded
by age because size is highly correlated with age (Baum & Oliver, 1991). Meanwhile, as
firms age, they may have more opportunities to take actions that help to establish
legitimacy among external stakeholders.
Moreover, large firms may enjoy an advantage in technical legitimacy (Ruef & Scott,
1998) and reputation (Staw & Epstein, 2000). Investigating the antecedents of the
technical legitimacy of 143 hospital organizations over a 46-year period, Ruef and Scott
(1998) found that a larger size is positively associated with technical legitimacy. Size was
treated by the latter as a proxy for the ability of an organization to acquire the latest
diagnostic and medical resources to achieve technical supremacy.
In addition, larger firms are more visible than their smaller counterparts. As a result, they
may receive more attention from external stakeholders such as media and nongovernmental organizations (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Nonetheless, they may receive
more media scrutiny and lower levels of media support (Deephouse, 1996).

3.1.2.4

Market Power

Compared with smaller firms, larger firms may have greater market power (Josefy et al.,
2015). They also tend to possess more market share and can force their suppliers and
customers to become price takers (Dobrev & Carroll, 2003).
Larger firms enjoy advantages in terms of resources, economies of scale and scope,
legitimacy, and market power. Nonetheless, there are also liabilities associated with
largeness, such as increased bureaucracy, inertia/instability, and scrutiny (Josefy et al.,
2015). Meanwhile, smaller firms also enjoy certain advantages, as described by
Schumacher (1974): “small is beautiful.”
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3.1.3

Small Is Beautiful

Small firms have resources and capabilities that differ from those of larger firms. Unlike
their larger counterparts, which may face constraints from bureaucracy and
organizational inertia, small firms are nimbler and more flexible. They may be better
positioned to exploit certain opportunities, such as a growing industry niche (Dean,
Brown, & Bamford, 1998).
Meanwhile, small firms may also possess resources for innovation that differ from those
of larger firms (King, Covin, & Hegarty, 2003). Although larger firms possess slack
resources that are conducive to innovation, smaller firms are less constrained by
organizational bureaucracy and may earn greater returns on their R&D investment
(Josefy et al., 2015). Individuals are often more creative in small firms, as they exercise
greater control over their situational factors (Glynn, 1996). Small firms are also more
likely to introduce radical innovation, as they are less constrained by the status quo.
Although small firms are more flexible and innovative, they often lack resources to
effectively commercialize innovation and frequently seek partnership with larger firms
(Josefy et al., 2015).
Moreover, compared to their larger counterparts, who are constrained by structural
inertia, small firms are more likely to quickly engage in competitive behavior and execute
strategic changes (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).
In addition, larger firms are generally more influential than their smaller counterparts. For
instance, larger firms have a greater ability to diffuse innovation (Josefy et al., 2015).
However, in certain circumstances, smaller firms can exert a disproportionate influence.
For example, when the value of adopting certain organizational practices, such as
ISO9000 quality management standards, increases with organizational size, smaller
adopters have a greater influence than their larger counterparts over subsequent adoption
by other organizations (Terlaak & King, 2007).
Finally, with the advancement of new technology, it is easier for a small firm to raise
capital through crowdfunding (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2013) because
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traditional sources of funding give preference to larger firms (Aldrich & Auster, 1986).
Meanwhile, new technology has also made it easier for small firms to establish
legitimacy through social media. For example, small firms can post campaigns, videos,
and promotions on social media platforms such as Instagram or Facebook, which can go
viral and help the firms obtain support from celebrities or customers (Josefy et al., 2015).

3.1.4

Subsidiary Size and Exit

This section first reviews the literature on size and survival, then examines the literature
on subsidiary size and survival in international business.

3.1.4.1

Size and Exit

As explained in previous sections, larger firms enjoy several advantages over small firms
in terms of access to resources and economies of scale and scope, which helps them
survive longer than their smaller counterparts. Larger firms in their initial years survive
longer than their smaller counterparts and this effect is almost permanent, as
demonstrated by Geroski, Mata, and Portugal (2010) in a large sample of 118,070 new
start-up firms from 1983–1993 in Portugal. Meanwhile, larger firms often receive
favorable regulatory treatment due to their importance to a national economy, i.e., “too
big to fail” (Dobrev & Carroll, 2003), as evidenced by the government bailouts of large
financial institutions and large manufacturers by the U.S. government in the 2008
financial crisis (Lien & Klein, 2013).
Meanwhile, small firms also have a survival advantage in industry segments where they
are too small to be profitably exploited by large organizations (Dobrev, 2000). Dobrev
and Carroll (2003), in studying automobile manufacturers in Britain, France, Germany,
and the United States from 1885 to 1981, found that firms at both ends of the relative size
spectrum enjoyed a survival advantage. The results on small firms are also supported by
separate studies. Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) found that the likelihood of survival for
small firms was generally lower than for their larger counterparts. However, the same
relationship does not hold for mature stages of the product lifecycle (Agarwal, Sarkar, &
Echambadi, 2002) or technology-intensive products because small players can
successfully fill a strategic niche.
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3.1.4.2

Subsidiary Size and Exit

The size of a subsidiary is a proxy for the tangible and intangible resources available to it
(Penrose, 1995; Johnston & Menguc, 2007). There are few empirical studies using
subsidiary size as the main predictor. One of the few exceptions is Johnston and Menguc
(2007), who examined the relationship between subsidiary size and the level of
subsidiary autonomy and found a quadratic inverted U-shaped relationship.
There is even less empirical research on the relationship between subsidiary size and exit.
Delios and Ensign (2000) investigated Japanese investment in Canada, and subsidiary
size was one of the main predictors. Subsidiary size measured by the log of capital
invested was negatively associated with the likelihood of exit. In most empirical studies
on subsidiary exit, subsidiary size was added as a control variable (e.g., Getachew &
Beamish, 2017). Our study addresses this empirical gap by systematically investigating
the relationship between subsidiary size and survival, with a particular focus on small
subsidiaries.

3.2 Theoretical Framework
3.2.1

Main Effect of Subsidiary Size

MNEs have access to and use resources such as financial capital, managerial talent, and
knowledge (Johnston & Menguc, 2007). Hedlund (1981) suggested that a large
subsidiary has greater resources than a small subsidiary, which was supported empirically
(Prahalad & Doz, 1981). Because there is a negative association between resources and
rate of exit (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Baum & Oliver, 1991; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan,
1983), size is thought to have a negative effect on mortality. Hence, we have the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit rate than larger ones.
In the following section, four contingency factors are proposed to moderate the main
effect. The first contingency factor is the type of resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
owned by small subsidiaries, where “centers of importance” command higher status in
the MNE network. The second factor is vertical versus horizontal FDI (Slangen &
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Beugelsdijk, 2010). The third factor is being in a human capital-intensive industry (Silk
& Berndt, 1993), where larger firms do not necessarily enjoy the cost-saving advantages
of economies of scale and scope. The fourth factor is environmental factors at the
national level that attenuate the liability of smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965).

3.2.2

Centers of Importance

There are four main types of MNE activity, i.e., natural resource seekers, market seekers,
efficiency seekers, and strategic asset or capability seekers (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).
In addition, there are other motives for MNE activity, such as escape investments,
support investments, and passive investments. This chapter focuses on support
investments, where the very purpose of subsidiaries is to support the MNE network of
which they are part (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).
Subsidiaries that are set up for support investments are often cost centers instead of being
self-contained profit centers. They incur costs and create benefits for the rest of the MNE
network. Most of these support investments are trade- and finance-related investments of
MNEs, and aim to facilitate the export of goods and the purchase of raw materials from
other companies. These activities are often the first step in setting up market- or resourceseeking production facilities (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Others are regional
headquarters with various functions, such as coordinating the activities of operating units
and collecting marketing and financial information for the parent firm. They often act as
a “listening and monitoring arm” of the parent firm (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).
Borrowing from the concept of “centers of excellence” (Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign,
2002), we coin the term “centers of importance” to describe these support investments.
We define a “center of importance” as a non-regular organizational unit with a set of
resources and capabilities serving the functioning of the MNE network as a whole. These
“centers of importance” include subsidiaries for support investments, new business
development, and strategic asset-seeking activities. As argued by orchestration theory,
not all subsidiaries are equally important within an MNE network (Pitelis & Teece,
2018). Because centers of importance own resources that are strategically important to
the MNE network, they are likely to command a higher status compared with regular
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subsidiaries (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As a result, the MNE parent firms are likely to
devote more attention and resources (Hedlund, 1981) to these subsidiaries. Meanwhile, as
these centers are designed as cost centers, their profitability may not be relevant to their
survival.
Small subsidiaries established for support function purposes own resources critical to the
MNE network. MNE parent firms are likely to devote more attention to these affiliates
and incur more costs for their survival. As a result, they have a lower mortality rate than
small affiliates without such functions because they have these extra resources and
attention from MNE parent firms. Hence, we put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Small subsidiaries designed as “centers of importance” have a
lower exit rate compared with subsidiaries established for other purposes.

3.2.3

Vertical versus Horizontal FDI

Exploratory studies on the divestment decisions of big firms suggest that small units that
do not enjoy synergy with other units are more likely to be divested (Duhaime & Baird,
1987). In addition to classifying FDI along the main typologies of investment purposes,
these investments can also be categorized along two other dimensions: vertical
investment and horizontal investment (Beugelsdijk, Smeets, & Zwinkels, 2008; Caves,
2007; Kobrin, 1976; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010; Zaheer, 1995). Horizontal
investments are standalone affiliates with the main purpose of local market seeking. They
often sell products to unaffiliated customers and perform all value chain activities starting
from raw material procurement to production and sales (Caves, 2007; Zaheer, 1995).
They may operate rather independently of their parent firms and sister subsidiaries and
are well embedded in their local environment (Kobrin, 1976; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).
On the other hand, vertical investments often perform part of the value chain activity and
sell their output to affiliated subsidiaries for further processing or final sales (Caves,
2007; Zaheer, 1995). They are part of the interlinked MNE network and seek to take
advantage of inter-country differences in terms of natural resources and inexpensive labor
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Kobrin, 1991; Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). Because vertical
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affiliates are often supplied by sister subsidiaries instead of local suppliers and because
they sell their output to affiliated rather than unaffiliated customers, they are more tightly
integrated with the rest of the MNE network than horizontal affiliates (Prahalad & Doz,
1987).
Because small subsidiaries that are set up for the purpose of vertical FDI are more tightly
integrated with the MNE network than standalone horizontal FDI, we expect that small
vertical subsidiaries have greater synergy with the rest of the MNE network and are less
likely to be divested. Hence, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: Small vertical subsidiaries have a lower exit rate than small
horizontal subsidiaries.

3.2.4

Human Capital-Intensive Industry

As discussed earlier, larger firms enjoy economies of scale and scope over smaller firms,
thus entailing a cost advantage in traditional labor-intensive industries such as
manufacturing (Josefy et al., 2015). In traditional industries, small firms partially
overcome the liability of smallness (and the frequently high exit rate) by occupying a
strategic niche (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2002). However, in human
capital-intensive industries where clients receive professional services, such as law,
consulting, advertising, and accounting, both very large and very small firms persist (von
Nordenflycht, 2011). The following discussion is limited to why very small firms exist
and persist in human capital-intensive industries.
First, small firms in those industries do not necessarily suffer a cost disadvantage because
there is a very low threshold for scale economies. For example, in the advertising
industry, $3 million or $4 million in annual revenue is enough to achieve economies of
scale (Silk & Berndt, 1993). Second, even if operating at 50% below that threshold, the
cost disadvantage incurred is less than 5% (Silk & Berndt, 1995). Third, most firms in
those industries operate across a wide scope, which has made economies of scope an
industry norm, rather than an exception enjoyed only by large firms (Silk & Berndt,
1995).
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As a result, there is less of a liability of smallness (hence, a lower exit rate) in human
capital-intensive industries compared with small firms in traditional industries. Hence, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: Small subsidiaries in human capital-intensive industries have a
lower exit rate compared with small subsidiaries in other industries.

3.2.5

Developed versus Developing Countries

The FDI literature suggests that developed countries and developing countries differ
significantly in terms of both institutional environments and macroeconomic conditions
(Beamish, 1985; 1993; Getachew & Beamish, 2017). In general, developed countries
have better institutional support and mature market infrastructure, while developing
countries are characterized by weak institutional support and high market growth
potential.
First, in terms of the institutional environment, developed countries provide stronger
property rights protection and law enforcement, high levels of general literacy, and a
mature market economy infrastructure (Makino et al., 2004). In contrast, developing
countries are characterized by “institutional voids” (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011) where
market-supporting institutions are weak (Mair & Marti, 2009) or absent. Developing
countries also suffer from “institutional instability” due to sudden changes of government
(Zoogah, Peng, & Woldu, 2015) or war and conflict (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013;
2017). Empirical studies suggest that foreign subsidiaries have a higher exit rate from
developing countries such as African nations than their counterparts in developed
countries such as OECD nations (e.g., Getachew & Beamish, 2017).
Second, macroeconomic conditions affect the likelihood of firm survival for several
reasons (Geroski et al., 2010). First, under unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, firms
have pessimistic perceptions of future economic development and are more likely to exit
than during economic booms. Second, during economic recessions, many firms face cash
constraints and struggle to secure financial resources even if they intend to stay in
business. Using the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate as a proxy for a favorable
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macroeconomic environment, Geroski et al. (2010) found a negative association between
GDP growth rate and firm exit.
Moreover, during economic recessions, new and small firms are more likely to exit than
their larger counterparts because the problem of cash constraints is more severe for them
than for established firms (Cabral & Mata, 2003). New and small firms have less time to
establish legitimacy and secure financial resources (Diamond, 1989).
Although developing countries have higher economic growth potential, general
macroeconomic conditions are better in developed countries than in developing countries.
In addition, developed countries have better fiscal policies than developing ones. As a
result, small subsidiaries are less likely to go out of business, because it is also much
easier for them to access financial resources due to favorable fiscal policies. As a result,
MNE parent firms are less likely to divest small subsidiaries in developed countries than
in developing countries. Thus, we put forward the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Small subsidiaries in developed countries have a lower exit rate than
their counterparts in developing countries.

3.3 Methodology
3.3.1

Data and Sample

We used the Toyo Keizai dataset, which covers Japanese investment from 1991 to 2017.
The Toyo Keizai annually surveys general managers of all Japanese subsidiaries in which
a parent firm is listed on a major stock exchange in Japan. Although the survey is
exhaustive of all overseas investment of Japanese parent firms that respond to the annual
survey, it is estimated that the Toyo Keizai dataset’s coverage is close to only 40% of all
Japanese FDI (Delios & Ensign, 2000). The Toyo Keizai dataset has been used in more
than 120 high-quality journal publications. It covers 56,193 Japanese overseas
subsidiaries in 164 countries by 8,318 Japanese parent firms.
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3.3.2
3.3.2.1

Measures
Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the exit rate of an overseas subsidiary. A dummy variable is
used to indicate the exit status of a subsidiary in each year. This variable is coded as 1 if a
subsidiary exited from the database and 0 otherwise.

3.3.2.2

Independent Variables

The main independent variable is a subsidiary’s size. It is measured by the number of
employees in each subsidiary. Unlike previous studies that log transform the number to
achieve a normal distribution of the variable (e.g., Getachew & Beamish, 2017), we
categorize this variable so that those subsidiaries with zero employees can still be
included in our analysis. A preliminary descriptive analysis shows that 40 is the median
number of employees, while 234 is the mean number of employees. Moreover, 20 has
been used as the cut-off point for firms with a small number of employees, a group that
has been routinely excluded from data analysis in the IB literature (Beamish & Inkpen,
1998). In addition, we intend to gain a nuanced understanding of small subsidiaries with
fewer than 20 employees, and thus we further divided subsidiaries in this category.
Taking all these factors into consideration, we divided the subsidiaries into seven
categories, i.e., (1) zero employees; (2) between 1 and 5 employees; (3) between 6 and 10
employees; (4) between 11 and 19 employees; (5) between 20 and 40 employees; (6)
between 41 and 234 employees; and (7) 235 or more employees. As shown in Table 12,
the largest category belongs to those with between 41 and 234 employees (31%), while
around 10% subsidiaries have zero employees; 20% of subsidiaries have between 1 and 5
employees; 16% of subsidiaries have between 6 and 10 employees; another 16% of
subsidiaries have between 11 and 19 employees; 20% of subsidiaries have between 20
and 40 employees; and 17% of subsidiaries have 235 or more employees.18.

18 As the number of employees of a particular subsidiary changes, the subsidiary can fall into multiple

categories. As a result, the percentages of the numbers of subsidiaries add up to more than 100%.
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Four contingency factors were also identified in hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. The first factor
is a subsidiary’s status of “center of importance.” As discussed previously, “centers of
importance” include support investments, new business development, and strategic asset
seeking. Those subsidiaries with support investment motives such as “financing and
currency hedging,” “information gathering,” and “control business of the area” are coded
as 1. Meanwhile, those with the investment motive of “new business development” or
“research and development” are also coded as 1. If a subsidiary has none of the
abovementioned investment motives, it is coded as 0.
Table 12: Number of subsidiary-years and subsidiaries in each cell
Category
Zero employees
1–5 employees
6–10 employees
11–19 employees
20–40 employees
41–234 employees
235 or more
employees
Missing
Total

No. of
subsidiary-years
22,261
52,315
37,721
38,526
54,930
123,283
77,246

(%)

(%)19

4.00
9.39
6.77
6.91
9.86
22.13
13.86

No. of
subsidiaries
5,790
10,946
9,144
9,087
11,389
17,176
9,276

150,897
557,179

27.08
100.00

30,844
56,193

54.89
100.00

10.30
19.48
16.27
16.17
20.27
30.57
16.51

Second, those subsidiaries with the investment purpose of “natural resources and
materials” are coded as 1 for “vertical investment” and 0 otherwise.
Third, “human capital-intensive industry” is indicated by the industry sector of the
subsidiary. Those in the industry sectors of “finance, insurance and real estate,”

19 As the number of employees of a particular subsidiary changes, the subsidiary can fall into multiple

categories. As a result, the percentages of the numbers of subsidiaries add up to more than 100%. The
number of subsidiaries entries add up to more than 56,193.
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“investment company,” “retail,” “services,” or “wholesale trade” are coded as 1 and 0
otherwise.
Fourth, we defined developed countries versus developing countries using the country
classification of the United Nations (Makino et al., 2004). This broadly defined countries
as falling under three categories: developed economies, developing economies, and least
developed countries. Because the sample size of the least developed countries is
conspicuously small (only accounting for 0.5% of all subsidiaries), we combined the
categories of developing economies and least developed countries. A country is coded as
1 if it is a developed country and 0 otherwise.

3.3.2.3

Control Variables

To rule out other potential explanations, we controlled for several variables at the
subsidiary, parent firm, and country levels. First, at the subsidiary level, we controlled for
two variables that have been found to be theoretically related to subsidiary exit. We
controlled for subsidiary age, as younger firms have a higher exit rate than their older
counterparts (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982). We also
controlled for the ownership level of the parent firm, as a higher ownership level is
associated with a lower exit rate (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Getachew & Beamish,
2017). This is operationalized by the first Japanese parent firm’s ownership level.
Second, at the parent firm level, we controlled for the number of Japanese parents. As
multiple parent firm companies will lead to managerial complexity, which improves exit
(Makino & Beamish, 1998). We also controlled for parent firm size, by the log
transformation of its net sales.
Third, at the country level, we controlled for the GDP growth rates of the host countries.
Higher GDP growth in a host society is negatively correlated with subsidiary survival
rates (Thomas, Eden, Hitt, & Miller, 2007). We obtained these data from the World
Development Indicators. We also controlled for the cultural distance between the host
country and home country, as previous studies have found that it positively affects
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subsidiary mortality (Barkema et al., 1997; Zeng et al., 2013). This variable is measured
by the cultural distance index developed by Kogut and Singh (1988).

3.3.3

Model Specifications

With regard to the statistical model, we used event history analysis (EHA) to examine the
hazard of the exit of a subsidiary. A Cox proportional hazards model was applied with
time-varying variables (Cox & Oakes, 1984). “Robust” and “cluster” STATA procedures
were used to estimate a robust coefficient covariance matrix and control for possible
dependence among FDI initiated by the same MNE.

3.4

Analysis and Results

The descriptive statistics and correlations among all variables are provided in Table 13.
On average, the exit rate is 5%. About 12% of all subsidiaries command the status of
“center of importance.” Between 1.5 and 2% of all subsidiaries are engaged in vertical
investment. About 50% of subsidiaries are in a human capital-intensive industry, and
37% of subsidiaries are limited to developed countries.
Tables 14 to 18 present the results of our analysis. First, Table 14 shows the result of the
main hypothesis, i.e., the effect of subsidiary size on exit. The detailed results are as
follows. Compared with the reference category, i.e., 235 employees or more, those
subsidiaries with zero employees are 7.6 times more likely to exit. Those with between 1
and 5 employees are 5.0 times more likely to exit. Those with between 6 and 10
employees are 3.3 times more likely to exit. Those with between 10 and 19 employees
are 2.4 times more likely to exit. Those with between 20 and 40 employees are 2.2 times
more likely to exit. Those with between 41 and 234 employees are 1.5 times more likely
to exit. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported.
Our second hypothesis presents a moderating effect of “centers of importance” on the
relationship between subsidiary size and subsidiary exit. Table 15 provides useful
estimates in testing this prediction. We find that those small subsidiaries with a number
of employees between 6 and 40 have a significantly lower exit rate if they have been
assigned the role of “center of importance.” Thus, hypothesis 2 is supported.
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Table 16 presents the results for a test of H3, which predicts a negative moderating effect
of vertical investment on the relationship between subsidiary size and exit. The signs of
moderating coefficients are all negative when the investment motive of natural resource
seeking is used as a proxy for vertical investment. Those small subsidiaries with between
1 and 5 employees have a significantly lower hazard ratio—that is, 2.2 versus 5.0.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that small subsidiaries in human capital-intensive industries have a
lower exit rate. Table 17 presents the results. The signs of all moderating coefficients are
negative and significant. Small subsidiaries in all size categories have a lower exit rate if
they are in a human capital-intensive industry. Thus, hypothesis 4 is fully supported.
Finally, Table 18 shows the moderating effect of being a developed country versus a
developing country. In general, the signs of the coefficients of the interaction terms are
positive and not significant, which means that there is no significant difference in terms
of the exit rate for small subsidiaries. However, only those subsidiaries with zero
employees have a significantly lower exit rate when they are located in a developed
country (5.8 versus 10.2). Thus, hypothesis 5 is marginally supported.
Last, all control variables are significant predictors of subsidiary mortality, except for
GDP growth rate. As expected, subsidiary age and the first Japanese parent firm’s
ownership level have a significantly negative impact on the subsidiary exit rate.
However, the number of Japanese parent firms lowers the exit rate and the size of the
MNE improves the exit rate. With regard to the variable of cultural distance, it is negative
and significant. MNEs tend to exercise greater ownership control when there is more
cultural distance between the host and home countries (Anand & Delois, 1997), which
lowers the exit rate of subsidiaries.
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Table 13: Mean and correlation matrix
Mean
1 Exit

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.05

1.00

0.12

−0.01

1.00

0.02

0.00

0.08

1.00

0.50

0.03

0.11

−0.07

1.00

0.37

0.04

0.08

−0.01

0.23

1.00

14.00

−0.02

−0.04

−0.00

0.03

0.14

1.00

60.10

−0.05

0.16

0.02

0.10

0.00

0.01

1.00

1.25

−0.01

0.02

0.05

−0.15

−0.12

−0.05

−0.13

1.00

12.94

0.06

−0.16

−0.02

0.05

0.07

0.10

−0.19

0.05

1.00

3.32

−0.01

0.02

−0.00

−0.01

−0.19

−0.04

0.07

0.02

−0.03

1.00

4.46

−0.02

−0.05

0.01

−0.19

−0.48

−0.21

0.01

0.06

−0.06

0.19

11

2 Center of
importance
3 Vertical
investments
4 Human
capitalintensive
industry
5 Developed
country
6 Subsidiary
age
7 First
Japanese
parent
ownership
level
8 Number of
Japanese
parents
9 Parent firm
size
10 Cultural
distance
11 GDP
growth rate

1.00
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Table 14: Main effect of subsidiary size on survival
Hazard ratio
Zero employees

7.6***

1–5 employees

5.0***

6–10 employees

3.3***

11–19 employees

2.4***

20–40 employees

2.2***

41–234 employees

1.5***

Reference category: 235 or more employees
Control variable
Subsidiary age

0.8***

First Japanese parent ownership level

1.0***

Number of Japanese parents

0.9***

Parent firm size

1.2***

Cultural distance

1.0**

GDP growth rate

1.0

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
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Table 15: Moderating effect of “center of importance” on subsidiary survival

Subsidiary size
Zero employees
1–5 employees
6–10 employees
11–19 employees
20–40 employees
41–234 employees
Reference category: 235 or more
employees

Hazard ratio
(center of
importance
sample)
6.3
3.4
1.9
1.3
1.2
1.1
1

Hazard ratio
(non-center of
importance
sample)
7.3
4.9
3.4
2.4
2.2
1.5
1

Coefficient of
interaction
term
−0.17
−0.31
−0.49*
−0.58**
−0.54**
−0.27

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included

Table 16: Moderating effect of vertical investment on subsidiary survival

Subsidiary size
Zero employees
1–5 employees
6–10 employees
11–19 employees
20–40 employees
41–234 employees
Reference category: 235 or more
employees

Hazard ratio
(vertical
investment
sample)
5.3
2.2
2.4
1.0
1.9
1.5
1

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included

Hazard ratio
(non-vertical
investment
sample)
7.6
5.0
3.3
2.4
2.1
1.4
1

Coefficient
of
interaction
term
−0.29
−0.72*
−0.21
−0.75
−0.14
0.09
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Table 17: Moderating effect of human capital-intensive industry on subsidiary
survival

Subsidiary size
Zero employees
1–5 employees
6–10 employees
11–19 employees
20–40 employees
41–234 employees
Reference category: 235 or
more employees

Hazard ratio
(human capitalintensive
industry sample)
5.6
3.7
2.4
1.7
1.5
1.1
1

Hazard ratio
(non-humancapital-intensive
industry sample)
9.4
5.9
4.3
3.2
2.8
1.6
1

Coefficient
of
interaction
term
−0.40*
−0.32*
−0.42**
−0.51**
−0.51**
−0.30*

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included

Table 18: Moderating effect of country development stage on subsidiary survival

Subsidiary size
Zero employees
1–5 employees
6–10 employees
11–19 employees
20–40 employees
41–234 employees
Reference category: 235 or
more employees

Hazard ratio
(developed
country sample)
5.8
4.2
3.1
2.5
2.2
1.6
1

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; control variables included

Hazard ratio
(developing
country sample)
10.2
5.4
3.3
2.2
2.1
1.3
1

Coefficient of
interaction
term
−0.44**
−0.07
0.06
0.22
0.15
0.10
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3.5 Discussion
This study was motivated by our intention to contribute to understanding the conditions
under which small-employment subsidiaries may have a better survival outcome.
Extending the literature on the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), we
examined the effect of subsidiary size on survival. Using a sample of Japanese overseas
FDI, we offer a nuanced picture of the effect, i.e., smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit
rate than larger ones. We also quantified the effect.
Furthermore, we found that the liability of smallness is conditional upon the specific roles
of the subsidiary, industry features, and country-level characteristics. Specifically, we
found that subsidiaries that have been assigned the role of center of importance have a
lower exit rate than their counterparts of a similar size without such a role. This provides
additional empirical support to orchestration theory’s argument that an MNE operates
like an integrated entity, instead of being a set of isolated and separable elements (Pitelis
& Teere, 2018).
Moreover, we found that small subsidiaries with the function of vertical investment have
a lower exit rate than their counterparts without such a function, especially when the
subsidiary is extremely small (0–5 employees). Being tightly integrated within the MNE
network improves the survival chances of small subsidiaries. This result differs from
Getachew and Beamish’s (2017) study on the moderating effect of horizontal investment
on the relationship between entry into Africa and exit. They found that market-seeking
FDI has a better survival outcome than horizontal FDI because it is more tightly
integrated with the local environment, including suppliers and customers. This study
offers a new perspective on the conditions under which vertical investment has a better
chance of survival.
In addition, we identified the third contingency factor of human capital-intensive
industries. This study provides additional empirical evidence that being small is not much
of a liability when the subsidiary is in such human capital-intensive industries as
“finance, insurance and real estate,” “retail,” “service,” “wholesale,” or “investment
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companies.” As these industries have a low threshold for scale economies (Silk & Berndt,
1993; 1995), small subsidiaries in them have a lower exit rate compared with their
counterparts of a similar size in other industries.
Finally, this study provides marginal support to the notion that being located in a
developed country lowers the exit rate, which is different from Getachew and Beamish’s
(2017) argument that being located in Africa increases the exit rate. Only those
subsidiaries with zero employees have a significantly lower exit rate in developed
countries. One explanation is that some subsidiaries are set up as financial instruments,
serving special purposes. Other than that, there is no significant difference in terms of
exit rate for subsidiaries of similar sizes.

3.6 Limitations and Directions for Future Studies
This study is not without limitations. First, because of data constraints, the results are
based on Japanese FDI. Investment from other countries may differ. Second, results are
based on a quantitative survey of subsidiary managers. Additional qualitative studies
from the MNE parent firm level may provide insights on contingency patterns.
Future directions of study include investigating other contingency factors for the survival
of small-employment subsidiaries. Meanwhile, researchers should investigate
subsidiaries with zero employees. The finance literature has firmly established that there
are special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that are “essentially robot firms that have no
employees, make no substantive economic decisions, have no physical location, cannot
go bankrupt” (Gorton & Souleles, 2007: 550). As a result, there is a category of zeroemployee subsidiaries. In the analysis of zero-employee subsidiaries in the TK dataset,
we included all observations with the record of zero in a particular year as a proxy of
zero-employee subsidiaries. However, this practice may accidentally include missing
values for this variable in the dataset. Future analysis can mitigate this problem by jointly
considering the number of employees over the life cycle of the subsidiary, the investment
motive as well as the industry of the subsidiary so as to cross-check whether it is a
missing value.
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Finally, those subsidiaries with extremely large sizes are lumped together with other
subsidiaries of 235 or more employees. It might be worthwhile to treat those extremely
large subsidiaries as a special category and investigate their key features.
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Chapter 4

4

Crisis Response by MNEs: The 2008 Consumer
Confidence Crisis in China

4.1 Introduction
How do multinational enterprises react when one of their overseas markets is affected by
a domestic consumer confidence crisis? Theoretically, three considerations should affect
their response. First, foreign-owned companies and foreign brands may be better able to
disassociate themselves from the sources of the consumer confidence crisis, and hence
they face opportunities to increase their market share vis-à-vis domestic competitors.
Second, foreign owners may become more concerned about the standards of operations
within their own operations: the confidence crisis will lead to greater scrutiny of what
firms actually do in their operations. To this challenge, they are likely to respond with a
stronger focus on organizational control and compliance with the MNE’s quality
assurance processes. Third, MNEs may be concerned that an association with the industry
and country of the crisis may affect their global reputation. In consequence, they may
want to exit the country, especially if they are unable to ensure compliance with their
quality assurance processes.
Based on these three considerations, we explore the impact of a consumer confidence
crisis on the strategies of foreign investors with respect to entry, exit, and ownership
change. Specifically, we investigate how a consumer confidence crisis influences a)
foreign entry, b) foreign exit, and c) equity stakes held by foreign investors, with a
special focus on different responses in manufacturing and services. Moreover, we
investigate how changes in equity stakes vary across ownership categories (i.e., WOS,
majority equity, and minority equity).
In developing our hypotheses and empirical tests, we apply and extend several lines of
theory in international business. First, we draw on the theoretical lens of transaction cost
economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982), especially literature
concerned with the governance of MNEs (e.g., Chen, Paik, & Park, 2010; Yan & Gray,
2001). Second, we draw on institutional theory, especially the concepts of legitimacy and
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reputation (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Rao, 1994), to explain the relative advantages of
foreign and local firms facing a crisis. In doing so, we also draw on the concept of
country of origin, which stipulates that an investor’s national origin affects their
perception by consumers (e.g., Knight, Holdsworth, & Mather, 2007; Usunier, 2006;
Verlegh, 2007; Zhou & Hui, 2003). Contrary to other recent studies in China (e.g., Zhang
& Luo, 2013; Zhao, Park, & Zhou, 2014), we argue that foreign firms may actually face
enhanced legitimacy as a result of the crisis.
We empirically test hypotheses about the impact of a consumer confidence crisis on the
food sector—an industry that is highly culturally embedded and therefore tends to lead to
consumer preferences for domestically sourced products (Usunier, 2006; Yasuda, 2015).
At the same time, consumers have concerns about violations of health and safety
standards in food products because any such violations can directly impact their personal
health. Such health concerns can compensate for consumer ethnocentrism and provide
opportunities for foreign investors. Our hypotheses focus on the differences in responses
at the time of a consumer confidence crisis with respect to the difference between
investors in the food sector and foreign investors in general, with an emphasis on the
manufacturing and service segments.
For the empirical context, we chose the baby formula milk scandal that hit China in 2008.
This scandal triggered increasing awareness among Chinese consumers that despite
impressive economic growth and other achievements, product safety—and food safety in
particular—was still a major concern in China (Beamish & Bapuji, 2008; Luo, 2008; Wu
& Chen, 2013). We chose a single-host, single-home study design to eliminate countrylevel variations affecting our results.
Using a large sample of Japanese MNEs in China with 79,528 subsidiary-year
observations, our results show that the crisis triggered more foreign entries in the crisis
sector compared to non-crisis sectors, especially in the service segment. At the same
time, the crisis also triggered fewer foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing
segment. With regard to existing operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce
their exposure to risk. Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS,
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majority, and minority) were under varying levels of partner opportunism and
reputational risk. As a result, majority owners were more likely to increase their
ownership level to ensure quality control than minority owners. Majority owners were
also more likely to disassociate from the reputational risk through divestment, compared
with WOS and minority owners.
The present research makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it
contributes to TCE by extending the theoretical argument about the relationship between
external uncertainty and organization control. It empirically shows that MNEs are likely
to lower their equity control to reduce their exposure to risk in a post-entry crisis setting.
Moreover, it introduces the concepts of reputational risk and an MNE’s equity position in
examining the relationship between behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism) and
organizational control. We argue that majority owners, compared with WOS and
minority owners, are at high levels of both operational and reputational risk. As a result,
they are more likely to increase their equity control or divest. To our knowledge, this is
the first study to introduce the concept of an MNE’s equity position in examining
behavioral uncertainty.
Second, our study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in their entry and
exit decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth,
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are
more likely to enter and less likely to exit in the crisis sector.
Third, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, &
Coombs, 2016) as applied in international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010;
Zhao et al. 2014) by showing that MNEs have a repertoire of strategies to cope with
industry-wide crises, including entry, exit, lowering equity control, increasing equity
control, and remaining unchanged.
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4.2 Research Background
4.2.1

Consumer Confidence Crisis: Food Safety in China

Product-harm crises or well-publicized events involving dangerous or defective products
often lead to the loss of consumer trust and damage to product or brand evaluations (Lei,
Dawar, & Gurhan-Canli, 2012). In particular, a food safety crisis can go beyond a single
product or brand and spill over to the entire food industry. Here, we define “consumer
confidence crisis” as a situation where consumers become more concerned about the
quality of products, in particular their health, safety and/or environmental features, which
reduces their preference for buying the product affected by the crisis. Such a crisis arises
from actual or perceived changes in product features that are of concern to consumers.
For example, consumers in North America experienced a major confidence crisis with
respect to toys made in China after reports suggested that these products contained high
levels of lead. This impacted brands such as Mattel that imported from China, even
though the primary cause of the problem was design flaws originating with the U.S.
parent firm (Beamish & Bapuji, 2008).
The food sector is particular sensitive to consumer confidence. In China, concerns about
domestic food safety standards were elevated in 2008 after the baby milk scandal broke.
The melamine-contaminated baby formula scandal was the major event that made
Chinese consumers think twice before purchasing domestically produced food products.
In a survey conducted by the Chinese government in 2012, 41% of respondents reported
that food safety was a “serious problem.” Food safety concerns, inequality, and
corruption represented three top governance concerns of the Chinese population (Yasuda,
2015).
Melamine is a nitrogen-rich chemical compound that was used illegally in milk products
to create a false appearance of protein content. This food incident led to six infant deaths
and 52,000 hospitalizations of young children. A further 250,000 children were estimated
to have suffered mild kidney problems due to intake of melamine-contaminated milk
products (Wu & Chen, 2013). Moreover, all major producers of milk products were
involved in the melamine scandal, including local brands such as Sanlu (a China–New
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Zealand joint venture), Mengniu, Yili, and Yashili and foreign brands such as Nestlé and
Cadbury (Pei et al., 2011). A survey among Chinese residents in 2011 showed that over
70% of respondents decided not to purchase milk products produced in China.20 In practice,
mainland Chinese flocked to Hong Kong to buy baby formula and other milk products,
which created scarcity among Hong Kong residents. In March 2013, the Hong Kong
Customs and Excise Department issued a special clause on imports and exports with regard
to the quantity of baby formula for those departing from Hong Kong.21 The limit was 1.8
kg in total weight (2 cans). Otherwise, a person would be liable for a fine of up to
HK$500,00022 and imprisonment of two years.
In addition to melamine-contaminated milk products, there were also media reports on
banned cooking oil (Wu & Chen, 2013), pork contaminated with chemicals, and other
unhealthy ingredients in food products. As a result, Chinese consumers purchased food
products made in other countries through e-commerce sites such as Taobao.com and
JD.com.23

4.2.2

Country of Origin and the Food Business

“Country of origin” as a theoretical concept was first demonstrated by an experiment
(Schooler & Wildt, 1968) where two products were exactly the same except for the
country labels (made in U.S.A. vs. made in Japan). Participants used these country-oforigin labels as cues for the perceived quality in their evaluation, and they favored
products made in the United States. Subsequent research has shown that product
categories also matter when a country-of-origin effect is present. For example, consumers

20 “Domestic Tests Indicate Chinese and Imported Milk Powder Have No Significant Differences,” Sina

News, February 28, 2011, accessed August 2, 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-0228/023022023966.shtml.
21 “Import and Export (General)(Amendment) Regulation 2013 (with effect from 1 March 2013) - Quantity

of Powdered Formula for Persons Departing from Hong Kong,” Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, accessed August 3, 2017, www.customs.gov.hk/en/whats_new/API/index.html.
22 The exchange rate was C$1 = HK$7.5 in 2013.
23 Xinhuanet, accessed August 3, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fashion/2015-03/06/c_127543826.html.
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preferred cars made in Germany, but preferred shoes from Italy and perfume from France
(Roth & Romeo, 1992). Moreover, most studies find home-country biases in product
evaluations due to ethnocentrism and national identification, as exemplified by the
psychological need for self-enhancement (Verlegh, 2007). Studies among consumers in
the Netherlands and the United States showed that both ethnocentrism and national
identification positively influenced consumers’ purchasing decisions for domestically
produced products over foreign-produced products. This relationship was mediated by
the perceived quality of domestic and foreign products.
Country of origin has also been shown to be important in China (Bi et al., 2012). In
particular, with regard to products made in developed Western countries, country of
origin carries symbolic value as consumers tend to associate Western products with
status, modernity, and lifestyle (Zhou & Hui, 2003). A survey among Chinese consumers
on inconspicuous consumption of pork sausages made in Canada found that the symbolic
value of Canadian food was positively associated with purchasing intention, while the
perceived quality and utilitarian value had no impact (Zhou & Hui, 2003).
Why do consumers use country of origin as a cue or signal for perceived quality? There
are two mechanisms involved, that is, the halo effect and the summary effect (Knight,
Holdsworth, & Mather, 2007). First, the halo effect originates from a vague concept or
image of a country that consumers incorporate in their evaluation of products from that
country. For example, consumers who imagine New Zealand as having clear skies, clean
water, and pleasant pastures might favorably judge New Zealand fruit and believe New
Zealand kiwi to compare in quality to Mercedes-Benz cars from Germany (Knight,
Holdsworth, & Mather, 2007). Second, the summary effect is a phenomenon in which
consumers make judgements about products based on their perception of quality control
standards, taste, appearance, and packaging quality. In a qualitative study of professional
buyers in the food industry, Knight, Holdsworth, and Mather (2007) found that
professional buyers were risk-averse and that their evaluation of the quality of food
products was based on their “trust” in the integrity of regulators and suppliers from the
country of origin.
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We extend these two lines of argument by analyzing the effects of a consumer confidence
crisis on enhanced legitimacy for MNEs. A consumer confidence crisis is likely to
change consumers’ relative preferences for domestically produced food products over
foreign products. We argue that consumers were less likely to be influenced by homecountry bias due to their lost trust in the integrity of Chinese regulators and suppliers
after the food crisis. First, Chinese consumers had low confidence in Chinese regulators
of the food industry. Regulatory interventions by 14 different government agencies
created major challenges for effective communication and coordination (Wu & Chen,
2013). Regulatory responsibilities were shared among the Ministry of Health, Ministry of
Agriculture, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine, the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce, and other agencies involved in food production and storage. Due to the
fragmented regulatory authority, there were serious regulatory gaps, conflicting
standards, and bureaucratic turf wars among different ministries and all levels of
government (Yasuda, 2015). As a result, their supervision of food producers was
ineffective (Wu & Chen, 2013).
Second, unlike in Western developed countries, where food production supervision was
carried out during the production process, Chinese food was checked only at the final
product stage (Pei et al., 2011). As a result, the supervision system was reactive, not
proactive. In the case of contaminated milk products, melamine was added to fresh milk
when it was collected from individual farmers, who accounted for 80% of the milk
supply. The remaining 20% was supplied by self-owned dairy farms of big companies
through vertical integration of the supply chain. However, there was no quality check or
product control at this stage of production. To make things worse, Sanlu products were
exempted from quality checks due to its previous track record of quality, because popular
brands in China enjoyed quality-check exemptions (Pei et al., 2011).
Third, in terms of the integrity of producers, there arguably was moral degradation
among Chinese producers (Luo, 2008). It has been argued that during the Chinese
economy’s transitional period, Chinese producers experienced a state of lawlessness and
were profit-driven while engaging in illicit and immoral business practices. Because local

138

Chinese producers were involved in unethical and immoral behavior in the food industry
on such a large scale, the standards in the food industry became problematic.
Chinese consumers tend to differentiate not only between domestic and imported brands,
but also to use three categories: domestically made domestic brands, domestically made
foreign brands (assumed to have foreign quality control), and imported foreign brands. In
terms of consumer ethnocentrism, domestically made domestic products are preferred,
ahead of domestically made foreign brands and imported brands (Bi et al., 2012). In
terms of quality concerns, however, the preferences are reversed, with imported products
being preferred over domestically made foreign brands and local brands (Chang & Park,
2012). We suggest that the consumer confidence crisis resulted in a shift from consumer
ethnocentrism to consumer quality concerns, and hence an increased preference for
foreign over local products. Below, we analyze how foreign investors responded to such
a crisis.

4.3 Hypothesis Development
4.3.1

FDI in Manufacturing and Services

In exploring the responses of foreign investors to a consumer confidence crisis, we are
particularly interested in explaining how such responses vary between the manufacturing
and service sectors. Previous studies have suggested that firms in the manufacturing and
service sectors respond differently to TCE attributes, including environmental uncertainty
(Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003).
Manufacturing firms are investment-intensive (i.e., with fixed asset investment upfront,
including plant, equipment, and inventory) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). On the other
hand, service firms are people-intensive (Erramilli & Rao, 1993), and this light-asset
feature provides service firms with more flexibility.

4.3.2

Foreign Entry

In general, MNEs are subject to the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) because the
host environment has less information about foreign entrants with which to make
informed judgements and actors in the host environments may adopt a different (higher)
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legitimacy standard (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). However, when local firms lose their
legitimacy for some reason, non-local firms are perceived as more legitimate (Kostova &
Zaheer, 1999). In the crisis industry, local producers have been reported by the media as
being involved in unethical behavior. They are perceived by local consumers as
illegitimate. As a result, this creates more opportunity for non-local firms in the crisis
sector, especially in terms of entry and exit decisions.
If a consumer confidence crisis makes consumers more aware of quality concerns with
respect to a particular set of manufacturers or brands, this creates opportunities for those
unaffected (or less affected) to gain market share. Specifically, a consumer confidence
crisis affecting domestically made products creates opportunities for foreign investors
operating in the industry. Foreign entry is more likely in the crisis sector as a
consequence of the shift in consumer preferences to foreign and imported brands, which
is likely to induce more foreign entries in the crisis sector than in the non-crisis sectors.
This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: The crisis will trigger more foreign entries in the crisis sector.
The strength of this effect is likely to vary between the manufacturing and service
sectors. The huge fixed investment upfront poses difficulties for the manufacturing
segment to take the opportunity to enter. On the other hand, the light-asset nature of
service firms makes it easier for the service segment to exploit the growing opportunity
by setting up a business entity.
In addition, given consumers’ differentiation between foreign brands with local
production and imported brands, foreign investors will perceive an opportunity
specifically in importing rather than local manufacturing. Importers setting up a local
operation would register this operation as a service (such as a wholesale operation). Thus,
we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1b: The crisis will trigger more foreign entries in the service segment
of the crisis sector.
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4.3.3

Foreign Exit

As argued earlier, a consumer confidence crisis will make consumers more aware of
quality concerns with respect to a particular set of manufacturers or brands, especially
domestic brands. It therefore creates opportunities for foreign manufacturers and brands.
As a result, more market opportunities exist for MNEs, which is likely to induce fewer
exits in the crisis sector.
Meanwhile, due to different features of the manufacturing and service segments, they are
expected to respond differently. Foreign investors already manufacturing before the crisis
need to consider the sunk cost of their existing operations, i.e., fixed upfront investments.
They will experience increased opportunities to compete with local firms, provided they
can assure consumers that their local manufacturing operations employ quality standards
of the parent organization that are higher than those of local firms. Given the sunk cost
that these firms face, we expect them to persist in the crisis sector to a greater extent than
firms in the manufacturing segment of a non-crisis sector. In service businesses, sunk
costs are lower such that we may not see such an effect. Thus, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 2a: The crisis will trigger fewer foreign exits in the crisis sector.
Hypothesis 2b: The crisis will trigger fewer exits in the manufacturing segment
of the crisis sector.

4.3.4

Ownership of Existing Operations

“Organization control” is a central concept in international business research, especially
in international joint venture research (e.g., Chen, Paik, & Park, 2010; Yan & Gray,
2001). Yan and Gray (2001) defined organizational control as “the mechanisms a partner
employs to ensure that the venture conforms to its interests” (p. 397). In this study, we
extend the concept of organizational control to subsidiary control exercised by an MNE.
TCE has been one of the main theoretical lenses to explain organizational control as
exercised through equity (Brock, Shenkar, Shoham, & Siscovick, 2008; Delios &
Beamish, 1999; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish, 2014). Traditionally,
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TCE has conceptualized control in terms of discrete governance modes, i.e., the make or
buy decision (Williamson, 1985). More recently, scholars have argued that firms exercise
a wider range of control along the make/buy continuum (Parmigiani, 2007). IJVs
represent a hybrid governance structure that lies between wholly owned subsidiary and
market transactions (Beamish & Banks, 1987). In IB research, scholars have argued that
MNEs exercise greater control over overseas subsidiaries through the retention of equity
(Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004) and less control when they delegate
decision-making power to host-country equity partners (Rangen & Drummond, 2011).
Uncertainty, asset specificity, and transaction frequency constitute the three main
attributes of a transaction that increase transaction costs and influence the governance
structure of a firm (Williamson, 1985). In this study, organizational control means an
MNE’s control over its overseas subsidiaries. Uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of
future outcomes (Sartor & Beamish, 2014). Two types of uncertainty exist, i.e.,
environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, &
Aguinis, 2013). Environmental uncertainty refers to “the extent to which a country’s
political, legal, cultural, and economic environment threatens the stability of a business
operation” (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988: 315). Environmental uncertainty has also been
referred to as external uncertainty (Park, Holtbrügge, & Mohr, 2009), economic
uncertainty (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003), investment risk (Brouthers, 2002),
and country risk (Kim & Hwang, 1992).
Demand uncertainty is one type of environmental uncertainty. Demand uncertainty refers
to uncertainty associated with future host-country demand for an MNE’s products (Kim
& Hwang, 1992). Whereas demand uncertainty is associated with the external
environment over which an MNE has no control, behavioral uncertainty is associated
with a transaction partner’s behavior (Griffith, Harmancioglu, & Droge, 2009: 218).
Behavioral uncertainty originates from a transaction partner’s opportunistic behavior or
opportunism. The following discussion focuses on two research questions: (1a) What is
the impact of demand uncertainty on MNEs’ subsidiary control in the crisis sector? (1b)
How does the impact vary by industry segments? (2) What is the effect of MNEs’ equity
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position (i.e., WOS, majority equity, minority equity) on subsidiary control in the crisis
sector?

4.3.4.1

Demand Uncertainty

Extant theory holds that under conditions of environmental uncertainty, including
demand uncertainty, firms will prefer hybrids over hierarchies (Sartor & Beamish, 2014).
In studying entry-mode choices (i.e., wholly owned subsidiary versus IJV) under the
condition of environmental uncertainty, scholars have argued that IJVs are preferred over
wholly owned subsidiaries for two reasons. First, IJV partners may possess resources and
knowledge to cope with risk (Puck, Holtbrügge, & Mohr, 2008; Beamish & Banks,
1987).
Second, IJV partners can share risks when environment uncertainty risk is high and
MNEs would prefer to accept a low level of commitment in the host country (Brouthers
& Brouthers, 2003). Empirical research has provided consistent support to this line of
argument by showing a positive association of environment uncertainty and preference
for IJVs over WOSs (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003; Kim &
Hwang, 1992). This result was confirmed in a recent study where there was a negative
association between demand uncertainty and organizational control (Sartor & Beamish,
2014). Moreover, the same line of logic was applied in studying post-entry-mode change,
where perceived external uncertainty was negatively associated with the likelihood of
converting an IJV into a WOS (Puck et al., 2008). In short, when environmental
uncertainty is high, MNEs prefer IJVs over WOSs, i.e., take less equity control over the
subsidiary, both at the international entry stage and in post-entry-mode conversion.
As argued earlier, when the safety crisis hit the food industry, demand uncertainty was
high because of reverse-ethnocentrism and changed consumer behavior. To cope with the
risk of an industry-wide crisis, MNEs may assume less organizational control in existing
operations, i.e., less equity ownership, to reduce their risk exposure. Hence, we
hypothesize the following:
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Hypothesis 3a: The crisis will trigger MNEs to take lower equity control in
existing operations.
Compared with the people-intensive nature of service firms, manufacturing firms are
more investment-intensive, i.e., they have greater investments in plant, equipment, and
inventory (Campbell & Verbeke, 1994; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Gatignon & Anderson,
1988). In entry-mode studies, manufacturing firms prefer IJVs over WOSs due to the
flexibility of IJVs. IJVs allow them to reduce their exposure to potential hazards of
environmental uncertainty by lowering their resource commitments (Gatignon &
Anderson, 1988; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Luo, 2001). This line of argument was supported
by several empirical studies (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003).
Environmental uncertainty was found to be significantly related to a preference for IJVs
over WOSs for manufacturing firms.
As argued earlier, a domestic consumer confidence crisis can trigger reverse consumer
ethnocentrism and increased demand uncertainty for MNEs operating in the food
industry. Applying the same line of logic of lowering commitment when environmental
uncertainty is high, we argue that manufacturing firms in the crisis sector will take a
lower level of equity control so as to lower their potential risk due to demand uncertainty.
Hence, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3b: The crisis will trigger MNEs in the manufacturing segment to
take lower equity control in existing operations.
Service firms are more people-intensive and lower in fixed assets. Previous studies
suggest that service firms require greater control when there are changes in the
environment in order to main flexibility (Bowen & Jones, 1986). When environmental
uncertainty increases, IJVs may lack the time to renegotiate contractual agreements,
which may reduce the flexibility of MNEs to cope with the changing environment
(Erramilli & Rao, 1993). As a result, MNEs may prefer a higher level of control over
their subsidiary, i.e., WOSs over IJVs, to maintain flexibility (Hennart, 1994;
Williamson, 1991). This line of logic has received mixed empirical support. For example,
some studies show that environmental uncertainty is not significantly related to entry-
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mode choice in the service segment (Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Brouthers & Brouthers,
2003). However, other studies have found that increased environmental uncertainty is
related to the preference for WOSs over IJVs (Contractor & Kundu, 1998).
Applying the logic of increased organizational control in environmental uncertainty in the
service sector, we argue that a crisis will trigger MNEs in the service sector to increase
their organizational control, i.e., higher levels of equity control, so that they have a higher
level of flexibility to cope with the changing environment in a timely manner. Hence, we
put forth the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3c: The crisis will trigger MNEs in the service segment to increase
their equity control.

4.3.5

Behavioral Uncertainty, Reputational Risk, and Equity
Position

First, behavioral uncertainty is “the degree of difficulty in verifying whether compliance
with established agreements has occurred” (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).
Here, partner opportunism is of particular concern. According to TCE, some economic
actors may behave opportunistically and act with self-interest and guile (Williamson,
1985). For an IJV, the local partner’s opportunistic behavior may exert a detrimental
effect on the quality of products, although they may claim that these practices lower the
cost of the IJV. Compared with IJVs, WOSs are a favorable form of governance structure
when partner opportunism is present, as MNEs can exercise fiat over WOSs (Williamson,
1985).
Second, reputation originates from the quality of a product. For a reputation to be widely
known beyond its immediate audience, there must be a legitimacy component, i.e., the
organization should be regarded as “desirable, proper, and appropriate within a widely
shared system of norms and values” (Scott, 1987; cited in Rao, 1994: 30). In other words,
to gain favorable social recognition and legitimacy, the behavior or practice of an
organization must conform to social norms and expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Legitimacy acts as a necessary condition for the positive reputation of an organization. It
has less to do with the actual quality of a product, and more to do with organizational
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practices, i.e., the operational process and standards of making a product must conform to
social rules and norms in the first place. If an organization violates norms or social
expectations in the operational process of making a product or delivering a service, the
organization will gain a bad reputation, which will exert a detrimental impact on its
performance outcome. Previous research showed that childcare facilities with
institutional linkages had a better survival rate compared with their counterparts with no
institutional linkages because they were perceived as more legitimate (Baum & Oliver,
1991).
In the case of MNEs and their overseas subsidiaries, due to negative legitimacy spillover
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), the illegitimacy of a subunit will hurt the legitimacy of other
subunits and the parent firm. In essence, the bad reputation of an overseas subsidiary will
hurt the reputation of an MNE as a whole. For example, when a subsidiary of Nike in
Southeast Asia experienced problems with its labor practices, the legitimacy of Nike as
an organization was called into question (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).
In the following discussion, we will simultaneously consider the joint impact of
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism or operational risk), reputational risk,
and equity position (WOS, majority equity, and minority equity) on an MNE’s strategic
decision about a focal subsidiary.
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Figure 17: Exposure to Operational and Reputational Risk
Reputational Risk

high

WOS

Majority equity

Minority equity

low

low

high

Operational Risk

We define “operational risk” as the risk that an employee within the organization is
engaged in bad practices. It is often associated with limited operational control of the
organization. Reputation risk refers to the negative legitimacy spillover when the bad
reputation of a subsidiary impacts the reputation of the MNE as a whole. In practice,
when an MNE adopts a WOS or majority equity position in a subsidiary, the subsidiary
will use the brand of the MNE. However, if an MNE adopts a minority position in a
subsidiary, the subsidiary is more likely to use the brand of a local partner. As shown in
Figure 17, both majority and minority equity owners face a higher operational risk than a
WOS owner due to the potential risk of partner opportunism. Meanwhile, both WOSs and
majority-owned subsidiaries face a higher reputational risk than minority-owned
subsidiaries due to negative legitimacy spillovers. As shown in Figure 17, majority
owners are simultaneously exposed to high levels of operational and reputational risk and
are the most troubled group compared with minority and WOS owners.
Previous research has shown that MNEs choose WOSs or markets over IJVs in the case
of increased behavioral uncertainty (Geyskens et al., 2016) because changing IJV
contracts requires mutual consent, which requires time to build (Williamson, 1991).
Following the same logic, we argue that, simultaneously challenged by high operational
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risk and reputational risk, majority owners may reduce their exposure to risk in two
alternative ways: (1) they may increase their operational control or (2) they may
disassociate themselves via divestment. The first risk-mitigation strategy is to ensure that
high operational standards are maintained in their organizations. This requires higher
levels of equity control or even full equity control. To ensure better quality control,
majority owners are likely to turn to formal control mechanisms, i.e., equity control, to
have a stronger voice in the board of directors over the strategic decision making and
day-to-day operations of the focal subsidiary. Hence, we advance the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4a: Compared with minority owners, majority owners are more likely
to increase their equity control in the crisis sector.
The second strategy is to dissociate through divestment, i.e., to eliminate the potential for
internal negative legitimacy spillover. Because the illegitimacy of a subunit will exert a
negative impact on the legitimacy of the MNE as an organization and other subunits, and
given the demand uncertainty in the crisis industry and difficulty in ensuring high
operational standards, divestment may not be a bad choice. Hence, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 4b: Compared with minority owners, majority owners are more likely
to divest in the crisis sector.
Hypothesis 4c: Compared with WOS owners, majority owners are more likely to
divest in the crisis sector.

4.4 Method
4.4.1

Sample and Data Collection

We used the Toyo Keizai dataset, which covers Japanese overseas investment from 1991
to 2017. This dataset covers 40% of all Japanese FDI (Delios & Ensign, 2000). Our
sample is restricted to Japanese subsidiaries in China, as China is the empirical setting for
the research question. This single-home, single-host study design allows for control over
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country-specific effects on the outcome variable. For hypotheses 1 to 3, we use the whole
sample and apply a difference-in-difference methodology (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) that
allows us to estimate the effects in the focal industry relative to a benchmark of similar
firms in other industries.
For hypothesis 4, we are interested in treatment heterogeneity, i.e., how different
subgroups in the treatment group respond differently to the treatment (the consumer
confidence crisis in the food industry). Following Chung et al. (2013), we limit our
analysis to Japanese investment in the Chinese food industry between 2007 and 2017.
The reason is that the food safety crisis started in 2008 and there were multiple food
scandals over the next few years. In October 2015, a new food safety law was put into
practice. Moreover, to ensure that the strategic response of subsidiaries could be
attributed to a single parent firm, we selected subsidiaries with only one Japanese parent
(Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013). The final sample consists of 263 Japanese subsidiaries in
the food industry. We created a cross-sectional database of 263 observations to test
hypothesis 4.

4.4.2

Measures

Dependent variables. There are four dependent variables in the four hypotheses. For
hypothesis 1a/b, the dependent variable is new entry (entry is coded as 1 and 0
otherwise). For hypothesis 2a/b, the dependent variable is exit (exit is coded as 1 and 0
otherwise). For hypothesis 3a/b/c, the dependent variable is equity control and is
operationalized as the focal MNE’s ownership level in a subsidiary (Sartor & Beamish,
2014).
For hypothesis 4a/b/c, the dependent variable is a categorical variable of ownership
change in a subsidiary, which is defined as the focal Japanese parent’s ownership-level
change between 2007 and 2017.24 This variable has four categories: (1) increase; (2)

24 Those subsidiaries established in 2017 were excluded from our analysis because ownership-level change

could not be measured with the one-year data available.
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decrease; (3) unchanged; and (4) divestment. Divestment includes both the closure and
selling off of a subsidiary by the MNE (Chung et al., 2013).
Independent variables. For hypotheses 1 to 3, the crisis industry is operationalized as the
food industry. It is coded as 1 if a subsidiary is in the food industry and 0 otherwise. For
hypothesis 4, an MNE’s equity position in a subsidiary is measured by the focal Japanese
parent firm’s ownership level in the subsidiary and is converted into four categories: (1)
wholly owned subsidiary (ownership level = 100%); (2) majority-owned subsidiary (50%
< ownership level < 100%); (3) equity-owned subsidiary (ownership level = 50%); and
(4) minority-owned subsidiary (0% < ownership level < 50%).
Regarding the subsidiary’s industry segment, we used the original industry coding of the
TK dataset. There are three segments in an industry: (1) manufacturing; (2) wholesale;
and (3) retail. Service was operationalized by both wholesale and retail.
Treatment effect. To identify the treatment effect, we ran a document count from Factiva
with the keywords “food safety” and “China.” The result is shown in Figure 18. The
number of articles on Chinese food safety issues gradually increased after 2000 and there
was an obvious spike in 2008. We also performed a sensitivity analysis by dividing the
number of articles on “food safety in China” by the number of articles on “China” to
counter the argument that there have merely been more articles in Factiva over the years.
The result also shows that there was a spike in 2008. In the analysis, we use post-2008 as
the treatment period.
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Figure 18: Document Counts on Food Safety in China by Factiva (1983-2016)

Source: Factiva, accessed March 19th, 2017.

Controls. We also included controls in our analysis. Regarding hypotheses 1 to 3, we
included MNEs’ experience in China. This represents MNEs’ local embeddedness, which
may provide a valuable knowledge base (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Li & Meyer, 2007)
for an MNE to respond to an industry-wide crisis, especially in terms of entry and exit
decisions. Meanwhile, the literature on the effect of experience in a host country on the
ownership level is inconclusive (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Li & Meyer, 2009). On the
one hand, with more experience in the host country, MNEs gain capabilities to operate
there. As a result, there is less need to share ownership with local partners and MNEs
tend to increase their ownership level as they accumulate more experience (Delios &
Beamish, 1999). On the other hand, MNEs may develop the ability to select the right
partner over time, which reduces their uncertainty and ownership level (Li & Meyer,
2009). In our study, experience is measured as subsidiary-years by an MNE in China
(Delios & Beamish, 2001). Due to its skewness, we used the log transformation of
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subsidiary years in the analysis. Moreover, we controlled for the alternative explanation
that Chinese consumers turn to foreign-produced food products due to their rising
income. The rationale is that foreign food products are more affordable because the
Chinese have more disposable income. We included year-fixed effects in the analysis to
control for this effect. In addition, we utilized the panel structure of the dataset and
estimated all the models using clustered standard errors to account for within-firm
correlations.
Regarding hypothesis 4, we controlled for MNE-level and subsidiary-level effects. First,
we considered an MNE’s experience in China. Second, at the subsidiary level, we
controlled for subsidiary size, as it represents a parent firm’s resource commitment
(Delios & Beamish, 1999; Zhang & Beamish, 2017). It was measured by the log
transformation of the number of employees.25

4.4.3

Analytical Strategy

For the first three hypotheses, we have three dependent variables, i.e., entry (logistic
regression), exit (Cox proportional hazards model), and ownership level of the subsidiary
(OLS regression). The main econometrics method is difference in difference (DD)
(Angrist & Pischke, 2008), which can take care of both the time trend and the treatment
effect. The treatment group is the food industry and the treatment period is post-2008. We
also investigated the sub-group differences (i.e., food manufacturing, food wholesale, and
food retail) in the food industry.
The main model is specified as follows:
Yit=α+βFoodIndustryi+γPeriodt+δFoodIndustryi×Periodt+λXit+εit

(1)

where Yit is entry in FoodIndustry i during period t in hypothesis 1, and exit in
FoodIndustry i during period t in hypothesis 2. Yit is the percentage ownership of the

25 Due to missing information on the number of subsidiary employees, the final sample consists of 202

observations.
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Japanese MNE in FoodIndustry i during period t in hypothesis 3. FoodIndustry takes the
value of 1 if it is in the food industry and 0 otherwise. We have one treatment period in
our analysis, which takes the value of 1 if it is post-2008 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient
of interest is δ. Xit is a vector of control variables, including year-fixed effects and other
control variables.
For illustration purposes, we plotted the DD trend of ownership level for food versus
non-food industry (see Figure 19) before our statistical analysis. As shown in Figure 19,
the general trend before 2008 was almost parallel between the food industry and nonfood industry. We also plotted the trend for sub-groups, i.e., manufacturing segment
(Figure 20), wholesale segment (Figure 21), and retail segment (Figure 22).
For hypothesis 4, we used multinomial logistic regression to investigate the effect of an
MNE’s equity position and the subsidiary’s industry segment on the MNE’s ownershiplevel change in a subsidiary. The principal advantage of multinomial logistic regression is
that there is no inherent ranking order among the four types of ownership-level change.
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Figure 2: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Industry versus Non-Food Industry

Figure 20: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Manufacturing versus Non-Food
Manufacturing
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Figure 31: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Wholesale versus Non-Food
Wholesale

Figure 42: DD Trend for Ownership Level: Food Service versus Non-Food Retail
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4.5 Results
4.5.1

Entry

With regard to entry, we used logistic regression to test the odds of entry. The coefficient
for the interaction term is of interest. Results in Table 19 show that there is a higher
likelihood of entry for the food industry, as the coefficient for the interaction term is 0.21
and the standard error is 0.1, which is significant at a 0.05 level. Among subgroups, the
food wholesale sector also shows a higher likelihood of entry, as the coefficient for the
interaction term is 0.44 and the standard error is 0.26, which is significant at a 0.1 level.
There is no significant result for food manufacturing or food retail. Hypotheses 1a and 1b
are supported.
Table 19: Logistic Regression Result for Entry
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Whole sample

Manufacturing Sector

Wholesale Sector

Retail Sector

Independent variables

entry

entry

entry

entry

Food industry

-0.00

0.02

0.08

-0.46***

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.20)

(0.17)

-0.98***

-1.03***

-1.07***

-0.70***

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.05)

(0.15)

0.21**

-0.04

0.44*

0.38

(0.10)

(0.13)

(0.26)

(0.28)

-1.73***

-1.82***

-1.38***

-1.12***

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.10)

79,528

61,169

16,561

1,798

Treatment period
Food industry*
treatment period
Constant
Observations

Note: Control variables include MNE experience and year-fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
*p<0.1

4.5.2

Exit

We used the Cox proportional hazards model to test subsidiary exit. The result is shown
in Table 20. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant for both the
food industry (the coefficient is –0.61, the standard error is 0.09, and it is significant at a
0.01 level) and food manufacturing (the coefficient is –0.62, the standard error is 0.11,
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and it is significant at a 0.01 level), which means that the crisis triggered fewer exits in
the food industry, especially in food manufacturing. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported.
Table 20: Cox Model for Exit
Model 1

Independent variables
Food industry
Treatment period
Food industry*
treatment period
Observations

Model 3

Model 4

Whole sample

Model 2
Manufacturing
Sector

Wholesale Sector

Retail Sector

exit

exit

exit

exit

0.70***

0.62***

0.64**

0.26

(0.08)

(0.09)

(0.31)

(0.21)

0.52***

0.44***

0.48***

0.35*

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.08)

(0.18)

-0.61***

-0.62***

-0.17

-0.20

(0.09)

(0.11)

(0.33)

(0.27)

79,528

61,169

16,561

1,798

Note: Control variables include MNE experience and year-fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
*p<0.1

4.5.3

Results for Existing Operations

Table 21 presents the results of the DD analysis. Coefficient estimates and robust
standard errors are shown in the table. In hypothesis 3, we hypothesized that MNEs will
exercise less organizational control, i.e., less equity, in order to reduce their exposure to
risk. Model 1 shows that δ is –3.26, and the standard error is 1.92, which is significant at
a 0.05 level. This means that the crisis triggered Japanese MNEs to lower their ownership
by 3.26%.26 Thus, hypothesis 3a is supported.
Models 2, 3, and 4 show the result of sub-group analysis for MNEs in the manufacturing,
wholesale, and retail sectors. Consistent with the DD trend, δ is –3.84 for the
manufacturing sector, the standard error is 2.12, and it is significant at a 0.1 level. This
means that the crisis triggered MNEs in the food manufacturing sector to lower their
ownership level by 3.84%. As such, hypothesis 3b is supported. For the service sectors

26 In a separate analysis when WOSs are excluded from the analysis, the coefficient of the interaction term

is 0.02 and it is also significant at the 0.05 level.
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(wholesale and retail), neither δs is significant. This means that the crisis did not trigger
MNEs in the service sector to change their ownership level. Ergo, hypothesis 3c is not
supported.
Table 21: OLS Results for Ownership Level
Model 1
Independent variables

Whole sample

Model 2
Manufacturing
Sector

Model 3
Wholesale
Sector

Retail Sector

2.44

8.76**

-0.23

2.98

(-5.25)

(-3.84)

(-3.02)

(-2.82)

14.69***

16.64***

-5.38

19.40**

(-2.36)

(-2.57)

(-9.47)

(-8.88)

-3.26*

-3.84*

5.86

-1.12

(-1.92)

(-2.12)

(-6.95)

(-5.41)

51.71***

48.90***

70.61***

41.25***

(-1.57)

(-1.66)

(-7.9)

(-4.06)

79,522

61,163

16,561

1,798

Food industry
Treatment period
Food industry* treatment
period
Constant
Observations

Model 4

Note: Control variables include MNE experience and year-fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
*p<0.1

4.5.4
4.5.4.1

Equity Position and Ownership-Level Change
Results of Cross-Tabulation

Table 22 presents the cross-tabulation of MNEs’ ownership status and MNEs’
ownership-level change in subsidiaries. As explained in Section 4.4.1 (Sample and Data
Collection), we limited our analysis to Japanese investment in the Chinese food industry
between 2007 and 2017. We used a cross-sectional dataset with 263 observations.
Overall, 42% of MNEs maintained their original ownership level, while another 43%27 of
MNEs exited the Chinese market altogether. Only 7.6% increased their ownership level,
while another 7.6% decreased their ownership level. When an MNE’s ownership status
was considered, there were four preliminary results: (1) greater proportions of MNEs as
majority shareholders increased their ownership level; (2) greater proportions of MNEs

27 This exit rate of 43% is based upon the cross-sectional dataset, which is different from the annual exit

rate (5%) of the entire TK dataset.
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as minority shareholders decreased their ownership level; (3) greater proportions of
MNEs as WOS owners maintained their current ownership level; and (4) MNEs as WOS
owners were much less likely to exit compared with the other three categories.

Table 22: Distribution of MNE’s ownership level change, by MNE’s ownership
status
Type of ownership
status

Type of ownership level change
Increase

All

Decrease

Equity
Minority

4.5.4.2

Unchanged

Exit

20

20

111

112

263

7.60%

7.60%

42.21%

42.95%

100%

Not
applicable

7

74

42

123

5.69%

60.16%

34.15%

100%

11

3

11

30

55

20%

5.45%

20.00%

54.55%

100%

0

1

5

8

14

0%

7.14%

35.71%

57.14%

100%

9

9

21

32

71

12.68%

12.68%

29.58%

45.07%

100%

WOS
Majority

Total

Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression

In Tables 23 to 24, we report the relative risk ratios, which represent the exponential
values of the coefficients, and the standard errors. The reference group is no change, with
the relative risk ratio representing the relative risk of increase rather than no change, or
the relative risk of decrease rather than no change, or the relative risk of exit rather than
no change. MNEs’ ownership status, subsidiaries’ industry segment, MNEs’ experience,
and subsidiary size all lagged for one year.
Table 23 shows the results of the relative risk ratios when minority was used as the
reference group. First, majority shareholders were 3.8 times (the standard error is 2.9 and
it is significant at a 0.1 level) more likely to increase their ownership level than minority
shareholders, in line with hypothesis 4a. Second, IJVs with a foreign majority
shareholder were 3 times (the standard error is 1.8, and it is significant at a 0.1 level)
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more likely to exit than those with a minority foreign shareholder, as suggested in
hypothesis 4b.
Table 24 shows the result of the relative risk ratios when WOS was used as a reference
category. It shows that majority IJV owners were 5.5 times (the standard error is 2.7, and
it is significant at a 0.01 level) more likely to exit than investors operating a WOS. This is
in line with hypothesis 4c.
Table 23: Relative risk ratios from multinomial logistic regression of type of MNE’s
ownership level change (minority shareholder used as the reference category)
Characteristics

Increase vs. no change

Decrease vs. no
change

Exit vs. no
change

1

1

1

5.18E-08

0.407

0.544

(3.64E-05)

(0.304)

(0.254)

3.865*

1.82

2.999*

(2.968)

(1.677)

(1.809)

9.39E-08

0.692

0.992

(0.000234)

(0.891)

(0.75)

(0.219)

(0.175)

(0.123)

202

202

202

Ownership type
Minority (ref)
WOS
Majority
Equity

Observations

Note: Control variables include MNE experience, industry segments and subsidiary size, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 24: Relative risk ratios from multinomial logistic regression of type of MNE’s
ownership level change (WOS used as the reference category)
Characteristics

Decrease vs. no
change

Exit vs. no change

1

1

4.474*

5.510***

(3.719)

(2.756)

1.7

1.822

(2.154)

(1.277)

2.458

1.837

(1.839)

(0.857)

202

202

Ownership type
WOS (ref)
Majority
Equity
Minority
Observations

Note: Control variables include MNE experience, industry segments and subsidiary size, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.6 Discussion
The present research is motivated by the question of whether and how a consumer
confidence crisis creates opportunities for foreign investors. Our results show that the
crisis triggered more foreign entries in the crisis sector, especially in the service segment.
Meanwhile, the crisis also triggered fewer foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing
segment. With regard to existing operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce
their exposure to risk. Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS,
majority, and minority) were under varying levels of partner opportunism and
reputational risk. As a result, majority owners were more likely than minority owners to
increase their ownership level to ensure quality control. Majority owners were also more
likely to disassociate from reputational risk through divestment, compared with WOS and
minority owners.

4.6.1

Theoretical Contributions

This study makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to TCE
and extends the theoretical argument on external uncertainty, especially in regard to
demand uncertainty. Consistent with prior research on entry-mode choice (i.e., IJVs or
WOSs) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish, 2014) and post-entry mode
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conversion (i.e., conversion from IJVs to WOSs) (e.g., Puck et al., 2009), our study
suggests that MNEs lowered equity control, i.e., took a lower level of commitment, to
cope with environmental uncertainty. This finding goes beyond prior research by
extending the argument in a post-entry crisis empirical setting.
In addition to extending the argument on the relationship between environmental
uncertainty and organizational control, we also examined the relationship between
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism) and organizational control by
introducing the concept of reputational risk and an MNE’s equity position. Our results
show that compared with WOSs and minority owners, majority owners are at high levels
of both operational and reputational risk. As a result, majority owners will choose to
either a) increase their ownership level to exert more organizational control in order to
ensure product quality or b) disassociate themselves from the IJV altogether through
divestments in order to avoid reputational damage to their global brand and operation. To
our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the strategic options of MNEs of
different equity positions in coping with partner opportunism.
Second, our study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in entry and exit
decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are
more likely to enter and less likely to exit a sector experiencing a local crisis.
Third, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, &
Coombs, 2016) as applied in international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010;
Zhao et al., 2014). When facing political risk or an economic crisis, MNEs adopt a
“fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and FDI has focused on
the “flight” scenario and has investigated the determinants of survival (e.g., Chung &
Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish,
2017). There have only been a few examples of how MNEs “fight” or adjust their
operations to survive a crisis (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al., 2010; Naidoo,
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2010; Zhao et al., 2014). For example, Naidoo (2010) suggested that marketing
innovation helped manufacturing firms survive the global financial crisis after 2009. Our
research contributes to the second line of literature by demonstrating that MNEs have a
repertoire of strategies of entry, exit, lowering or increasing their ownership level, or
simply remaining unchanged, which depends on their equity position and industry
segment.

4.6.2

Managerial Implications

This study shows that the negative impact of a food crisis actually created opportunities
for MNEs due to the assumption that they abided by high health and safety standards. As
there are more opportunities in crisis sectors, MNEs can prepare and manage more
entries—especially in the service segment, due to its light-asset nature and flexibility.
Meanwhile, our study suggests that being a majority owner in a crisis sector is
troublesome. Decisions should be made about whether they should exercise more
organizational control or simply divest.
Beyond crisis management, this study also has business ethics implications for managers.
Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that legitimacy contributes to access to resources and
firm survival. It is still applicable for firms even today. The consumer confidence crisis
faced by all the industry players in the food sector (especially the baby milk sector)
reminds all managers to abide by rules and regulations in order to ensure quality control.

4.6.3

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

This study has a few limitations. First, the data is on MNE subsidiaries from a single
home country (Japan) in a single host country (China). This controls for country-specific
effects in the outcome variables. Future studies can further explore whether there are
more market opportunities for MNEs from other countries, including MNEs from
advanced economies and emerging economies. As Japanese MNEs had no major food
scandal in China, the results are generalizable to MNEs from those countries that had no
food scandals, e.g. the Netherlands. However, the results may be less applicable to MNEs
from countries that had food scandals in China, e.g. the USA.
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Second, due to the small sample size in testing hypothesis 4, we only included a limited
set of control variables. Future research should include additional relevant MNE and
subsidiary-level control variables to check the robustness of our results, such as
expatriate control and the revenue of the subsidiary.
Third, equity control is just one type of organizational control. Future research could be
useful based on more in-depth qualitative studies to investigate how MNEs manage their
daily operations to ensure quality standards and the likelihood of vertical integration. In
addition, other strategies and tactics used by MNEs to disassociate themselves from a
consumer confidence crisis should be further explored.
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusions

This dissertation focused on non-traditional investment motives within foreign direct
investment (FDI). The first objective was to reemphasize the “centrality” of investment
motives to firm internationalization research. Given the particular interest in nontraditional FDI, it examined the characteristics and performance of non-traditional
investment motives, the relationship between small-employment subsidiaries and
survival, and MNEs’ responses to an industry-wide consumer confidence crisis.
Most previous studies on investment motives have covered the four major motives, i.e.,
market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking
(Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, there are other investment
motives in Dunning’s (1993) original typology, such as in the case of escape, passive,
and support investments, including management-supportive, trade-supportive, and
finance-supportive investments. Although they are important both in a strategic sense and
in terms of investment dollars, these non-traditional investment motives have been
regarded as secondary and have received much less attention from scholars in subsequent
studies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015).
Many existing studies on investment motives have used aggregate-level data as a proxy
for non-traditional investment motives. In addition, small-employment subsidiaries have
sometimes been excluded from data analysis. This dissertation attempts to address this
research gap by comparing the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries that have
non-traditional investment motives with standard subsidiaries. It also investigates the
relationship between subsidiary size and survival, with a focus on small-employment
subsidiaries.
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) emphasizes the centrality of investment motives in international
business (IB) studies by proposing a theoretical framework for the antecedents and
consequences of investment motives (see Figure 1). It integrates a) the theoretical
argument that an MNE’s ownership advantages (O-advantages) interact with the location
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advantages (L-advantages) of host and home countries to jointly determine the type of
investment motive(s) of an affiliate (Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015; Narula, 2012;
Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011) and b) a theoretical framework of the effects of
investment motives on subsidiary-level characteristics and performance (Benito, 2015).
To achieve that goal, four hypotheses were developed.
The data analysis looks at the characteristics and performance of subsidiaries according
to different investment purposes (Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017;
Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 2004), with a special emphasis on non-traditional investment
motives. Although there exist different classification typologies of investment purposes
(e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, & Un, 2015; Behrman, 1972; Hollander, 1970; Hymer,
1976; Kacker, 1985; Porter, 1986; Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), as a
baseline, we adopt the typology proposed by Dunning (1993). In addition to the four
main investment motives (Dunning, 1993; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), this essay pays
special attention to two other categories of investment purposes: support investments and
passive investments. Essay 1 attempts to answer two research questions: (1) What are the
determinants of investment motives? (2) How do subsidiaries with different investment
purposes differ in their characteristics and performance?
The key characteristics examined in Essay 1 include subsidiary-level characteristics such
as the size of the affiliate (measured by the number of local employees), the ownership
mode (wholly owned subsidiary, majority-owned subsidiary, equally owned subsidiary,
and minority-owned subsidiary), expatriate control (expatriate number, expatriate
percentage), and performance (measured by both revenue and subjective evaluation).
Essay 1 provides a nuanced picture of FDI in functions such as “financing and hedging,”
“information gathering and royalty revenue,” and “building new business,” which have
been neglected in most empirical analyses of investment motives (Cuervo-Cazurra &
Narula, 2015). These investment motives are not only important in a strategic sense, but
also in investment dollars. FDI with these motives is substantially different from other
types of FDI and collectively exemplifies the central theme of this dissertation—that
there is huge heterogeneity (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2008) among subsidiaries. Hence, there
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is a need to disaggregate data and treat investments with different investment motives
separately. We also argue that where data is available, investment motives should be
routinely included in an IB analysis looking at foreign investment. Moreover, our results
show that there is a huge difference among subcategories of major investment motives.
For example, under the big umbrella of “market-seeking” FDI, there are four
subcategories: “local market access,” “tax breaks for investment,” “alliances with
customers in Japan,” and “building new business.” The latter three subcategories are
substantially different from the first subcategory in all four of the characteristics and
performance measures tested in the present research. This suggests that future IB studies
should consider investment motives at the subcategory level.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between subsidiary size and survival. It
addresses the following two research questions: (1) What is the main relationship
between subsidiary size and survival? (2) How is the main effect moderated by the
special roles of small-employment subsidiaries? Examples of such roles include those
serving as centers of importance and vertical investment.
The main theoretical/conceptual lenses were the liability of smallness (Aldrich & Auster,
1986) and orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). Using a sample of Japanese
overseas FDI, we found that smaller subsidiaries have a higher exit rate than larger ones.
Furthermore, we found that the liability of smallness is conditional upon four factors: (1)
serving as a center of importance; (2) vertical investment; (3) being in a human-capitalintensive industry; and (4) being located in a developed country.
Following the theme of non-traditional FDI, Essay 3 (Chapter 4) was empirically
motivated by a natural experimental setting where there was an industry-wide consumer
confidence crisis in the Chinese food industry after the melamine-contaminated baby
milk scandal in 2008. It also fills a theoretical gap in crisis management in the IB
literature by going beyond the determinants of survival (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2005;
Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013, 2017) and examining the repertoire of strategies that MNEs
can deploy in a crisis.
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It addresses four research questions: (1) Does a crisis trigger more foreign entries in the
crisis sector? (2) Does a crisis trigger fewer foreign exits in the crisis sector? (3) What is
the impact of demand uncertainty on MNEs’ subsidiary control in the crisis sector? (4)
What is the effect of MNEs’ equity position (i.e., WOS, majority equity, minority equity)
on subsidiary control in the crisis sector?
The main theoretical lens was transaction cost economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982) and institutional theory (i.e., legitimacy and
reputation) (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Rao, 1994). A large sample of Japanese MNEs in
China with 79,528 subsidiary-year observations was used.
Our results show that reduced confidence in local products triggered more foreign entries
in the crisis sector, especially in the service segment. Meanwhile, the crisis also triggered
fewer foreign exits, especially in the manufacturing segment. With regard to existing
operations, MNEs lowered their equity control to reduce their exposure to risk.
Moreover, MNEs of different equity positions (i.e., WOS, majority, and minority) were
under varying levels of partner opportunism and reputational risk. As a result, majority
owners were more likely to increase their ownership level to ensure quality control than
minority owners. Majority owners were also more likely to disassociate from reputational
risk through divestment, compared with WOS and minority owners.

5.1 Contributions
This dissertation makes multiple contributions to the literature, which, taken together,
collectively challenge existing views of a “typical” subsidiary in a “typical” investment
setting.
First, it contributes to Dunning’s (1993) typology on investment motives by establishing
a research baseline on the effect of investment motives on the characteristics and
performance of subsidiaries, with special attention given to subsidiaries with nontraditional investment motives.
Second, it shows that subsidiaries with non-traditional investment motives are indeed
quantitatively different from typical manufacturing facilities (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998).
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They represent extreme outliers in our data analysis. As a result, this dissertation urges
scholars to disaggregate data and treat investments with different investment motives
separately.
Third, this dissertation extends the literature on the liability of smallness (Aldrich &
Auster, 1986) and orchestration theory (Pitelis & Teece, 2018). Our results show that
small subsidiaries playing the role of center of importance command a higher status in the
MNE network, hence their greater resource endowment. As a result, they have a higher
survival likelihood compared with their counterparts without such a role. Meanwhile,
small subsidiaries with the function of vertical investment are more tightly integrated
within the MNE network and less likely to be divested. In addition, being in a humancapital-intensive industry and being located in a developed country also enhance the
survival of small-employment subsidiaries.
Fourth, the dissertation contributes to TCE and extends the theoretical argument on
external uncertainty, especially demand uncertainty. Consistent with prior research on
entry-mode choice (i.e., IJVs or WOSs) (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sartor & Beamish,
2014) and post-entry mode conversion (i.e., conversion from IJVs to WOSs) (e.g. Puck et
al., 2009), our study suggests that MNEs lowered equity control, i.e., took a lower level
of commitment, to cope with environmental uncertainty. It goes beyond prior research by
extending the argument in a post-entry crisis empirical setting.
In addition to extending the argument on the relationship between environmental
uncertainty and organizational control, we also examined the relationship between
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., partner opportunism) and organizational control by
introducing the concepts of reputational risk and an MNE’s equity position. Our results
show that compared with WOSs and minority owners, majority owners are at high levels
of both operational and reputational risk. As a consequence, majority owners will choose
to either a) increase their ownership level to exert more organizational control in order to
ensure product quality or b) disassociate themselves from the IJV through divestment in
order to avoid reputational damage to their global brand and operations. To our
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knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the strategic options of MNEs of
different equity positions in coping with partner opportunism.
Fifth, this study extends Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) argument that the illegitimacy of
local firms provides non-local firms with an initial level of legitimacy in entry and exit
decisions. Integrating the country-of-origin literature, which highlights the trade-offs
between symbolic value (Zhou & Hui, 2003) and perceived quality (Knight, Holdsworth,
& Mather, 2007) in consumer decisions, we argue and show empirically that MNEs are
more likely to enter and less likely to exit a crisis sector.
Sixth, we contribute to the crisis management literature (Bondy, Pfarrer, Short, &
Coombs, 2016) as it relates to international management (Hasse, 2016; Naidoo, 2010;
Zhao et al., 2014). When facing political risk or an economic crisis, many MNEs assume
a “fight” or “flight” attitude. Most literature on crisis management and foreign direct
investment has focused on the “flight” scenario and investigated the determinants of
survival (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2005; Chung et al., 2013; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013;
Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2017). There have been few examples of how MNEs “fight” or
tweak their operations to survive a crisis (e.g., Chung & Beamish, 2008; Chung et al.,
2010; Naidoo, 2010; Zhao et al., 2014). For example, Naidoo (2010) suggested that
marketing innovation helped manufacturing firms survive the global financial crisis after
2009. Our research contributes to the second line of literature by showing that MNEs
have a repertoire of strategies of entry, exit, lowering or increasing their ownership level,
or simply remaining unchanged, which depends on their equity positions and industry
segments.

5.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This dissertation is not without limitations. First, the empirical analysis is based on FDI
from a single home country, which may limit the generalizability of the findings. Future
work may examine whether the results are generalizable from other host countries,
including those from advanced economies and those from emerging economies.
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Second, this dissertation proceeds based on the assumption that once an MNE decides to
establish a subsidiary based on one single investment motive, other attributes of the
investment (such as affiliate size, mode choice, expatriate control) will follow naturally.
Yet an MNE may have multiple investment motives in mind for a subsidiary. Also, even
if a subsidiary is established with a single motivation, it may develop or be tasked with
meeting other purposes later. Thus, future studies can further analyze the evolution of
investment purposes.
Third, although this dissertation proposed a theoretical framework with the inclusion of
both home- and host-country advantages and how they interact and contribute to firmspecific advantages (FSAs), due to the limitations of a single home country in the
database, these hypotheses are not empirically tested. Future research may further explore
the abovementioned relationship by using data from multiple home countries.
Fourth, this dissertation shows the vast heterogeneity among subsidiaries by examining
subsidiaries with a small size, i.e., fewer than 20 employees. Future studies can further
explore the theme of heterogeneity by examining subsidiaries at both ends of the size
distribution, i.e., those with zero employees and those with thousands of employees.
Fifth, the three integrated essays are based upon quantitative data analysis using a wellestablished database. Future research can develop further survey questionnaires to collect
more information based on the same population. Meanwhile, qualitative research using
field work and interviews can help researchers better understand the mechanisms
involved in a practical setting and generate new theoretical insights to guide future
research.
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